The Catholic University of America

THE IMPACT OF BISHOP CHARLES HENRY BRENT UPON AMERICAN COLONIAL AND FOREIGN POLICY 1901-1917

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of the Catholic University of America in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement fot the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

By

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Washington, D.C.

1968

This dissertation was approved by Dr. John T. Farrell as Director and by Dr. Harold D. Langley and Dr. Thomas R. West as readers.

This dissertation is affectionately dedicated to my parents and to the memory of Remsen Ogilby whose preservation of source material made subsequent research possible.

PREFACE

The year 1898 ushered in a new era in American history. With the acquisition of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and especially the Philippine Islands, the United States became a colonial power. American control of the Philippines led to the formulation of a colonial policy, a new departure in American government. Control of the islands also led to far-reaching consequences in the field of American foreign policy. The Americans who were sent out to the Philippines during the early days of the occupation were a new type of pioneer. The military, the civil service, and the churches each played a part in America's most important colonial venture. The purpose of this dissertation is to discover the part played by Charles Henry Brent, the American Episcopalian Bishop of Manila.

Brent served as Bishop of Manila from 1901 to 1917, the first member of his church to occupy that position. Throughout the course of his episcopate, he was greatly concerned with the problems posed by the American occupation

of the islands, as well as the larger problem of the relationship between the United States and the Oriental world as a whole. Throughohis writings, letters, and conversation he attempted to influence the course of American policy in the Far East and particularly in the Philippines.

Grateful acknowledgement is given to the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress for aid in research. In particular, the research staff engaged in cataloguing the William Howard Taft Papers was of incalculable assistance. Grateful appreciation for assistance in research is also due the historical research staff of the National Archives. The writer is particularly indebted to John T. Farrell, Ph.D., Professor of History at Catholic University, for his many helpful suggestions, as well as for his aid and encouragement throughout the period of research and preparation of this dissertation. To Harold Langley, Ph.D., and Thomas R. West, Ph.D., who have labored on the manuscript as readers, the writer is also grateful.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CHARLES HENRY BRENT

In the years immediately preceeding the Spanish-American war, Americans once again began to take an interest in foreign lands. A new wave of expansionism and imperialism swept the country. In the wake of the passing of the frontier and the bitter class protest embodied in the Populist and free-silver crusades, Americans looked to overseas expansion as a relief from domestic troubles. Europe had set the example; most of Africa had been partitioned, and the European powers were busily claiming "spheres of influence" throughout the Chinese empire. Once again, imperialism was in the air, and the powers looked to the East for new lands to absorb.

The philosophic basis for imperialism in the United States was laid by missionaries, historians, teachers, and philosophers of the era. Missioners of many Christian Denominations had been active in the Pacific and the Far East since the early decades of the nineteenth century. Their proselytizing efforts among the peoples of far-off lands were widely known in America, and many Americans took great interest in their activities. To these examples of

imperialism in practice were added the theories of Charles Darwin, who contended that the struggle for existence applied to nations as well as to biological forms. Thus the strongest nations and the ablest races were the ones destined to survive. If the strong suppressed or subordinated weaker competitors, they were only executing the law of nature and progress. Social Darwinism as applied to the international scene usually resulted in an affirmation of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon or Teutonic race, and its right to exercise imperial over "inferior" peoples.

The various Protestant churches in the United States were quick to catch the expansionist fervor. In America, protestant religious zeal has often marched hand in hand with territorial expansion--from the great Puritan migration to New England in the seventeenth century down to the American Missionaries in the Pacific and Caribbean in the 1840's. In the 1890's a new wave of missionary zeal swept the churches as they once more turned their attention to the conversion of the heathen to Christ.

Many protestants managed a reconciliation between religion and the new scientific teachings which formed the philosophic basis for territorial expansion. One of the most ardent supporters of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority was Josian Strong, a Congregational clergyman and champion

of overseas missionary work. In a book entitled Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis, Strong declared that the Anglo-Saxon race, and especially its American branch, represented the great ideas of civil liberty and pure Christianity and was divinely commissioned to spread its institutions over the earth. Many of the great preachers of the day emphasized this idea of mission; once again religion and imperialism joined forces.

Although the more evangelical sects were the most outspoken in favor of expansionism, the conservative churches too were quick to catch the expansionist fervor. It was a time of new missionary ventures for all the churches. When in 1899 the United States acquired possession of the Philippine Islands, the churches were ready and missionaries of many denominations poured into the islands. The Episcopal Church continuing a long tradition of missionary activity, sent its missionaries to the Philippines also, and in 1901 the General Convention of the Episcopal Church constituted the islands a missionary diocese. In that same year the first missionary bishop of the Philippine Islands was elected, and the man chosen for this pioneer position was Charles Henry Brent.

The future Bishop of the Philippines was born on April 9, 1862, at Newcastle, Ontario. The son of an Anglican clergyman, young Charles from an early age prepared himself to follow in

his father's footsteps. He studied at the Newcastle public school and high school, then attended Trinity College School at Port Hope, Ontario in 1880. After two years of study, he entered Trinity College in the University of Toronto where he received his Bachelor of Arts degree in 1884.

Between 1884 and 1886 Brent taught at the Port Hope School and prepared himself for Holy Orders by supplementary reading. His program was successful, for in 1886 he passed the examinations for Holy Orders set by the diocesan authorities. In that year he was ordained to the diaconate. The following year he was ordained a priest in Toronto.

Father Brent discovered that there was no place for him in southern Canada, which at that time had a sufficient number of priests to carry on the work of the church. However, in nearby New York there was a need for more priests. And so, in a decision which would have far-reaching consequences, Brent took up work at St. Andrew's Mission in Buffalo, New York. From that time on, until he was called to be Bishop of the Philippines in 1901, Brent labored for the Church in the United States rather than in the land of his birth.

After two years at St. Andrew's, Father Brent spent the years 1889 to 1891 with the Cowley Fathers in Boston. The Cowley Fathers were a monastic order within the Episcopal Church; they devoted themselves to prayer and contemplation.

Brent seriously considered joining the order; he had gone as far as entering the novitiate when he decided that he had no vocation to the contemplative life and left the Cowley Fathers to take up a more active ministry. However he always looked back on this period as one of the happiest of his life, and the Cowley Fathers left their mark on the young priest. His personal spiritual life was deepened and enriched by his contacts with the men of the order, and his innate leaning towards High Church ritualism was strengthened. This tendency toward ritualism was the immediate occasion for his leaving the order, as a dispute arose between Brent and another priest over the matter of candles on the altar. While the dispute was trivial, it generated bad feeling and threatened to wreck the harmony of the order. It was at this time that Brent realized he had no monastic vocation. But he profited greatly from his years with the Cowley Fathers. It was the start of a lifelong friendship between the young priest and Father Arthur Hall, later Bishop of Vermont. Hall became a trusted confidant and a faithful correspondent of Bishop Brent.

Upon leaving the Cowley Fathers, Brent took up work at St. Stephen's Church in Boston. Here he was destined to remain for ten years, until called to the Philippines. St. Stephen's was an urban mission which ministered to the poor

people of Boston. Many of these were Irish Catholics; as a result Brent found himself in a hostile religious atmosphere from the start. This experience however proved most helpful in later years when the bishop found himself in similar circumstances among the Catholic Filipinos. But not all of Boston showed itself hostile to Father Brent. During these years at St. Stephen's, he made friends with some of the more affluent citizens of the city who supported his work. They became the core of the group which in later years contributed so generously to Bishop Brent's Philippine ventures.

While serving at St. Stephen's, Brent took another long step forward on the road which would lead him to the Philippines and to a place of international prominence. On October 23, 1893, he became a United States citizen. We may surmise that this was in part a question of expediency, since Brent at the time was living and working in America. But it was much more than that; Brent always attached great meaning and significance to his American citizenship.

With the enthusiasm of the era, Brent accepted the outlook and ideals of the United States. His acquired citizenship was at least as important to him as his Canadian birthright. While sacrificing none of the affection for his Canadian homeland, he gave America the full measure of his

loyalty, and during World War I he wore the American rather than the Canadian uniform. However he thought of himself as an interpreter, a servant of both nations. He hoped to be an intermediary between the two countries. Doing his part to promote Canadian-American friendship.

Brent saw no contradiction, no sense of conflicting loyalties in his dual citizenship.

> It is not hard for an Englishman or at any rate a colonial to become in the profoundest sense an American. American principle is in embryo in the British constitution. Americans are not revolutionists. They have progressed alone the lines of British development with the modifications demanded by their surroundings.[1]

Brent was loyal both to the country of his birth and the country of his adoption; in his mind they occupied positions of equal importance. However it would seem that the United States grew to hold the first place in his affections. In reading his letters and articles it is easy to forget that he was by birth a Canadian, and to think of him as a lifelong American.

It is perhaps surprising in view of the American tradition of separation of Church and State to see a priest

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[1]Brent Diary; July 4, 1903. The Brent Diaries are located in the Library of Congress, (hereafter referred to as LC) Charles H. Brent Papers, Boxes 1-3. The influence of Darwinian theory can be seen in this statement of Brent. He espoused the evolutionary rather than the revolutionary view of history, at least of American history.

attaching so much importance to the matter of citizenship. Brent, while believing in the principle of separation of Church and State, looked always towards the higher unity which lay beyond the apparent diversity. As he was a citizen of two nations, so he believed that every man is a citizen of two realms--the Kingdom of God and the temporal world. It was his duty as a priest to set an example to those under his guidance by taking an interest in the affairs of the state as well as those of the church. In 1904 he wrote: "The effective priest cannot afford to forget that he is a citizen, and that as such he must plunge into present-day questions. . . ."[2]

For the rest of his life, Brent was an intensely patriotic American. It was in this spirit that he accepted the call to the Philippines and worked in the islands for the glory of the United States as well as the glory of God. Frederick Ward Kates refers to him in these years as "A staunch and almost militantly patriotic American, in a tempered though robust Theodore Rooseveltian manner. . ."[3] Indeed many similarities can be seen between Brent and Theodore Roosevelt. It was an age of emotionalism, of

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[2]Brent, Adventure for God (New York: 1905), p. 128.

[3]Frederick W. Kates, Charles Henry Brent (London: 1948), p. 13.

outspoken and even violent patriotism which has been called the adolescent period of the United States. To many, the blustering, swaggering President, the "cowboy" Teddy Roosevelt, typified the age. And Bishop Brent in a more quiet way displayed many of the Rooseveltian characteristics.

As we have seen, Brent's patriotism was similar to Roosevelt's--outspoken, impatient, demanding. Both men gloried in exercise and physical wellbeing; Brent took great pleasure in a hard day's ride on horseback and thoroughly enjoyed his trips through the wilder portions of the islands. The bishop also stressed organized sports, and instituted regular athletic programs in the schools which he founded. Brent apparently believed in rugged sports as an antidote to the enervating influence and sexual license inherent in life in the tropics.

The President of the United States and the Bishop of the Philippine Islands were alike in their thought processes and in their reaction to events. Both were loyal, patriotic, impulsive, and impatient. These characteristics were both their strength and their weakness. Brent, for instance, was a poor administrator; he hated administrative detail and was more apt to attempt a job himself than to delegate it to someone perhaps better equipped for the task than himself. Perhaps both Brent and Roosevelt, and the age in which

they lived, can best be characterized by the adjective "robust."

Despite his poor record as an administrator, Bishop Brent's achievements in the Philippines were monumental. The bishop was an excellent missionary leader; he caught the imagination and stirred the conscience of vast audiences. He helped bring about an understanding of the necessity of closer collaboration between missionary boards and workers in the field. In the Episcopal Church, he was the leader in achieving a more satisfactory relationship between the missioners and church authorities in the United States. He also secured more freedom of action for missionary bishops.[4] Kates believes that the strength of the Episcopal Church in the twentieth century in the Philippines is a testimony to Brent's inspired leadership and energetic labors.[5]

But the significance of Brent's years in the islands lies not merely in his ecclesiastical accomplishments. For he was a missionary of the State as well as of the Church. In the Philippines he lived always against a background of world politics. "The problems of the Orient were always

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[4]For a discussion of the effects of Brent's episcopate on other missionary endeavor, see Alexander Zabriskie, Bishop Brent, Crusader for Christian Unity (Philadelphia: 1948), pp. 90-92.

[5]Kates, op. cit., p. 7.

with him, and he shared in the forming of public opinion concerning them both at home and abroad."[6] As a government representative, as a churchman, and as a private citizen Bishop Brent was called to help in the shaping of policies. During these years in the Philippines Brent rose to national and international prominence; he became a diplomat and a statesman as well as a churchman. And this further development grew directly from his missionary work in the islands. "It was his experience and career as a missionary in a foreign land among primitive peoples that equipped him for and led him inescapably into an ever-widening involvement in international affairs."[7] In particular the crusades for Christian unity and against the opium vice, to which Brent would devote most of his life, grew directly from his missionary work in the Philippines. Throughout his years in the islands, he related his missionary activities to social and political problems.

The years from 1901 to 1917 represented a broadening of horizons and a widening of viewpoints for the bishop. By the outbreak of the first world war, Brent was truly a

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[6]Eleanor Slater, Charles Henry Brent (Milwaukee: 1932), p. 29.

[7]Kates, "Bishop Brent--Adventurer on Uncharted Seas", The Chaplain XXI (June, 1964), p. 23.

citizen of the world, with a world-wide point of view. The war brought profound changes for the bishop. He was stunned and horrified by the European holocaust, but soon decided that neutrality was impossible and that America should join the Allies. It was at this time (1917) that he left the Philippines and accepted the post of senior chaplain with the American Expeditionary Force.

Brent felt more deeply than most the horrors of the war, yet he served bravely, winning among other honors the Army's Distinguished Service medal. He was also decorated by the French and British governments. But he was glad to be finished with the war and all its brutality, to return in 1919 to the episcopal see of Western New York which he had accepted in 1917.

Brent returned to the United States as he hoped, to live quietly in Buffalo, attending to his episcopal duties. But it was not to be. For the last ten years of his life Bishop Brent was absent from his diocese more often than he was present. Some of these absences were caused by his further work in the anti-opium crusade. The crusade had been taken over by the newly-formed League of Nations and Brent worked in conjunction with League committees. In 1924 he attended a series of anti-opium conferences sponsored by the League at Geneva, Switzerland.

But the great passion of Brent's later life, and indeed of his entire life, was the cause of Christian unity. His whole life had been a preparation for his crusade for unity; he had always been an ecumenist. From his earliest days he had shown a tolerance for other religions, other philosophies, other beliefs than his own. Even before leaving for the Philippines in 1902 he had announced that he would refrain from proselytizing among Roman Catholics. Such a statement, coming as it did from a Protestant missionary, was considered radical in the extreme. Most of Brent's contemporaries, Protestant and Catholic, never understood his position. His motivation apparently sprang solely from his deep Christian charity, from his abiding belief in the brotherhood of all men.

Brent's crusade for Christian unity took shape in the summer of 1910, when he attended the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh. That conference saw the birth of the "Faith and Order" movement with which the bishop would be associated for the rest of his life. Brent had viewed with satisfaction his work in the Philippines as an apostle of unity. His services there had given him an equipment in understanding difficulties and an appreciation of the worth of divergences so that he naturally became the leader in the movement for Faith and Order. Later in 1910, Bishop

Brent received the conviction that a conference of all Christian churches should be held to discuss points of disagreement. He presented this conviction to the General Convention of the Episcopal Church and on October 19, 1910, a resolution was passed calling for a World Conference on Faith and Order.

For the next seventeen years Brent worked to achieve this goal. Even before the Edinburgh conference he had been in correspondence with Dr. Robert Gardiner who would spearhead the movement. The Anglican Church and particularly the Episcopal Church in the United States took the lead in the organization of the conference. But the work moved only slowly, and halted altogether with the outbreak of the war. It revived in the 1920's, with Brent and Gardiner still leading the crusade, and finally the World Conference on Faith and Order met at Lausanne in 1927.

When the conference met, the delegates elected Brent as their President. It was a great honor, the tribute of which he was most proud,[8] and it represented the high point of his life. He had taken up the fight against opium addiction and had seen the evil curbed and on the way to being eradicated--

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[8]Before his death in 1929, Brent left instructions that the words "President of the World Conference on Faith and Order" should be inscribed on his tomb.

in part as the result of his influence. He had taken up the cause of Christian unity and had lived to see the world conference which he had envisaged. The results were not as concrete as they had been in the case of the opium evil, in part because the problem was both complex and immaterial. But the spirit which prevailed at Lausanne was truly ecumenical. It foreshadowed all the conferences, councils, and dialogues of the mid twentieth century which Bishop Brent would surely have rejoiced to see.

But the bishop's vision of unity embraced more than unity of the churches although that phase of it was uppermost in his mind. In the years following World War I, his view of the world and of mankind became ever more synthetic. "A citizen of two countries, a resident of two hemispheres, he had come to realize that the ties that should unite men are stronger than the differences which have separated them."[9] As a citizen of the world, an internationalist in the truest sense of the word, Brent dreamed of a world united in friendship and trust. Perhaps the most beautiful expression of his dream is contained in a sermon he preached in November 1928, just four months before he died.

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[9]Remsen Ogilby, "Charles Henry Brent", Dictionary of American Biography XXI, p. 116.

> I glory in the fact that an incomparable vision holds me in its gracious thrall. It is not so much that I possess it as that it possesses me. My vision is of a world in the here and now at peace and unity with itself. There is no change in the diversity which now obtains. That abides; but a unifying and illuminating spirit pervades the whole. There is one Church, binding man to God and man to man in a common life and purpose--'The holy city of Jerusalem coming down out of heaven from God, having the glory of God.' 'There is no temple therein; for the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb are the temple thereof.' No more is the fact of the Incarnation with its attendant beneficient truths blasted and scorched by controversy. All human powers, set free from friction and doubt, which always dim and sometimes paralyze the soul, pour with full stream into the upward-and-onward-rushing flood of constructive thought and life. Nation interlocks with nation in a unity of mutual service, and each brings its glory into the common fund. No longer hampered by war or the fear of war, undreamed of human capacity and might are loosed and developed for the universal public good. If this vision seems so distant as to be impossible, yet it is a vision which inspires in a Kingdom composed of far vistas. He who now holds it, with the embrace of faith and hope, in his own soul, already possesses the reality, and hastens the coming of that happy day when the affairs of this world will no longer be conducted by the whim of man, but according to the eternal purpose of God as revealed in Jesus Christ our Lord. Whether in this life, or beyond, it is the only kind of world great enough for man made in the image of God.[10]

Statesman, Diplomat, churchman, man of vision--such a man was Charles Henry Brent who was elected Bishop of the Philippine Islands in 1901.

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[10]Brent, sermon delivered at Canterbury Cathedral November 25, 1928. In Brent Papers, Box 58.

CHAPTER II

EARLY YEARS 1901-1904

On October 11, 1901, Charles Henry Brent received word that he had been elected Bishop of the Philippine Islands. The news came as a shock; Brent had been aware of the possibility of his nomination but had discounted it. Once he recovered from his initial surprise, however, his reaction was one of exhilaration. "This is a recognition of the reality of my American citizenship. I rejoice in that. Our first colony and I am chosen by the Church to go as citizen and Bishop."[1]

This emphasis on citizenship was to be a continuing theme in Brent's thought during his years in the Philippines. He was always very conscious of his dual citizenship as a British subject by birth. Late in 1901 he wrote to his sister Edith: "To think that I a Canadian by birth should be asked to represent the country and the Church in our first colony!"[2] He was aware of a providential relationship

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[1]Brent Diary: October 11, 1901.

[2]Brent to his sister Edith: 1901 (undated). Brent Papers, Box 51.

between his spiritual status within the Kingdom of God and his temporal status as a citizen of the United States of America.

Following the news of his election, Brent was swamped with letters of advice from friends and acquaintances. Most urged him to accept the position; those few who did not based their arguments on either his health or his expected usefulness in America.[3] He himself was concerned about his health, but when his doctor reassured him and urged him to accept, Brent made up his mind to go to the Philippines.

Between October of 1901 and May of 1902, Brent's time was spent in preparing to assume his episcopal duties. On December 19, 1901 he was consecrated bishop at Emmanual Church in Boston. He then proceeded to travel cross-country in an attempt to secure personal and financial support for his new work. When the Board of Missions of the Episcopal Church could not supply him with the funds he considered necessary, he turned for help to influential churchmen. J.P. Morgan took charge of a fund to raise money for Brent's work. Other wealthy and prominent men made private contributions. Throughout his years in the Philippines, Brent had always a number of friends in the United States to whom he could appeal for financial aid.

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[3]See Brent Papers, Box 5.

In March and April of 1902, Brent visited Washington, D.C. This proved to be a landmark in his career, for during his stay in the capital he met Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, both of whom would become personal friends. Brent met Taft on March 3, at a dinner given by Bishop Henry Yates Satterlee, the Episcopal Bishop of Washington. Taft at the time was making his own preparations for a stay in the Philippines, having been appointed civil governor of the islands. Brent and Taft found one another extremely congenial, and Bishop Satterlee's dinner marked the start of a lifelong friendship.

Brent met Theodore Roosevelt, whom he resembled in so many ways, at the White House on March 5. The President was "very hearty", and Brent was very favorably impressed with Mrs. Roosevelt.[4] In addition to the President, the new bishop met many of Roosevelt's cabinet--among them John Hay and Elihu Root. Brent asked them to call on him if there were ever any service that he could perform for the government.[5]

By the time he left the United States in May 1902, Brent had formulated a definite opinion of Philippine-American relations. His opinion reflected the imperialism

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[4]Brent Diary: March 5, 1902. Brent to Henry Talbott: March 5, 1902. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[5]Brent Diary: April 7, 1902.

of the era, and his own pride in America. While he would alter his views on specific issues many times, his overall view of Philippine-American relations remained unchanged during his years in the islands. He believed, with William McKinley, that the acquisition of the Philippines was both honorable and necessary, and that the United States had a moral duty to educate the Filipinos in democracy.

> It is. . .a question. . .of national responsibility. Nor does the question of imperialism or anti-imperialism enter into it. We are confronted with the simple fact that the archipelago is under our care, and it is our moral duty to seize the opportunity afforded us.[6]

The Philippines, according to Brent, had become the possession of the United States "not by choice but by the tide of events."[7] History would view the acquisition of the islands more tolerantly than contemporary critics. The title which the United States held was as honorable and inalienable as that to Texas or California.[8]

Brent believed, however, that the situation of the

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[6]Brent, Address to the People of St. Stephen's, Boston. (undated clipping from unknown newspaper in Brent Papers, Box 42.)

[7]Brent, sermon delivered in the spring of 1902. Brent Papers, Box 25.

[8]Brent, sermon notes. Brent Papers, Box 25. Apparently Brent believed that the title of the United States to Texas and California was a completely honorable one. This is of course a moot point; one which Mexicans in particular would dispute.

United States in the Philippines was novel and had no exact counterpart in the past. The only force which was keeping America in the islands was "the compulsion of responsibility."[9] "The old colonial conception was to gain territory so as to exploit it for the benefit of the exploring nation. Our idea is to give rather than to gain. Acquisition was the watchword of the older civilizations, responsibility and trust is our watchword."[10] This emphasis upon America's responsibility was a continuing theme in the bishop's thought; he referred to it again and again during his years in the Philippines. Brent saw three courses which the United States could take--immediate abandonment, temporary occupation, or extended tutelage. "The first presupposes power of self government which is absurd; the second presupposes such conditions as to make self government soon possible; the third that if we are to do our best for the Filipinos we must be patient."[11] The new bishop obviously preferred the third alternative.

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[9]Brent, sermon delivered in the spring of 1902. Brent Papers, Box 25.

[10]Brent, Address to the Missionary Conference at St. Paul's Church. Undated newspaper clipping in Brent Papers, Box 42.)

[11]Brent, sermon delivered in the spring of 1902. Brent Papers, Box 25.

Brent saw the United States' involvement in the Philippines as a great problem, probably the greatest in the nation's history. "My church has bidden me, as a citizen and a Christian priest, to become a factor in the solution of the problem. I go as an American citizen to protect and stand by the purity and power of American civilization."[12] Brent thus visualized his position as Bishop of the Philippine Islands as more than a purely religious one. He would be serving the nation as well as the church, preaching the responsibilities of democracy as well as Christianity. In his episcopal office he would stand by the government "in all its efforts to establish a strong and equitable regime in our new possession."[13] Years later, as Brent was leaving the PHilippines, he stated that he had accepted the responsibility of the bishopric because of its national character.[14]

Bishop Brent left the United States for Manila on May 17, 1902. He sailed for the Philippines by way of Europe, accompanying Governor Taft who was on his way to Rome to open negotiations with the Vatican over the problem of Friar lands in the Philippines. As early as March of 1902 Brent, struck

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[12]Undated newspaper clipping in Brent Papers, Box 42.

[13]Brent to Mr. Clapp: November 19, 1901. Brent Papers, Box 48.

[14]Brent, "Annual Report of the Bishop of the Philippine Islands 1916-1917." Brent Papers, Box 34.

by Taft's initial friendliness, had considered the possibility of their traveling to Manila together. This plan proved feasible, and the trip with Taft typified and foreshadowed the many close contacts which the bishop would enjoy with many of the representatives of civil government during his years in the Philippines.

While in Rome Taft received word of the passage of the Cooper Act by the United States Congress on July 2. This act, the first Philippine Organic Act, legalized the functions of the earlier Taft Commission, thus confirming Taft's position as civil governor. The Philippine Islands were recognized as unincorporated territory and former Spanish subjects could become citizens of the Philippine Islands if they so desired. The government of the territory would be partially elective and partially appointive: a Philippine lower house was to be elected and the already existing Philippine Commission was to serve as the upper house and aid the governor. The commissioners and governor would be appointed by the President of the United States, subject to Senate approval. This bicameral legislative body would constitute the government of the islands. Civil government replaced military government throughout the islands on July 4, 1902.

Meanwhile Taft and Brent proceeded to Rome, where

Taft opened negotiations with the Vatican. Brent played no part in the subsequent diplomatic discussions; his position was that of an interested outsider. While he had no official role, his friendship with Taft gave him access to the diplomatic correspondence of the negotiations; in a private letter written at the end of his stay in Rome, he stated that "I have been through the entire correspondence."[15]

Taft and a group of American commissioners met with a committee of the College of Cardinals during June and July of 1902. The Vatican originally agreed to replace the Spanish friars with American priests and to allow the sale of the friar lands to the United States government if an agreement on price could be reached. Subsequently, however, the negotiations bogged down as the Vatican hedged on its proposal to recall the Spanish friars. As a result, no settlement was reached.

Brent recorded his reaction to the outcome of the negotiations in his diary on July 24:

> The Commission has not been wholly successful. The Vatican has lost its opportunity. It would seem as though while tacitly admitting the situation they are afraid to come into collision with the monastic orders. Propositions were

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[15]Brent to Mrs. Foster: August 5, 1902. Brent Papers, Box 48.

> made by both sides and rejected in each case. Everything depends on the appointment of the right man as apostolic delegate. If we can get an American who is unprejudiced and who will not allow himself to be won over to the friars all will be well.[16]

Brent was not impressed with the part played by the Vatican in the negotiations. He felt that the Holy See was too afraid of the monastic orders to come to an agreement with the American commissioners. In his eyes, the Vatican was characterized by "timidity, expediency at the expense of principle and a temporizing spirit that has always been a feature of Roman Catholicism."[17] Brent also believed that the Vatican would attempt to take advantage of the situation by giving it a diplomatic significance and by using it as an argument for arbitration in such countries as France and Spain when land questions arose.

While not impressed by Vatican Diplomacy, Brent reacted more favorably to his first sight of Pope Leo XIII. The bishop was present at a public audience in St. Peter's during his stay in Rome, and he was struck by the Pope's

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[16]Brent Diary: July 24, 1902. The man who was appointed apostolic delegate was Jean Baptiste Guidi, unfortunately not the type of man whom Brent had in mind as the ideal delegate. Taft eventually negotiated a settlement with the monastic orders whereby the United States government purchased most of the friar lands on December 23, 1903.

[17]Brent to Mrs. Foster: August 5, 1902.

intelligence, benignity and emotion.[18] Brent's favorable impression of Leo must have been reinforced by the report of Vatican gossip that Leo favored American rule in the Philippines as the best possible form of political control for the islands.[19]

Brent's reactions to ecclesiastical Rome as a whole, however, were highly unfavorable. He believed that the Papacy was corrupt and had lost all spiritual force; sunk in materialism, it was interested only in present power. "Intrigue, unscrupulousness, unreality, worldliness are characteristics of the Vatican which only the blind fail to see. Until the Pope gives up his claim to temporal power, Rome will not, cannot be a spiritual force."[20] In Brent's view, the Papacy had deliberately lied to the world by trying to cover up the misdeeds of the friars in the Philippines. The Holy See, Brent believed, was more concerned about its own reputation than it was about reaching an equitable settlement. Thus was born in the bishop's mind a dichotomy between the Catholic Church as revealed through its members and the Catholic Church as represented by the Vatican hierarchy.

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[18]Brent to Bishop Hall: June 7, 1902. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[19]Brent Diary: June 7, 1902.

[20]Brent to Mrs. Sprague: August 6, 1902. Brent Papers, Box 54.

Brent's correspondence indicates that the trip to Rome was for him something of a spiritual crisis. In a letter to his close friend and confidant Bishop Hall, Brent revealed that he had been afraid of Roman Catholicism. He apparently had feared the logic of the Catholic position, as well as the continuity of the Catholic Church. But the trip to Rome left him with no fear, only pity. The appeal which Catholicism had apparently made to Bishop Brent was dissipated in the revelation of the political aspects of the Catholic hierarchical structure. After seeing Rome, Brent was convinced of the righteousness of his position and willing to confront Catholicism in the Philippines.[21] While continuing to admire many points of Catholic dogma, the bishop condemned the corrupt organizational and hierarchical structure which he had observed in Rome. His final judgment of the Holy See was that "No organization in the world is so skilled in intrigue as the Vatican--or so unscrupulous. . . . Tammany and the Vatican have common features."[22]

Brent and Taft left Rome at the end of July and proceeded to Manila, arriving on August 24, 1902. It was an

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[21]Brent to Bishop Hall: July 23, 1902. Brent Papers, Box 56.

[22]Brent to Mrs. Foster: August 5, 1902. Theodore Roosevelt would echo Brent's comment in later years after some confusion over a private audience.

inauspicious beginning; Manila was in the grip of a cholera epidemic and Brent was delayed by extra quarantine precautions. But the new bishop plunged immediately into the organization of his diocese. This proved to be a difficult task, for Brent was not succeeding anyone in a well established position. As the first bishop of the newly-created Missionary District of the Philippine Islands, Brent had the job of inaugurating an ecclesiastical policy, rather than either following or diverging from an established policy.

As a missionary bishop, Brent found himself in an anomalous position ecclesiastically. Episcopalians holding diocesan sees in the United States were elected for life or until retirement. This was not true of bishops of missionary districts such as the Philippines. Missionary bishops were liable to translation; that is, they could be elected to diocesan sees in the United States. Thus there was an element of uncertainty in the tenure of the missionary bishops who were free to accept or reject a call to another see. Brent disliked this situation and worked unsuccessfully to eliminate the principle of translation for missionary bishops. He himself was on four occasions elected to other sees, and on each occasion was required to make the difficult decision between acceptance and rejection.

As early as December 1901, Bishop Brent formulated his

program for missionary work in the Philippine Islands, and he staunchly adhered to it throughout his episcopate. In a letter to the Episcopalian missionaries already at work in the islands, he enunciated three principles which he would follow in his episcopal work.

"1. The latest report gives the American civilian population of Manila as between eight and nine thousand. Our first effort, then, should be among these, our fellow citizens, who, at a distance from old associations, will be peculiarly responsive to spiritual help, as well as peculiarly in need of it.

"2. We must emphasize the national quality of our Church by standing upon the dignity of our American citizenship, a privilege and heritage only less divine than our citizenship in the Kingdom of God. Every unselfish effort of government should receive our intelligent and hearty support. The work of the Civil Service and all educational effort should command our constant attention and co-operation. The Church is the soul of the State and alone can temper and beautify the operations of the civil power.

"3. We must avoid conflict as far as in us lies with the Roman Catholic Church. We are in a special sense the Church of the Reconciliation, and peace must be written on our hearts. No doubt we shall meet with persecution of a

subtle kind. But in quiet and confidence is our strength. We must prove our catholicity, not by the might of controversial weapons but by the forces of stability and righteousness. Proselyting I abhor. It is a negative and dangerous method of Christian work. But there are hundreds of Filipinos who are hopelessly estranged from the Roman obedience."[23]

In accordance with his first principle, Bishop Brent always regarded the Americans living in the Philippines as his primary responsibility. In his letter he had referred to them as "our fellow citizens"--another illustration of the importance of the concept of citizenship, and especially American citizenship, in Brent's thought. When the bishop arrived in Manila, there were more than 9,000 Episcopalians in the islands. Most of these were Americans, although a few were British. To these--army and navy officers, civil servants, businessmen--Brent directed the greater part of his efforts and attention. His co-worker and biographer Remsen Ogilby noted that "he was accepted as a spiritual leader by all Americans in the Philippines, and their welfare ever had the major claim upon his time."[24]

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[23]Brent to his co-workers: December, 1901. Brent Papers, Box 48.

[24]Remsen Ogilby, The Impatient Crusader (Manuscript draft of unpublished biography), chapter Vii, p. 21D. In Brent Papers, Box 53. Hereafter referred to as Ogilby Manuscript.

Brent immediately began his work among the American and British residents of the islands. Before leaving for the Philippines, he had received a donation of $100,000 for a cathedral in Manila. During his first year in the islands, he was able to secure property on which to build. Meanwhile, services were conducted at St. Stephen's, a temporary church in Manila. Brent also opened a settlement house, a kindergarten, and a dispensary in the city. The dispensary later grew into St. Luke's Hospital, one of the finest medical institutions in the Philippines.

In addition to the cathedral which he proposed to build, Brent also visualized a bishop's house and a club on the cathedral grounds. Both these plans were later realized. The club was eventually organized as the Columbia Club for American residents, and proved to be both popular and influential.

The focal point of Brent's episcopal work was the city of Manila, but he desired to extend his operations into other areas of the island of Luzon. The first step was the organization of two mission stations for United States soldiers and civilians at Cavite and Caloocan, army posts near Manila. (See map, p. 32) On a trip through northern Luzon in 1903, Brent discovered the town of Baguio. Because of its cooler climate, it was soon to become the vacation resort for

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foreigners in Manila, who were unused to the heat of the tropics. In 1903 Brent was able to secure property there for a church. Six years later, he would open a boys' school in Baguio for the sons of American residents in the islands.

Despite the tremendous amount of purely ecclesiastical work, Brent in accordance with his second principle of episcopal work in the Philippines took a great interest in the affairs of government, both in the islands and in the United States. Here we can see evidence of two important themes in Brent's thought. The concern with government reveals his belief in the ultimate unity and close interconnection of the spiritual and temporal worlds. It also illustrates his conviction of America's responsibility towards the peoples of the islands, a conviction shared by the leading imperialists of the day. Most of the bishop's parishoners were men connected in some way with the government of the Philippines, and Brent counted on their support, both personal and financial. In return, he tried to use Christian insights into their governmental problems.

During these early years Brent had many dealings with Governor Taft and the members of the Philippine Commission. The Commission, he reported, aided American missionaries in every way possible consistent with the principle of separation of Church and State. It was completely impartial, not biased

in favor of Catholicism as some press accounts stated.[25] Governor Taft continued to be a warm friend. When Brent had trouble acquiring the title to his Baguio property, and the local press exaggerated the situation into a conflict between Church and State, the bishop took the matter up with Taft and it was quickly settled. Brent commented: "This is one of several instances where the wisdom and considerateness of the Philippine Commission have enabled good work to go on without molestation."[26]

Brent's trip through the hill country also served to reinforce his conviction that American government was necessary to keep order in the islands. Given the heterogeneous composition of the Philippine population, Brent believed that withdrawal by the United States would result in many wars throughout the islands. But he was convinced that far more was at stake in the American occupation of the Philippines than merely the keeping of the peace.

According to Brent, American had an act of reparation to make to primitive peoples. The history of America's dealings with Indians and with Negroes was far from commendatory. In the Philippines, she had been given a change to

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[25]Brent to E.F. Baldwin: July 24, 1903. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[26]Brent, "A Trip through Northern Luzon," The Spirit of Missions 68 (November, 1903), p. 792).

redeem herself. This uniquely Christian concept of national redemption was essentially different from the prevailing conviction of Anglo-Saxon superiority which Brent shared. But the bishop emphasized the duties and obligations which were inherent in America's position, and he was not afraid to criticize her former mistakes. He hoped that these mistakes would not be repeated. Both the conservatives (who wished to abandon the islands because it was in their opinion unconstitutional to retain them) and the liberals (who wished to give the Philippines independence immediately) were wrong. The problem was a complex one; patience and time were necessary ingredients in its ultimate solution. ". . . we cannot give to the native in a day that which has taken genturies for us to appreciate and assimilate."[27]

The natives, Brent observed, were not always appreciative of what the United States was trying to do for them. In September of 1902 he noted in his diary that the natives had a sullen attitude towards Americans, and concluded that this was a result of the insurrection which would have to be overcome by patience and goodwill on the part of the Americans.[28] And a year later he noted that paternal government could be

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[27]Brent to Mrs. Sprague: August 6, 1902.

[28]Brent Diary: September 11, 1902.

under certain circumstances better than democracy. "Democracy in the 15th century would have been misrule. So now with the Filipinos. They should be made to learn that they are ignorant and inefficient."[29] Thus an extremely low opinion of the Filipinos' capacity for self-government accompanied Brent's confidence in the benevolence of American rule. He shared with most Americans of his day an implicit belief in the superiority of the American governmental system. But it would be many years before the Filipinos would be educated enough to enjoy the privileges of self-government. The bishop saw no contradiction between present colonialism and future self-government; both occupied important positions in his view of Philippine-American relations.

The bishop believed that, given this state of affairs, it would be impossible to abandon the islands. "We have given the people that dangerous thing, a little learning. They know enough about republican government to destroy themselves if left to their own devices."[30] Besides, he argued, federation rather than decentralization was the keynote of the day in international relations. Immediate independence therefore would not be the greatest good for the Filipinos.

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[29] Ibid., October 15, 1903

[30] Ibid., August 28, 1903.

The colonial powers of the world were aiming rather at interdependence, "the tutoring of a lower and half formed civilization by a higher."[31]

Brent believed that even if the United States failed in its mission to the Filipinos, it would be a winning failure. ". . . no country will ever again be able to pursue an avowedly selfish policy regarding colonies. Our aspiration and ideal will set a new political standard to nations."[32] It may be maintained, then that Brent advocated a new colonialism, one in which the colonial power stood in the relation of teacher to the colony, preparing it for eventual self-government. The emphasis would be on education and ultimate independence rather than upon markets, raw materials, or strategic military bases. However, the bishop did realize that American actions, as distinct from American policy, often fell quite short of this ideal. Nevertheless, the goal which America had set in the Philippines would serve as an inspiration to the world.

Even the actions of the President of the United States sometimes fell short of the ideal. Roosevelt was strongly criticized by Brent when in January of 1903 he appointed

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[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., October 21, 1902.

Taft to the Supreme Court. Taft declined the appointment to stay on as governor of the Philippines, but before declining he showed Brent the correspondence between himself and Roosevelt, and asked Brent's opinion. The bishop urged Taft to stay in the islands, believing his presence to be vital to good government in the Philippines. Brent criticized Roosevelt for taking a dogmatic position, that is, for believing that as President he possessed a more accurate judgment than Taft's. In Brent's view, Taft was in a better position to see all aspects of the case.[33]

Bishop Brent's third principle of missionary work in the Philippines was that of avoiding conflicts with Roman Catholicism as much as possible by not proselytizing among Catholic Filipinos. The bishop adhered staunchly to this position throughout the course of his years in the Philippines. Endowed with a true spirit of ecumenism and far in advance of his contemporaries, Brent was harshly criticized by many for his failure to build up a following among the Catholic Filipinos.[34] Ogilby notes that the "evangelical mind" of

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[33]For Brent's account of the President's appointment and Taft's refusal, see Brent Diary: January 10, 1903 and January 15, 1903.

[34]For example Bishop Graves, reporting on conditions in the Philippines in 1918 immediately after Brent's departure, stated that as a direct result of Brent's non-interference policy the church had no support whatever among the Filipino

the Board of Missions in the United States never understood Brent's attitude.[35]

Even before leaving the United States, Brent had made his position clear. He stated in April 1902 that the first thing he would do in Manila would be "to offer to work with the Roman Catholic archbishop wherever I could."[36] In the same month, the Catholic Witness quoted him as saying: "I do not intend to proselytize among Roman Catholics. The Church can do more important work than that. I do not believe in proselytizing Roman Catholics."[37] Brent admired Archbishop John Ireland and praised the Jesuits for the excellent work they had done in the Philippines. With remarkable objectivity, Brent never let his dislike of the Vatican interfere with his admiration for many of the teachings of Catholic theology. Nor did his condemnation of the Catholic Church's hierarchical structure prevent him from becoming the warm friend and admirer of many members of that hierarchy. His opposition to proselytizing

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people. See F.R. Graves, "Report of the Bishop-in-Charge--1917-1918," Annual Report of the Board of Missions for the Fiscal Year 1917-1918, (New York: 1918), p. 70.

[35]Ogilby Manuscript, Chapter VII, p. 140.

[36]Brent Diary: April 21, 1902.

[37]See the Catholic Witness, April, 1902.

was caused in part by a sense of justice and even of good sportsmanship. It was also due to his desire to avoid a practice which was not in accord with his own temperment and which he believed to have little permanent effect.

In order to comprehend Brent's position fully, we must understand his use of the terms "Catholic" and Protestant". Brend thought of himself as a member of the Catholic Church, meaning all sincere Christians. The Episcopal Church was a branch of the Catholic Church. Roman Catholicism was another branch--one which had become corrupted and was spiritually impotent but which had done great things in the past. He disliked the term "Protestant".

In accordance with his beliefs, Brent drastically limited missionary work among the native Filipinos. At the temporary church in Manila, one service each Sunday was held in Spanish. No other attempt was initially made in Manila to provide services for the natives. Brent did not like to interfere in these districts in the outlying areas of Luzon where Catholic priests had previously ministered. However, in some neglected regions he did baptize.

If he refused to proselytize among Christian Filipinos, Brent had no qualms about working among the various pagan groups in the islands. In Manila, he early instigated missionary work among the Chinese residents of the city.

The leader of the Chinese work was Hobart E. Studley, a former missionary in China who came to Manila to work under Brent. Studley gathered a congregation, and the Chinese mission in Manila became one of the more enduring of Brent's projects.

Brent was even more eager to start work among the native pagan tribes who inhabited the northern areas of the island of Luzon. He visualized a whole chain of mission stations north of Baguio. By the middle of 1904 two of the stations--Bontoc and Sagada--had been established. (See map, p. 32.) None of the other stations was ever founded, and Brent was never able to staff properly the two existing stations. The Bontoc mission, developed by Father Clapp, specialized in schools for the young natives. At Sagada, Father Staunton set up a sawmill and began a rudamentary vocational school.

Brent's ecumenism prompted him to co-operate with other Protestant groups whenever he could. However, such co-operation was not always possible or desirable. For instance, when Brent first arrived in Manila, he was invited to join a group known as the Evangelical Union. The Union divided the territory of the Islands among the various Protestant churches for proselytizing purposes. Brent and the Episcopal

Church refused to join: the bishop realized that it was anti-Catholic and that its aim was to win the Catholic Filipinos over to Protestantism.

> I cannot feel it to be the duty of the Church which I represent to build up a constituency by deliberately drawing upon the Roman Church. It is here that I find myself differing from the Protestant Churches at work in the islands, and for this reason if for no other I am unable to enter into any formal relationship with them.[38]

In refusing to join the Union, Brent privately revealed his lifelong desire for reconciliation and unity. "I feel to the Methodists and Presbyterians as I do to the Romans. Let us realize our devotional and organic difference and then unite as we can in practical ways."[39] He also revealed a real concern for the spiritual welfare of the Filipinos: "I am averse to disturbing what religious faith the natives have unless I am sure we can give them something richer and fuller."[40]

Hand in hand with Bishop Brent's concern for the spiritual welfare of the peoples of the Orient went an involvement in attempts to improve their physical welfare. Perhaps the greatest physical evil which existed in the East at that time was opium addiction. Brent quickly realized the gravity of the opium evil, and for the rest of his life he worked to

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[39]Brent Diary: September 26, 1902.

[40]Ibid., July 2, 1903. Also Brent to his sister Edith: July 5, 1903. Brent Papers, Box 48.

eradicate it. It was the anti-opium campaign which first made the bishop of the Philippines an international figure and broadened his vision until it embraced the whole world.

When Brent arrived in the Philippines in 1902, opium addiction was on the increase among Filipinos. In Spanish times, the "farming out" system of regulating opium use had been in effect. The government had "farmed out" the opium concession to the highest bidder who retained a government-approved monopoly over the drug in the Philippines. When the United States took over the government of the islands, the farming out system was discontinued. Instead, a tax was imposed on opium, and smoking dens were prohibited. The result was an increase in the use of opium, especially among Filipinos. In Spanish times, opium smoking had been confined for the most part to the Chinese in the larger cities.

In 1903, the Philippine Commission decided to reinstate the farming out system, and a bill was drafted to this effect. It provided for the sale of opium to Chinese but not to Filipinos, and gave a monopoly to whomever was granted the right to sell the drug. A tremendous storm of protest broke out, so much so that Elihu Root, the Secretary of War, ordered the bill to be held up and the situation restudied. On of the most ardent and articulate of the protestors was Bishop Brent. He believed that opium addiction was a moral evil,

and that it was the duty of the American government to control and gradually eradicate it.

Brent was given a copy of the proposed bill by Judge James F. Smith, Commissioner of Education, who asked for a criticism of it. Brent's first reaction was that the bill was "subtly pernicious", and he hoped to secure at least a modification of its provisions. He informed both Judge Smith and Governor Taft of his opinion. Smith later introduced an alternative bill, prohibiting the use of opium except for medicinal purposes. According to Brent, his own influence was decisive in the judge's decision to introduce the alternative bill.[41]

Brent's major influence on Smith took the form of a long letter written on July 6, 1903 which embodied not only the bishop's objections to the proposed bill, but also his viewpoint on the entire opium problem. Brent listed five arguments in favor of the proposed bill and against the alternative measure: The Commission did not have the authority to prohibit opium; prohibition would not be effective; prohibition would encourage smuggling; prohibition would deprive addicts of the drug and might cause death in some cases; the farming out system would provide a good source of revenue for

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[41]See Brent Diary: July 8, 1903. Brent stated that Judge Smith had told him that the alternative bill was proposed as a result of Brent's letter to Smith.

the government.

The bishop then proceeded to answer the arguments which he had advanced. In the first place, he reasoned that the Commission would not be exceeding its powers if it limited the selling of opium to medical use. ". . . it would be criminal to sell or use opium under any other conditions. The question is first and foremost a moral one. The use of the drug otherwise than medicinally is a vice. . . a crime."[42] Even if prohibition could not be enforced, every effort should be made to inaugurate it, for the protection of the Filipinos.

Brent argued that smuggling would not increase any more under a prohibitive law than it would under the proposed farming out system. Smugglers would continue to evade the law in any case. As far as the addicts were concerned, the bishop pointed out that doctors could care for them and prevent death from a lack of the drug. He also urged that Filipino addicts be given the same chance to obtain the drug as their fellow-sufferers among the Chinese.

The most pernicious of all the arguments in favor of the farming out system, so Brent believed, was the revenue argument. In his eyes the opium question was a moral, not a

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[42]For the text of Brent's letter to Judge Smith, see Brent Papers, Box 6.

financial problem. If the farming out system were introduced, the government would be deriving revenue from a polluted source. Britain had taken such a course in the Far East, forcing opium down the throats of the Chinese in order to maintain the revenue of India. This was a sorry chapter in the history of the British Empire, and Brent earnestly hoped that the United States would avoid a similar mistake.

Brent thus took a stand of uncompromising opposition to the proposed bill. He attended the public hearings before the Commission and spoke against it, suggesting an alternative plan of immediate and complete prohibition except for medical use.[43] Taft and the Commission on the other hand favored the farming out system, believing that it would prevent the use of opium among Filipinos. They were afraid of the alternative bill which provided for prohibition; they foresaw a corrupted police force and customs service, and an increase in smuggling.

In the face of the uproar aroused both in the Philippines and in the United States by the proposed return to the farming out system, Taft tabled the bill. He then decided to send out a special investigating committee to study opium legislation throughout the Far East. The governor hoped that the knowledge

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[43]See Brent Diary: July 8, 1903.

thus gained would enable the Philippine Commission to deal more wisely with the problem of opium in the Philippines.[44]

On July 31, 1903 Taft nominated three men to serve on the Opium Investigating Committee--Major Edward C. Carter, Dr. José Legarda, and Bishop Brent. Brent was surprised at his nomination; apparently he had not expected it. It would seem that his personal friendship with Taft and his obvious concern about the opium problem were the decisive factors in securing the nomination for him. Brent was in poor health at the time, and his doctor urged him to leave the Philippines temporarily, lest he break down completely.[45] The bishop accordingly decided to accept the nomination.

The committee's itinerary included Japan, Formosa, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Saigon, Singapore, Burma, and Java, as well as journeys within the Philippines. The official purpose of the investigation, as stated by Taft, was to ascertain opium laws currently in force in the countries visited, the effect of the laws on the use of the drug, the number of addicts

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[44]For a thorough and detailed discussion of the opium problem in the Philippines and the work of the Opium Investigating Committee, see Arnold H. Taylor, "The United States and the International Movement to Control the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 1900-1939", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Mullen Library, the Catholic University of America. Hereafter referred to as "The United States and Narcotic Traffic".

[45]Brent Diary: July 24, 1903.

and the amount of opium consumed, the price of opium and the value of monopoly concessions were present, the prevalence of smuggling, the ways in which opium was used, the effects of addition, and "in general, all the facts shown by the experience of the governments of the countries and cities named above, a knowledge of which is likely to aid the Commission in determining the best kind of law to be passed in these islands for redcuing and restraining the use of opium by its inhabitants."[46]

Brent realized the significance of the work which the Committee would perform. The task would be enormous, but if carefully done it would benefit all nations involved in the Far East. "The question is of vital importance and our report will command the attention of the civilized world, if it is worth anything--and we intend to make it of value."[47]

The Committee's first port of call was Japan, where over a month was spend gathering data (September 3-October 8, 1903). Brent was very favorably impressed with the way in which the Japanese handled the opium problem. It was viewed solely as a moral problem, and the Japanese law prohibited all use of

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[46]Taft to Major Carter: August 8, 1903. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[47]Brent to his sister Edith: July 25, 1903. Brent Papers, Box 48.

opium except for medicinal purposes. Not only sale or purchase, but also possession of opium was illegal in Japan. Even the Chinese in Japan were mostly nonsmokers, and the Japanese themselves hated and feared opium. As a result, there really was no opium problem in Japan.

The Committee arrived in Japan at a difficult time, for war with Russia was an imminent threat. Brent was impressed with the courtesy of the Japanese officials in the midst of a tense situation. In his opinion, Russia was forcing the issue; Japan had a just cause and was not being unduly aggressive.[48]

From Japan, the investigators proceeded to Japan's colony of Formosa where they stayed from October 11 to October 21. Here they found a situation very similar to that which existed in the Philippines--a subject population among whom the opium vice was already entrenched when the Japanese took over the government of the island. The Japanese did not inaugurate prohibition in Formosa; instead they set up an opium monopoly under direct government control. This system, known as progressive prohibition, involved licenses for addicts, harsh punishments for smugglers, and an anti-opium

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[48] See Brent to his sister Edith: November 2, 1903. Brent Papers, Box 48. Also Brent, "Japan and Her People," Outlook 76 (February 20, 1904), p. 451.

campaign in the schools.

The Japanese program in Formosa was one of immediate and careful regulation of opium, with a view toward gradually suppressing its use. Brent believed that Japan was doing a very creditable job in governing Formosa, showing judgment and skill in dealing with colonial problems. "The Formosan problem bears great resemblance to the Philippine; as far as I can see the Japanese have accomplished more than the American Government has in public improvements."[49]

But the bishop realized that even in Formosa the situation was far from ideal. Despite the progress which had been made in many fields, a serious opium problem existed. For instance, opium smuggling continued. And although many people were enthusiastic about the Formosan opium law, Brent believed that it was not as ideal in practice as it looked on paper.[50] Brent also had some doubts as to the sincerity of the Japanese government in Formosa. An American newspaperman in Japan had pointed out to him that the large revenue which the Japanese government obtained from the opium monopoly

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[49]Brent to Henry R. Talbott: October 15, 1903. Brent Papers, Box 65.

[50]Brent to William Howard Taft: October 15, 1903. William Howard Taft Papers, LC, Series 3, Box 80.

in Formosa might influence legislation.[51]

Leaving Formosa, the investigating committee proceeded to Shanghai and to Hong Kong, where it remained for the month of November. Brent was called back to Manila from Shanghai by episcopal business on November 11; he rejoined the committee at Hong Kong on November 28. In Shanghai, the investigators came face to face with the British stake in the Indian opium traffic. Brent concluded that Britain was largely responsible for the extent of the vice in China.[52]

The Chinese in general condemned opium addiction and advocated some sort of government regulation. Most agreed that prohibition would be impossible, and desired a government monopoly. But the committee found no evidence that the Chinese government was doing anything to stop the spread of opium addiction. As a result, addiction was on the increase, with a resultant demoralization of the Chinese people.[53]

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[51]See Brent Diary: September 21, 1903.

[52]Brent to his sister Edith: September 20, 1903. Brent Papers, Box 48.

[53]Report of the Committee Appointed by the Philippine Commission to Investigate the Use of Opium and Traffic Therein, and the Rules, Ordinances, and Laws Regulating Such Use and Traffic in Japan, Formosa, Shanghai, Hong-Kong, Saigon, Singapore, Burma, Java, and the Philippine Islands. (Washington: 1906), pp. 31-4. Hereafter referred to as Report of the Opium Investigating Committee. Brent seemed to feel that part of the problem in China was due to the attitude of the Chinese. ". . . the trouble with the Chinese is that they have a race but not a

Hong Kong, the committee discovered, was one of the major centers of opium smuggling in the Far East. After leaving Hong Kong, the investigators visited Saigon (December 4-6), Singapore (December 6-14), and Rangood (December 19-January 10). From Rangoon Brent returned to Manila where episcopal business again required his attention. Major Carter and Dr. Albert went on to Java, returning to Manila on February 5, 1904.

In Saigon the investigators were exposed to French, and in Singapore and Rangoon to British colonial rule. Brent believed that French colonialism had been a failure; French Indo-China appeared to be a stagnant rather than a dynamic colony.[54] In main revenue of the French in Saigon was derived from the opium monopoly or farming out system.

The British in Singapore followed the same farming out system. They expressed the opinion that since the natives demanded opium and the British government had no hopes of suppressing the vice, it might as well be used as an opportunity for creating revenue. Brent talked to several opium farmers in Singapore, and they regarded it as a legitimate opportunity for making money. One however, when pressed by

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national consciousness. In this respect, they are like the Jews." Brent to Mrs. Foster: November 11, 1903. Brent Papers, Box 48.

[54]Brent to Taft: February 6, 1904. Brent Papers, Box 6.

the bishop, admitted that the whole business was morally indefensible.[55]

After concluding their investigation, the members of the committee reassembled in Manila in February 1904 and in a series of meetings drew up their report to the Philippine Commission. The report mentioned the difficulties under which the committee had labored--lack of time and problems of language. Despite the difficulties involved, the conclusions which the committee recommended were unanimous, as Brent reported to Taft in a letter written at the very outset of the meetings. The bishop added that the only effective laws the investigators had discovered were those in Japan and Formosa. ". . . it is somewhat after the pattern of what she has done that we will mould our suggestions."[56]

The report of the committee was indeed most favorable to the Japanese and most unfavorable to the British. This coincided precisely with Brent's own viewpoint, and indeed the language and spirit of the report bore very strongly Brent's imprint, as Arnold Taylor points out.[57] The investigators stressed the gravity of the problem and the need for

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[55]Brent Diary: December 9-10, 1903.

[56]Brent to Taft: February 6, 1904.

[57]Taylor, "The United States and Narcotic Traffic", Loc. Cit., pp. 57-8.

immediate action, and unreservedly condemned the opium traffic.

The report reviewed the various ways of coping with the opium problem. The tariff system (which the United States has followed in the Philippines until 1903) was discarded because it tended to bring about an increase in smuggling and addiction. The farming out system also increased addiction and smuggling, and in addition the opium farmer usurped government authority. As for immediate prohibition, the committee agreed that it was practical only in areas such as Japan where the vice did not already exist. This left only the system of government monopoly. "A government monopoly seems on the whole to be the most desirable, as a more nearly complete control may thus be had of the use of opium and the traffic therein."[58]

The committee accordingly recommended for the Philippines an immediate government monopoly, with strict prohibition to go into effect after three years or so as soon as practicable. Licenses should be issued to confirmed addicts, and free medical treatment made available to them. A campaign in the schools against opium, and laws depriving Filipino addicts of voting rights and public office, were also recommended.[59]

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[58]Report of the Opium Investigating Committee, p. 53.

[59]See Ibid., pp. 51-4.

This was in effect the Formosan system of progressive prohibition as applied to the Philippines.

The work of the Opium Investigating Committee had many results, both direct and indirect. Direct results include legislation subsequently enacted by the United States Congress and the Philippine Commission. On March 3, 1905 Congress passed a law providing for total prohibition of nonmedical use of opium in the Philippines after March 1, 1908 (the three-year period recommended by the committee). This law also gave the Philippine Commission the power to adopt interim measures, with the proviso that sale of opium to Filipinos except as medicine be prohibited. The Commission, despite the committee's recommendation of government monopoly, reinstated the high tariff system as an interim measure on March 8, 1906. Brent opposed it,[60] but the opposition in general was not vigorous as the system was to last only two years and the committee's larger goal of eventual prohibition had been achieved.

Another direct result of the committee's work, or so Brent claimed, was the Chinese Imperial Edict of 1906, prohibiting opium smoking in the Chinese empire.[61] An interesting

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[60]Brent Diary: March 6, 1906.

[61]See Brent, "The Years That are Past, Part IV", The Churchman 109 (March 28, 1914), p. 416. Although it is true that the report of the Opium Investigating Committee was

indirect result of Brent's travels with the committee was his condemnation of the caliber of United States diplomatic representatives in the Far East. He observed that in many cases United States consuls in the East were not only inefficient but actually corrupt. His concern for the prestige of his adopted country led him to recommend their replacement. In a letter to Taft, he stated the situation frankly.

> . . . when one finds in one place after another that our consuls are held in contempt, not only by the populace generally, but even by our own American residents, one feels that there is something so radically wrong that the matter ought to be taken in hand vigorously. . . . I wish it were possible for some government commission to investigate personally the status of our consuls in the East. Unless something is done we are undoubtedly going to lose prestige. . .[62]

Perhaps the most important of all the results of the committee's work was its effect on Bishop Brent. Taft's action in appointing him to the Opium Investigating Committee made the bishop a truly international figure. He realized

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translated into Chinese and had a wide circulation in the Chinese Empire, it would seem that it was not the sole cause of the edict of 1906. The edict itself proves impossible to enforce, and opium addiction in China continued to increase.

[62]Brent to Taft: February 6, 1904. In Washington in 1905, Brent presented the case against the consuls to Theodore Roosevelt (See Brent Diary: January 14, 1905.) The President took action and some new men were appointed; Brent reported in July of 1905 that the new appointees were a much better group than the men they had replaced. See Brent to Mrs. Reis; July 21, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 6.

that the solution to the opium problem demanded organized international action, and he spent much of his time in trying to secure such action. In the course of the investigation he had written: "Everywhere the question of the opium traffic is admitted to be the gravest moral question in the East, and I only hope that the result of our work will have something beyond local value . . ."[63] To Brent himself must go the credit for making sure that their work would indeed be of more than local value.

Another problem with which Brent was deeply involved during his years in the Philippines was that of the Philippine Independent Church and its "bishop", Bregorio Aglipay. The Aglipay movement was a schismatic outgrowth of the Roman Catholic Church. It was an anti-foreign rebellion, a church for Filipinos run by Filipinos, and at one time it threatened to spread throughout the islands.[64]

The movement began in November, 1902 and Brent described its outset. "Aglipay's church rebellion took shape today. It seems to be a sort of religious insurrection. Several

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[63]Brent to Henry R. Talbott: November 13, 1903. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[64]For a detailed account of the history of the Aglipayan movement, see Pedro S. de Achutequi, S.J., and Miguel A. Bernad, S.J., Religious Revolution in the Philippines (Manila, 1960). A second volume, recently published, discusses the condition of the schismatic church after Aglipay's death.

thousand people gathered to hear him."[65] The movement spread rapidly throughout Luzon; Aglipay was "Obispo Maximo" consecrated about twenty other "bishops" and "ordained" some two hundred men. Many native priests joined the movement, usually bringing their entire congregations with them. By March of 1903, Brent reported that it seemed likely that all of northern Luzon would go over to Aglipay.[66]

Bishop Brent and many other churchmen in the islands tried to determine the true nature of the movement. Brent decided that it was essentially a protest, a new phase of political and social unrest, dressed in the clothes of religion.[67] It was, he believed, more of a political than a doctrinal movement, and its ranks contained many insurrectionists and malcontents.

Brent first met Aglipay late in 1902. After the rebellion had grown to large proportions,[68] Brent in the spring of 1904 decided to seek out Aglipay to hear his side of the

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[65]Brent Diary: November 2, 1902.

[66]Ibid., March 10, 1903.

[67]Brent, The Spirit of Missions 68, p. 637.

[68]Brent reported in 1904 that the Aglipay movement claimed to have four million adherents; Brent believed the true figure would be closer to three million. See Brent, "Religious Conditions in the Philippine Islands," The Spirit of Missions 69 (September, 1904), p. 663.

story. The two men had several meetings in May and June of 1904. Aglipay admitted to Brent that he was only a priest, not a legally consecrated bishop. He asked Brent whether the Episcopal Church would be willing to consecrate him. Brent replied that Aglipay would have to address a petition to the General Convention of the Episcopal Church. He also upbraided the Filipino for his dishonesty in posing as a bishop without ever having received episcopal orders. Brent urged Aglipay to affiliate his movement with some established church.

In subsequent meetings Aglipay gave Brent a letter to the Episcopal General Convention, but it was so vague as to be worthless.[69] Brent urged Aglipay to be more definite, to commit himself in writing. In the summer of 1904, Brent returned to the United States and laid before the Episcopal House of Bishops a private report of his meetings with Aglipay. He attributed Aglipay's vagueness to natural Malay suspicion plus a fear that his lack of episcopal orders might be publicized and cause confusion among his followers. Brent advocated a church commission to meet with Aglipay and his delegates and urged that the commission be composed of representatives from different churches.

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[69]For an account of the meetings between Brent and Aglipay, see Brent Diary: May 2, June 16, June 17, and June 20, 1904.

Aglipay's refusal to seek formal consecration reinforced Brent's growing apprehensions about the Filipino religious leader. In July of 1904 the bishop wrote: "The more I think of the matter the more distrust I feel towards him."[70] When the General Convention of the Episcopal Church met in the fall of 1904, no further word had been received from Aglipay. Brent accordingly advised the church to take no action. Meanwhile, Aglipay had contacted the Old Catholics in Switzerland, another schismatic group, in a further attempt to obtain episcopal orders. Aglipay wrote to Bishop Herzog, the leader of the Old Catholics, and Herzog corresponded with Brent. Like Brent, Herzog disliked Aglipay's masquerading as a bishop. The Old Catholics were interested in Aglipay's movement in the Philippines, recognizing in it a certain similarity to their own position, but decided not to interfere.

Thus Aglipay's attempts to secure episcopal consecration failed. According to Achutegui and Bernad, the failure was Aglipay's own fault. In their opinion, Brent and the Episcopalians were anxious to have Aglipay consecrated, but he would not take the final step to obtain consecration. Aglipay refused to commit himself on paper; he left Brent's letters unanswered and never wrote a formal petition for either

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[70]Brent to Bishop Hall; March 16, 1903. Brent Papers, Box 56.

affiliation or consecration to the Episcopal bishops.[71]

Brent never had a very high opinion of Aglipay, although as late as 1904 he pointed out that the official platform of the movement advocated "a sane view of ecclesiastical policy, Catholic doctrine, and moral living."[72] But privately he doubted whether this program could ever be put into effect. He distrusted Aglipay thoroughly, believing him to be a political agitator rather than a religious leader. As early as March of 1903, Brent had described Aglipay as unscrupulous and untrustworthy.[73] After the negotiations fell through in the summer of 1904, Bishop Brent had no further use for Aglipay. He believed that the Obispo Maximo was selfishly ambitious, fond of personal power.

Brent believed that there were no positive religious principles behind Aglipay's movement. In form its rites differed little from Catholicism, "except that wholesome safeguards and discipline were lacking."[74] Aglipay's movement was headed for fragmentation, the bishop believed, unless

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[71]Achutesui and Bernad, pp. 391, 402-3.

[72]Brent, The Spirit of Missions 69, p. 669.

[73]Brent to Mercer Johnston; July 11, 1904. Mercer Johnston Papers, LC, Box 38.

[74]Brent, "The Years That are Past, Part III", The Churchman 109 (February 28, 1914), p. 266.

it received some new inspiration. As it existed, it had little vital religion of any sort. Nor was Brent convinced of the probity of Aglipay's personal life. "At best I fear they (Aglipay and his associates) are pretty bad, and their earliest need is conversion from wickedness."[75] Brent's final judgment of Aglipay and his church was totally unfavorable: "That Bishop Brent, who was clearly in sympathy with the Aglipayan movement. . . . should have chosen, for reasons of moral principle, to have nothing to do with Aglipay and his church, is the most telling condemnation of that movement."[76]

Brent laid the responsibility for Aglipay's rebellion at the door of the Catholic Church. He believed that the past record of Roman Catholicism in the Philippines was so poor that it inspired revolts such as Aglipay's. Brent pointed out that the Filipino Catholic priests, whom the Spanish friars had never trained for positions of responsibility, were often inefficient and immoral.[77] While the Catholic Church spent its time "haggling over property" and deferring to the self-interest of the monastic orders, the Filipino people grew

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[75]Brent to Mercer Johnston: June 22, 1904. Mercer Johnston Papers, LC, Box 38.

[76]Achutegui and Bernad, p. 409.

[77]Brent to Mrs. Foster: March 14, 1903. Brent Papers, Box 48.

restless. Brent was especially distressed to hear, in May of 1903, that the friars were not to be recalled immediately, but would stay on in the islands. (American priests did eventually replace the friars, but not before the Church had lost a great deal of prestige.) This religious situation in the Philippines provided fertile soil for the growth of the Aglipayan church.

Brent believed, with justification, that the Catholic Church regarded Aglipay's movement as a challenge to her authority and would make every effort to undermine his influence. Brent was also certain that the Catholic hierarchy in the Philippines and elsewhere would oppose all efforts which the Episcopal Church might make to effect an affiliation with Aglipay. And yet, such was Brent's condemnation of Aglipay and his church, he expressed the belief that it would be better for the Filipino people if "the whole disaffected mass" were reabsorbed into the Catholic Church than if it continued on its separatist course.[78] Since no affiliation was ever achieved, and the Aglipayans did continue to go their separate way, it is impossible to determine whether Brent was right or wrong in his estimations.

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[78]Brent, Private Addendum to Report on Religious Conditions in the Philippine Islands (For Bishops Only); Brent Papers, Box 6, p. 9.

When not investigating opium laws or negotiating with Aglipay, Brent continued his episcopal and missionary work in the islands. By 1904, a church and vacation house had been built in Baguio. Two houses had been built at the Bontoc mission station, and much progress had been made. The bishop had also purchased property at Zamboanga, on the island of Mindanao (see map, p. 32), where he hoped to establish a hospital. Brent inaugurated regular services for the American personnel stationed at Zamboanga. In Manila, the settlement house and dispensary were doing valuable work, and Brent was urging the building of a hospital. True to his principle of ministering to American and British residents, Brent's work in Manila was confined chiefly to English-speaking people. The bishop had also inaugurated regular services at the army post at Iloilo for servicemen and their families.

Brent showed a trace of despondency over the general lack of response to his efforts. Many of the Americans in the islands, he discovered, were degenerate, immoral, and criminal.[79] Although not too surprised, he deplored this state of affairs. Among the native Filipinos, he found even more evidence of immorality. Gredulity, gambling, and concubinage were common, even among the native priests. Brent

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[79]Brent, The Spirit of Missions 69, p. 658.

blamed this unfortunate situation on human nature and the enervating influence on tropical life. He suggested that the law of clerical celibacy be relaxed to allow Catholic priests to marry, at least in tropical areas.[80]

But not all Americans or Filipinos with whom the bishop came in contact were degenerate or immoral. During these early years Brent formed warm friendships with many of the residents of Manila and the islands. And many of the people whom he first met as Bishop of the Philippines later rose to positions of great prominence. For the rest of his life, Bishop Brent would be a man with influential friends.

One of the most rewarding and important friendships which Brent formed at this time was with William Howard Taft. We have already seen how Brent and Taft became friends on the journey to Manila, how Brent advised Taft when the latter was offered a position on the Supreme Court, and how Taft appointed Brent to the Opium Investigating Committee. But contacts between Brent and Taft were much more frequent than these isolated instances indicate. Brent was a constant visitor at the governor's house, and the two men consulted each other frequently. They discussed Brent's missionary work, Philippine

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[80]In 1904 Brent persuaded the General Convention to appoint a committee which petitioned the papacy to relax clerical celebacy in the Philippines and in tropical areas generally. See Brent Diary: October 11, 1904.

affairs, conditions in the provinces, local scandals, and many other matters. Taft always listened respectfully to Brent's views, and often promised to take action predicated upon Brent's advice.[81]

Both men valued their friendship highly. Brent said of Taft: "I see a great deal of the Governor. My trip with him was the happiest and most opportune thing that could have occurred. I have no better friend in Manila."[82] And Taft responded: "I reciprocate your feeling in every way and count it one of the great good fortunes of my life that for some time at least our paths are parallel and close together."[83] But their paths were not to remain so close together. In October of 1903 Roosevelt appointed Taft Secretary of War. The appointment was an important one; it meant that Taft would continue to exert a decisive influence in the Philippines, since the ultimate responsibility for the government of the islands lay with the Secretary of War. The bishop hoped that in Washington Taft would be able to bring pressure

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[81]See Brent Diary: 1902-1904.

[82]Brent to D.B. Updike: September 20, (no year given). Brent Papers, Box 61.

[83]Taft to Brent: December 28, 1902. Brent Papers, Box 6.

to bear on Congress to speed up legislation on Philippine problems. Brent however was very unhappy over Taft's departure. He believed that the Philippines had lost a Great statesman, and he knew he was losing a close personal friend. Taft also was sorry to leave the islands. He expressed to Brent his regret at leaving so much work undone.[84]

When the new governor general, Luke E. Wright, arrived, the bishop continued his policy of close official and unofficial cooperation.[85] He saw himself as a spokesman for the American residents in Manila, and he believed that he had a duty to make himself heard. In April of 1904 Brent noted that he and Wright had discussed the principles of government and democracy and found themselves in substantial agreement.[86] When the government was not co-operating with Brent's plans for a hospital in Manila, he explained the situation to Wright and secured the governor's support. But the personal relationship between the two men was not what it had been between Brent and Taft: "I like Gov. Wright but he does not belong to the same category as Gov. Taft."[87]

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[84]Brent Diary: November 23, 1903.

[85]After Taft's term of office, the title was changed from civil governor to governor general.

[86]Brent Diary: April 22, 1904.

[87]Brent to Mrs. Foster: November 11, 1903.

Brent also knew personally many members of the Philippine Commission. His contacts with them, however, were not always as cordial as he might have wished. Brent and Dean C. Worcester, who was in charge of the Department of the Interior, came into conflict repeatedly. The basic source of their contention was Worcester's policy towards the native tribes. Brent believed that Worcester was wrong in treating the natives as adults. "The Filipinos are all of them children and they ought to be treated with a strong hand and not as by an indulgent parent."[88] Again Brent was emphasizing his belief in the inferiority of the Filipinos as a group. The bishop feared that the result of Worcester's lenient policy would be disorder and disaster.

In 1904 Brent first met Leonard Wood, who would become another close friend. Wood was at the time Governor of Mindanao and Sulu, in the Moro country (see map, p. 32), and Brent made Wood's acquaintance when he went to Zamboanga to purchase property for a hospital. Brent stayed with Wood and they discussed government and army affairs. The bishop then accompanied a detachment of Wood's men on a punitive expedition in the Moro country. Brent served as chaplain and thoroughly enjoyed the experience. It was just such experiences as this

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[88]Brent to his sister Helen: Baguio, 1904. Brent Papers, Box 63.

which would prove so valuable when Brent went to France in 1917 as chief of chaplains for the American Expeditionary Force.

In June of 1904 Brent returned to the United States to raise more funds for his Philippine work and to deliver the Paddock lectures at the General Theological Seminary in New York. He was a very different man from the new bishop who had set out for the Philippines just two years earlier. His work in the islands had widened his perspective and enlarged his viewpoint. But his opinion of Philippine-American relations had been strengthened rather than changed by his sojourn in the Orient. As he wrote to Bishop Hall in the spring of 1904:

> Before I came to the Philippines I was convinced that the people were incapable of self government immediately. But I had no idea that they were as incompetent and feeble a folk as they are. They have more self government now than is for their good. Independence would be disaster. We need to tighten not loosen our grasp. Our government should be more emphatically paternal than it is. You cannot treat children as though they were grown men without spoiling them.[89]

Brent believed that America was mistakenly trying to force her own idea of democracy upon the Filipinos. Democracy, he pointed out, is a principle, not a form of government. "It

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[89]Brent to Bishop Hall: Maundy Thursday, 1904. Brent Papers, Box 56.

is the political means by which a people secure or have secured for them their best opoortunity for self realisation."[90] The Filipino people, lacking a sense of national consciousness, needed the guiding hand of the United States. By 1904 the Filipinos had, the bishop believed, as much local autonomy as they were capable of handling, if not more than enough. The only force capable of leading the Filipinos to eventual self-government was the force of Christianity. This is another example of the close connection in Brent's mind between the spiritual order of Christianity and the temporal order of American rule. Needless to say, the Filipinos themselves, who had little direct contact with the bishop and who perhaps did not appreciate the complexities of his viewpoint, disagreed radically with his conclusions.

Brent also emphasized the obligations of the American Residents in the Philippines. He believed that American citizens in the islands had not given up their share in the government, that the Commission was responsible to them. And so the Americans in the islands had a duty to suggest, encourage, and rebuke. The success of the government would depend on how well the Americans in the islands fulfilled these duties of citizenship. Again the bishop revealed the importance of the

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[90]Brent to Bishop Hall: May 3, 1904. Brent Papers, Box 56.

concept of citizenship in his thinking.

Brent set his fellow-citizens in Manila a good example by speaking out on many occasions against the policies of the Commission. In addition to opposing the proposed opium law, he also criticized the Commission for being too timid in regard to American commerce and for following "the whims rather than the healthy desires" of the Filipinos.[91] While agreeing with the general policy of the Commission, Brent felt that many of its methods were mistaken. He was especially anxious about the popular assembly which would supposedly come into being in 1905.[92]

Brent's widening horizons can be seen in his general interest in the Far East, and in his comparison of the various colonial powers which had a foothold there. Spanish, Portuguese, and French colonial life as the bishop saw it was extremely corrupt. The Japanese were doing an excellent job in Formosa, but the best of all colonial powers, he believed, was Britain. (This view is not very surprising when we remember that Brent was by birth a Canadian.) Even though Britain at times put commercial interests ahead of morality,

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[91]Brent, "Justice and Liberty in the Philippines", The Churchman 90 (October 1, 1904), p. 557.

[92]Brent to Bishop Hall: Maundy Thursday, 1904. The assembly did not meet until October 16, 1907.

as in the case of the opium revenues, her colonial work in general was wise and thorough. America in the bishop's opinion might make mistakes in working out her policy, but her motives were right.[93]

As early as 1903 Brent realized the impact which the Far East would have on world affairs in the twentieth century. To his sister Edith he wrote: "For the future as far as the eye can reach the East will be the chief scene of the world's action, and those who labor faithfully here will leave an enduring mark on many peoples."[94] Subsequent events have fully justified the bishop's prophetic remarks.

Church unity was another area in which the bishop's viewpoint was expanded by his early experiences in the Philippines. Brent's outlook had always been different from that of the typical missionary. We have seen how he refused to proselytize among Catholic Filipinos. The bishop was an unusual man for his time: he was able to see good in other churches and to wish them well. He felt no great urgency to effect individual conversations, and he dislike and distrusted the emotional approach to religion which so many of his co-workers relied upon.

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[93]Brent to D.B. Updike: February 6, 1904. Brent Papers, Box 61.

[94]Brent to Edith: December 19, 1903. Brent Papers, Box 6.

Working as he did in a predominantly Catholic country, Brent was forced to formulate a viewpoint regarding Roman Catholicism. In 1904 this viewpoint was, as it would continue to be during his years in the islands, ambiguous. On the one hand, he was critical of the worldliness, the dogmatism, the spiritual impotence he saw in Catholicism. At times he revealed in a definite anti-Catholic bias; for instance, he believed that if a Catholic were elected President of the United States the Roman Curia would attempt to rule the country.[95] Brent also believed that Catholicism was not the best form of Christianity for the Philippines; he thought that some form of religious revolution would be necessary before the Filipinos could have a true national existence.

On the other hand, the bishop was very favorably impressed with some of the Catholics whom he met in Manila, such as Archbishop Jeremiah J. Harty. Brent emphasized the need of working together as much as possible in civil, national, and moral matters. Brent also admired the missionary work done by the Catholics. "We may not trust her system, believe in her theology, or admire her methods; but she (Roman Catholicism) commands, and we must give her, our respect as being true to the missionary trust in its widest reaches."[96]

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[95]See Brent Diary: April 23, 1903.

[96]Brent, Adventure for God, p. 16.

Thus the dichotomy which had grown out of Brent's visit to the Vatican was strengthened by his relations with the Catholic Church and with her ministers in the Philippines. In later years, the bishop's outlook would become ever more ecumenical, culminating in a great crusade to secure reconciliation among Christian sects. But even in these early years, his later efforts may be seen in microcosm in his efforts to work together with men of other faiths in the Philippines. And in his thinking, religious unity and international unity were interrelated because he saw the spiritual and temporal worlds as essentially one. Brent's work on the opium committee awakened a fervent desire for international co-operation, not only with regard to opium but ultimately with regard to all matters of international importance. Brent's early opium work had also won him many new friends--in the Far East, in America, and in Europe. When the bishop returned to the United States in 1904, he himself was an international figure of considerable importance.

CHAPTER III

WIDENING HORIZONS 1904-1909

On June 19, 1904 Bishop Brent left Manila for the United States. His return to America was necessitated by his need to campaign personally for more support in his missionary work and also by an invitation from the General Theological Seminary to deliver the Bishop Paddock Lectures. But he had a more important reason for returning to America; he wrote to a close friend of "my mission in the homeland which was not merely or chiefly to raise money but to bear by testimony to the serious character and the large opportunity of our work in the Orient."[1] Brent was aware of his growing influence with the American public and also with the policy-makers in Washington. Through articles in religious and popular journals he tried to impress upon the public the importance

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[1]Brent to Mrs. Foster: January 19, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 49.

of America's work in the Orient. He tried to achieve the same goal with government officials through private talks and confidential discussions. He believed that it was his civic duty to attempt to educate the American people on the Philippine problem, to show them how important it was that the United States remain in control of the islands.

It is difficult to assess the extent of the Bishop's impact on the American people and on the government officials in Washington. In the case of the latter, it would seem that Brent's direct influence was slight, although his opinions carried some weight with Roosevelt and more with Taft. With regard to his magazine articles and speeches, the Bishop's impact on public opinion is even more difficult to measure. His articles were widely read, and on occasion provoked criticism and replies in print. His speeches were well attended, but the extent of his hold on his audiences is impossible to determine. In general it may be said that the Bishop, as his reputation and reknown increased, exerted some influence on both the American people and their leaders, but the extent of his impact cannot be described with any accuracy.

The Bishop arrived in New York on September 13. From September until January of 1905 he traveled around the country, preaching, writing, and lecturing. During this period he made two trips to Washington--one in September and October of 1904 and another in January of 1905. On both occasions he conferred with the President and Secretary Taft.

On September 19, Brent received word that Roosevelt wished to discuss the Philippine situation with him. On September 25 the Bishop lunched at the White House with Roosevelt and they discussed Philippine matters.[2] Brent again lunched with Roosevelt on October 4; at this meeting the President discussed plans for a Japanese national church. Apparently the Japanese Ambassador, Baron Kosoro Takahira (who was also a luncheon guest that day) had broached the subject to Roosevelt, who then consulted Bishop brent.[3] Nothing ever came of the plan, but the incident indicates the President's high regard for Brent's judgment.

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[2]See Brent Diary: September 25, 1904. Unfortunately, Bishop Brent left no detailed record of his conversation with the President, so we can only surmise what was said.

[3]Ibid., October 4, 1904.

Brent liked Roosevelt's attitude on the Philippines and reported that as far as he could judge the people agreed with the President.[4] He himself supported Roosevelt's administration and his bid for re-election in 1904. When Roosevelt won the election Brent was exultant. "It insures a future for the Philipinos," he exclaimed.[5] He was delighted that the Roosevelt policy of American rule in the Philippines would be maintained. He was however distressed to note that the Philippine question had become a target of partisan politics.

Brent wrote Roosevelt a letter of congratulation on his victory at the polls and received a warm reply. "I thank you for your letter. I thank you still more for what you have done in and concerning the Philippine Islands. My troubles about the Islands will be small if there are only enough Americans of your stamp to go there as officials, as laymen, and as clergymen. Let me see you when you come to Washington."[6] It is not surprising

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[4]Brent to General Henry T. Allen: October 12, 1904. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[5]Brent Diary: November 8, 1904.

[6]Theodore Roosevelt to Brent: November 10, 1904. Brent Papers, Box 6.

that Roosevelt was impressed with Bishop Brent's character. The two men held very similar ideas regarding American policy, particularly Philippine policy. Brent at this time was a true Rooseveltian, subscribing not only to the President's political views, but also to his personal outlook on life.

Taft as well as Roosevelt was aware of Brent's widening influence. When an article appeared in October, 1904 in a popular magazine criticizing the administration's policy in the Philippines, Taft asked Brent to write a refutation. The Secretary realized that Brent was extremely busy and also that he might not wish to get involved in an editorial confrontation, "but your opportunity for observation and your position are such that they would give very great weight to the article."[7]

Brent's refutation did eventually appear in print as an article in the North American Review in September, 1905. Entitled "American Democracy in the Far East", Brent's article upheld the theory of colonialism while looking hopefully towards a future Philippine nation. He did criticize the United States tariff policy, but upheld United States Philippine policy in general.

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[7]Taft to Brent: October 13, 1904. Taft papers, LC, Series 8, Subseries semi-official, Volume 41.

The viewpoint which the Bishop expressed in this and other articles was his own personal judgment of various aspects of the Philippine situation, a judgment which developed only gradually as a result of his years in the islands. Although his general view of the position and future of the Philippines had been well developed even before 1901, his stand on specific questions and issues emersed only after he had viewed the situation from a Philippine vantage point.

It is impossible to determine the effect of Brent's article on the American public, but Theodore Roosevelt was very pleased with it. The President wrote Brent that he also hoped that the Filipinos would one day be able to stand alone as an independent nation. "I cannot express this hope too vividly in public, as it would be sure to be held to apply to the present decade,whereas it may not apply for a century to come."[8] Roosevelt welcomed even Brent's criticism of specific administration policies such as the tariff, believing that the Bishop had offered constructive criticism rather than destructive rituperation.

On Brent's second visit to Washington, he met with Roosevelt on January 3 and again on January 14, 1905. They

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[8]See Roosevelt to Brent: May 19, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 6.

conferred together about religious education and the Philippine opium Law of 1906. Taft, who was also present for these discussions, suggested that the high license system of opium control, rather than the Government monopoly which Brent endorsed, should be enacted for the PHilippines. Roosevelt endorsed delay of any opium bill.[9] Taft also told the Bishop to impress on the Filipinos that there would be no popular assembly before March of 1907.

Bishop Brent also conferred privately with Secretary Taft about Philippine matters on several occasions during the course of his second visit to Washington. Taft agreed with the Bishop that Congress should not have so rigid a control of Philippine legislation;[10] both men beleived that the Philippine Commission should have a larger voice in the government of the islands. Taft was responsible for introducing Brent to Roosevelt's entire cabinet on January 3.

Bishop Brent left New York for Europe on January 16, 1905 and arrived in Britain on January 23. Before sailing on to Manila, he visited London, Paris, and Lausanne. While in London, Brent arranged several discussions of Philippine and other colonial problems with

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[10] Ibid., January 2, 1905.

James Bryce, Britain's Ambassador to the United States, and Sir Arthur Godley of the India office. Bryce agreed with Brent that the Philippine Commission should have fuller legislative powers. The Ambassador and Godley, Brent reported, succeeded in giving the Bishop a good grasp of England's general colonial policy.[11]

Brent sailed from Rome in February 1905, with Manila as his final destination. However, he first arranged to stop for several days in Cairo. He wished to study first-hand the techniques and machinery of British colonial rule. As he wrote to Bishop Hall:

> In many ways the situation (of the British) is closely analogous to our own problem in the Philippines. I have felt that we could get more of practical value from a consideration of the work here (Cairo) than from any other bit of colonial work in existence, except, perhaps, from the Japanese occupation of Formosa.[12]

While in Cairo, Brent spoke with many colonial officials and found them all most helpful. He was particularly interested in the views of Lord Cromer, whom he interviewed. Cromer, and many other British colonial officials, believed that Egypt would never be ready for

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[11]Brent to George Wharton Pepper: March 30, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[12]Brent to Bishop Hall: February 22, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 56.

self-government. In Cromer's estimation, the Oriental was incapable of understanding democracy.[13]

Brent was much impressed with Cromer's career in Egypt; he called it "perhaps the most conspicuous bit of service ever rendered by an affluent to a bankrupt nation."[14] Although the Egyptians had not expressed their gratitude, this did not matter. In Brent's view, Egypt under Cromer had gone from bankruptcy to relative affluence, and Egyptian national consciousness had become a potent force. The British rule in Egypt, so the Bishop believed, has been extremely beneficial to the Egyptians whether or not they appreciated it.

However Brent was convinced that the American record in the Philippines was just as good if not better. And while America could learn from Britain's colonial experience, she would have to go her own way and not imitate Britain's personnel policy. Lord Cromer, he pointed out, allowed none but the very best and most efficient men to remain under his direction. The United States could follow no better policy in the Philippines.

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[13]See Brent to Taft: March 6, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 6. Also Brent to George Wharton Pepper: March 30, 1905.

[14]Brent <u>The Churchman</u> 109 (February 28, 1914), p. 285.

Brent was not sure whether he agreed with Lord Cromer in a belief that the Oriental was incapable of understanding democracy. "I think he is right from what I have seen. On the other hand one cannot tell what effect the pressure of Western thought will accomplish on the Eastern mind."[15] Perhaps the best answer given to Cromer was that of Taft in reply to Brent's letter of March 6: "I note with great interest what you say about Lord Cromer, and the general view of the impossibility of developing the Oriental into a self-governing individual. We shall try it at any rate, and then we shall know better than we do from the judgment of others."[16]

From Cairo, Brent sailed directly to Manila, arriving on April 3. Four months later, Taft visited the islands with a group of officials and private citizens. This early "fact-finding commission" included congressmen and Senators, journalists and politicians. Taft asked the Bishop to accompany the group as it toured the islands, and so Brent became an unofficial member of the commission. The tour lasted from August 13 to 28, then after a few final

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[15]Brent to George Wharton Pepper: March 30, 1905.

[16]Taft to Brent: April 4, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 6.

days in Manila, the Congressional party sailed for home on August 31, 1905.

The Bishop had been apprehensive about the Commission's visit to the Islands. He feared that the problems involved were extremely complicated, and therefore, the Commission could not hope to gather an accurate picture of conditions in the Philippines from a month's visit. The only result would be a strengthening of existing prejudices and "the raising of a discordant chorus such as will tend to mystify more than ever the American public."[17] But at the conclusion of the visit, Brent had to admit that his fears had been unjustified. The Commissioners of both parties had displayed admirable unity and loyalty to Taft. The Bishop particularly commended the freedom (from any partisan spirit) which had prevailed throughout the course of the visit.[18]

Brent was pleased that full freedom of speech had been allowed to the Filipinos during the Commission's visit. As a result, the Commissioners heard more than one impassioned plea for immediate independence from Filipino

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[17]Brent to Roosevelt: July 14, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 60.

[18]Brent to Roosevelt: September 2, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 60.

orators. On these occasions, Taft generally gave a speech in reply, stressing the Philipinos' need to display a capacity for self-government rather than merely asking for independence. Even the Democrats in the party, Brent noted, realized "the absurdity of continuing the independence cry."[19] But with both sides able to express their convictions freely, the Bishop hoped that tensions would ease and reason prevail.

Brent looked for permanent results from the Commissions visit in the form of tafiff revision by Congress. He hoped that at least limited free trade between the PHilippines and the United States would replace the prevailing customs duties. But free trade alone was not enough; what was needed also was the introduction of more American capital into the islands.[20]

The Bishop was aware of the drawbacks as well as the accomplishments of the visit of the commission. In his estimation, the commissioners saw too many celebrations and too little of life in the provinces. Thus the picture which

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[19]Brent to Edith: August 26, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 49.

[20]Ibid. The amount of American capital invested in the Philippines increased steadily throughout the period of the American occupation.

they received was perhaps inevitably incomplete. But the achievements far outweighed the drawbacks, or so Brent believed.

Despite his travels, both abroad and within the PHilippine Archipelago, Bishop Brent's first concern was his missionary episcopate. Work proceeded, though at a slower pace, during his absences from the islands. While he was in the United States and Europe in 1904-5, the Cathedral House was completed in Manila, and the Columbia Club organized and financed. A rectory was built, and both the settlement house and the dispensary prospered. Work at the mission stations of Bontoc, Sagada, and Zamoanga also progressed.

When the Bishop returned to the islands in April, 1905 he found episcopal affairs in fairly good order. Throughout Brent's years in the Philippines, his co-workers found that his frequent absences created problems in the administration of the Diocese. These absences were made necessary by the need to raise funds in America. So when the Bishop was away, the missionary work was carried on by his subordinates, though often at a disadvantage.

Brent on his return to Manila inaugurated two major projects--a Cathedral and a hospital. In 1905 he purchased

additional land for the proposed cathedral. The corner-stone was laid on January 25, 1906 and construction began. The exterior of the building was completed a year later, and on February 3, 1907 Brent consecrated the newly-built Cathedral of St. Mary and St. John.

The hospital proved to be more of a long-range project. Although the Bishop reported in 1905 that public opinion supported the idea of a free hospital for Filipinos,[21] it proved difficult to secure any more tangible support. Brent also had to secure the co-operation of the Philippine commission, which was slow in forth-coming. In 1906, however, Governor General Henry C. Ide made $5,000 available to Brent's dispensary. Eventually the Bishop was able to purchase the necessary land to construct a hospital. By July of 1907, the first ward of St. Luke's Hospital had been built and was affiliated with the new government medical school in Manila. Bishop Brent was always aware of the value of medical missions. He had great plans for St. Luke's; he hoped to secure an endowment and to start training Filipino nurses. Both these goals were later realized.

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[21]Brent, "The Joys of Pioneering," The Spirit of Missions 70 (November, 1905), p. 838.

Brent also planned other medical work in the islands. Father Staunton attempted to organize a dispensary at Sagada but failed. The Bishop in later years attempted to institute a hospital ship which would reach outlying areas of the islands, but he was never able to raise the necessary funds. Nevertheless, St. Luke's, and later the hospital which would be established at Zamboanga, continued as impressive expressions of the Bishop's belief in the value of medical missions.

By the end of 1905 the Columbia Club, which provided wholesome recreational facilities for the American residents of Manila, was proving very popular and was self-supporting. The Chinese mission in the city, while small, was prospering under Studley's careful direction. In addition to all his other duties, the Bishop had found the time to preach on two occasions to congregations aboard ships in the harbor. But Brent wished to see even more accomplished. One deficient area was education. Brent reported that American children in Manila were so pporly provided for by the United States government that they were being sent to convents.[22] Brent complained to the Superintendant of Education about this state of affairs.

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[22]Brent to Bishop Lawrence: April 26, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 6.

One problem to be overcome was a lack of housing, and the Bishop hoped eventually to establish self-supporting dormitories.

Bishop Brent was also deeply concerned about the problem of Oriental Christianity as a whole. He believed that Christianity was the only answer to Oriental backwardness, and a necessary prelude to any kind of national life in the East. Yet he realized the value of Eastern philosophy and religion and hoped for a synthesis which would preserve all that was good in Oriental thought. He criticized his fellow missioners who tried to abolish native religions and customs and to impose Christianity from without. What was needed, he believed was an indigenous Christianity which would be exemplified in a native hierarchy.[23]

This is one of the finest examples of Brent's ecumenism. He voiced hope for a synthesis of Oriental and Christian thought, a radical proposal indeed and one undreamed of by most of his contemporaries, both Eastern and Western. This idea illustrates perfectly the Bishop's growing vision of unity. While he would devote much of

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[23]See Brent to Bishop Hall: February 22, 1905. Also Brent to Mrs. Markoe. December 9, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 49.

his life to the promotion of unity among Christian churches, he was able at this early date to go beyond even this ambitious vision and dream of the ultimate unity of Christianity with the Oriental world. He was thinking at this time of the Orient as a whole, not of the peculiar situation in which he found himself in the Philippines. There Christianity had already been established, creating problems of a different order.

Throughout 1906 and the first half of 1907, Brent was able to continue his missionary work with relatively few interruptions. He divided this work into four departments--English-speaking people, Christianized Filipinos, Chinese, and Pagan tribes. Among the English-speaking people three congregations had been organized. One of these, the Cathedral congregation, was self-supporting. The second congregation was really an extension of the first--the Americans and other foreigners on vacation at Baguio. The third group was composed largely of army men and their families on the Island of Zamboanga. The congregation at Zamboanga however was without a missionary as the man who had been in charge had to leave. An army chaplain conducted services until Brent was able to supply another missionary.

With regard to the Christianized Filipinos, Brent was undertaking more work among them than he had originally planned. Settlement work in the poorer districts of Manila continued. St. Luke's Hospital was intended to benefit primarily the Christian natives. A chapel had been established for the natives in Manila, and Brent appealed for a missioner with a fluent command of the Spanish language to come and work among them.[24] The Bishop also hoped to establish a school for Filipino boys in the capital.

New projects had been inaugurated among the Pagan tribes. In 1906 Brent founded Easter School for Igorot Boys at Baguio. The school building was built with the money which the government had paid the Bishop for his services on the Opium Investigating Committee. Both the Bontoc and Sagada missions were prospering, Brent reported, but there was a great need for more workers.[25]

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[24]Brent, "Report of the Bishop of the Missionary District of the Philippine Islands", The Annual Report of the Board of Missions of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America (New York, 1907), p. 166. Hereafter Brent's reports will be referred to by number (First Annual Report, Second Annual Report, etc.) and the volumes in which they appear will be referred to as Board of Missions Report.

[25]Ibid., p. 168

The gravest problem which Brent faced in his work among the Pagan tribes was that of Catholic competition. When the Catholic authorities heard of Brent's work at Sagada and Bontoc, they attempted to counter it by sending out Catholic priests. At first, Priests visited the hill country only occasionally, but in 1907 Brent learned the Catholic Bishop was establishing a mission staffed by Belgian priests in the Bontoc-Sagada area. Brent thought that this type of rivalry was silly, in view of the large areas which lacked Christian ministers of any kind. Again the Bishop displayed his characteristic dislike of proselytizing and rivalry between Christian churches. "Of course we shall continue quietly with our work, and so far as possible maintain the unity of spirit in the bond of peace."[26]

Brent had reported as early as 1904 that his relations with the Catholic Church were becoming increasingly delicate and difficult;[27] in 1905 he accused the Catholics of trying to loosen his hold on his people. He mentioned a number of defections from his Episcopal flock and stated

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[26]Brent, "Among the Philippine Mountains," The Spirit of Missions 72 (August, 1907), p. 670.

[27]Brent to General Henry T. Allen: October 12, 1904.

that anti-Protestant propaganda was rife both among civilians and army people. He feared that the local Catholic hierarchy would attempt to control appointments in the civil government. Brent decided that he would report the matter both to President Roosevelt and to Taft if the situation continued unchanged. This reveals the continuing dichotomy in Brent's thinking with regard to the Catholic Church. On the one hand he desired unity and abhorred proselytizing; on the other he continued to fear the power of the Vatican and the Catholic hierarchy, and he refused to abandon his Boutoc and Sagada missions in the face of Catholic competition. "As you know, I am not a violent opponent of the Roman Church as a Christian organization, but as a mode of intrigue and as a political meddler, and as an institution that uses methods unworthy of the name of Christian and hardly that of moral, I shall oppose it to the bitter end."[28]

Relations between Brent and the Catholics were further complicated by the continued growth of the Aglipayan church. Brent saw no reason to alter his original judgment

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[28]Brent to Bishop Lawrence: April 26, 1905. Brent apparently never voiced his suspicions to Roosevelt or Taft; his correspondence during this period is devoid of any reference to problems with the Catholic Church. One reason for his silence may have been the fact that both Roosevelt and Taft were personal friends of Cardinal Gibbons.

of the movement: ". . . The Aglipay movement is now what it was at first--largely a political agitation. . ."[29] Its strength still lay in its nationalistic, anti-Catholic, and anti-Friar bias, rather than in any positive program of its own. Aglipay visited Brent after the Bishop returned from his trip to America; the Filipino said he had not answered Brent's letters because he had been away in the provinces. He also urged Brent to tell the government that he was not a political meddler. Brent's laconic reaction to this was "I did not believe him for a minute."[30]

Brent at times was afraid he was making a mistake in not being more friendly to the Aglipayans, but upon reviewing Aglipay's actions, he was convinced he could take no other course.

> I am conscious that there is a danger of our allowing a legitimate revolt of the poor people against ecclesiastical tyranny to go unsupported, but the whole thing as it stands is so unclean that I do not see how we can ally ourselves with it. . . . Bishop Herzog says that if there are five good men in the Aglipay movement there are enough for us to co-operate with; that is perfectly true, but on the other hand if there are five good men in the Roman Catholic Church

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[29]Brent, "Various Notes on Philippine Matters," The Spirit of Missions 71 (May, 1906), p. 375. Brent talked with an Aglipayan churchman who frankly admitted that his connection with the movement was for social and political rather than religious ends. See Brent Diary: October 5, 1905.

[30]Brent to Bishop Lawrence: April 26, 1905.

> there are enough to co-operate with them. Thus far we have been unable to find the five good men among the Aglipay fold.[31]

And so the Bishop continued to withhold his support from the Aglipayan Church.

Political problems continued to occupy Brent's attention during this period. The Bishop was as concerned as ever over the question of Philippine independence. He pointed out that there was no difference of opinion in the United States over the ultimate goal--liberty for the Filipinos. The questions at issue were ones of times and methods.[32] Brent was disgusted with the criticism of the anti-imperialists who desired immediate independence for the islands. In a letter to one of them he remarked that he and most other Americans in the Islands would be delighted to give the Filipinos independence immediately, if some feasible administration could be worked out. However, the Bishop observed, no constructive program for independence had been forthcoming.[33] This represents no great change in Brent's thinking. He continued to believe that the Filipinos

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[31]Brent to Bishop Greer: March 5,1906. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[32]Brent, Liberty and Other Sermons (New York: 1906), p. 143.

[33]Brent to Mr. Herbert Welsh: February 13, 1907. Brent Papers, Box 6.

were incapable of self-government at that time, and their inability was the main reason for the lack of any feasible plan for immediate independence.

Brent also continued to criticize the ultra-conservatives who objected to retention of the islands on constitutional grounds. Independence was not, Brent argued, essential to liberty. And changes in the Constitution were not necessarily dangerous. The Bishop always deplored excessive worship of the Constitution.

Not that Brent believed that the United States' governing of the Islands had been perfect. He continued to fulfill his duties as a citizen by criticizing various aspects of that rule, calling for reforms, suggesting alternative policies. He criticised the personnel in the islands: Too many of the men were inefficient and mediocre. He criticized a lack of understanding on the part of the United States: An attempt had been made to impose democracy without trying to understand the Oriental viewpoint. "We have been guilty of the one thing that the Oriental above all else hates--we have hurried him."[34] Haste led to extravagance and loss of perspective, so Brent believed--another reason for the continuation of American rule in the islands.

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[34]Brent, "American Democracy in the Far East," North American Review 181 (September, 1905), p. 340.

But Brent continued to stress his belief that the Filipinos were not yet ready for Democracy. They would need, he was convinced, generations of schooling before they would be sophisticated enough to put democratic principles into action. They were more accustomed to despotism than to democracy. Democratic methods might work perfectly in Massachusetts, for instance, but ceased to be democratic when applied to the Orient. Americans had to realize this situation, and the Bishop, in countless articles and books, tried to make them aware of it.

> . . . Just because our independence was the dramatic starting point from which we moved up into constructive liberty, we are ensnared into making independence a synonym of liberty, and forcing it down the throat of others without considering whether or not it fits the case--an error that not a few unpractical Americans have made in connection . . . the Philippines.[35]

After Secretary Taft left the Philippines, Brent had hoped for a revision in the tariff policy of the United States. But as time went on and nothing was done, he began to protest against the inaction of Congress. The Bishop was himself a free-trade advocate, and he wanted to see the Philippines given a free or at least a fair market in the United States. Industrial autonomy was also necessary, he believed. The Philippines, he pointed out, were in a state

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[35]Brent, Liberty, p. 10.

of economic unrest. Industrially they still had not recovered from the war and Emilo Aguinaldo's nationalistic revolt. In addition to an enlarged market, the industrial effieiency of the islands needed improvement. A freer market and a more efficient industrial system would be, the Bishop believed, an important step on the road to eventual independence for the islands.

In 1906, a tariff reduction proposal was killed by the Senate Philippine Committee, and Brent was furious. Vested interest groups such as sugar and tobacco producers had appeared in Congressional hearings and testified against reduction. Brent "went on the warpath", as he put it,[36] and wrote an article for the New York Outlook which appeared on July 14, 1906.

The Bishop pointed out that the Philippine Commission had advocated fair trade for the Philippines and an open market for Philippine products. The people of the United States had agreed, but Congress refused to follow their wishes. When the tariff was revised in 1905, American manufacturers had dictated changes, hoping to gain control of the insular trade. Brent protested against all special interest legislation with regard to the pHilippines, but his

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[36]Brent to Frederick Morgan: March 15, 1906. Brent Papers, Box 6.

main target was the United States cotton industry. "Congress apparently is the servant of the cotton industry."[37] The result of this preferential legislation was a foisting of American cottons on reluctant buyers. The Filipinos were forced to buy textiles which they did not want and could not afford. The Bishop called for action by Congress to end this sorry state of affairs.

Brent's article aroused a good deal of indignation but no general tariff revision was undertaken by Congress. The Bishop continued his crusade against what he regarded as an injustice on the part of Congress. During a visit to the United States in 1907, he gave several speeches advocating free trade or at least a reduction of tariff duties. But Congress made no move to reduce the tariff until 1909, and full free trade was established only in 1913.[38]

Brent was also concerned about the new Philippine Assembly which finally became a reality in 1907. He feared that it would bring only trouble and chaos. He observed

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[37]Brent, "Tyranny or Democracy--Which?" Outlook 83 (July 14, 1906), p. 600.

[38]The Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909 established free trade between the United States and the PHilippines except for rice and a quota limitation on sugar and tobacco. Full free trade was established by the Underwood-Simmons Tariff of 1913.

that few Filipinos had registered to vote for the assembly. Most of them did not know the date of the election, or even its purpose. At a meeting of Filipino teachers, when they were asked the purpose of the election, one thought it was a vote for independence and another an election of delegates who would appoint admirals and generals. The other educators knew nothing about the election.[39] Thus the Filipinos themselves were again proving their unreadiness for self-government.

Brent also felt that the Filipino people had been deceived. Americans in the islands had addressed the Filipinos ambiguously. The natives believed they had been promised immediate independence, and thought that the assembly would bring this about. The Americans on the other hand believed for the most part that they were in the Philippines to stay. The Bishop pleaded for truthfulness, courage, and honesty on the part of all American government officials.

Brent returned to America in July of 1907 and was thus absent when Taft opened the Assembly in Manila on October 16. The Bishop informed Roosevelt of his fears for the future of the Philippines under the new local administration. According to Brent, Roosevelt agreed but believed

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[39]Brent to Leonard Wood: August 4, 1907. Brent Papers, Box 63.

that the pressure of public opinion had demanded the creation of the assembly and that the United States must make the best of the situation.[40]

Brent also feared that Taft would receive an erroneous impression of the accomplishments of his visit. The Bishop was convinced that Taft did not realize the force of his own personality. According to Brent, Taft could carry a situation temporarily by personal charm and believe that he had achieved a permanent settlement. In his speech to the assembly Taft had promised ultimate self-government, and the independence agitation in the islands seemed to have died away. But the Bishop wondered what the exact situation was after Taft's departure. He voiced his fears in a letter to Leonard Wood, and the general agreed with him.[41]

The Bishop in these years between his first and second visits to the United States formed new friendships with influential men in the Islands and renewed old ones. His personal contacts with officials in Manila gave him an inside view of many aspects of the United States administration of the islands. For instance, when Governor General

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[40]Brent to Colonel Rivers: November 15, 1907. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[41]Brent to Leonard Wood: November 22, 1907. Brent Papers, Box 62. Leonard Wood to Brent: December 30, 1907. Brent Papers, Box 62.

Wright was removed from his post early in 1906, Brent reported that the Government's action had a very unsettling effect on the administration in Manila.[42] The Bishop felt that Wright's recall was a mistake. He saw it as one more example of legialative and executive intefference in the work of the Philippine Commission. As he viewed the situation, the Commission was unable to carry out any effective policy, as a result of Congressional interference.

The Commission was also hampered in Brent's opinion by sudden changes of personnel and by the dishonesty of many of the subordinate officials. He called for reform--for a longer term of office and for a higher caliber of officials.. "Our leaders lack administrative experience and knowledge, and they are too timid in handling the natives. They are indulgent and full of weak theories."[43] Only if changes were made could the Commission hope to stop political agitation and to make real progress towards eventual self-government.

Wright remained in the Philippines for some time after being removed from the post of Governor General. President Roosevelt had recommended him for an appointment

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[42]Brent to Bishop Greer: March 5, 1906.

[43]Brent to his Sister Helen: December 31, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 49.

as Governor of one of the Provinces. Aware of Brent's influence with the Commission, Wright approached him and asked the Bishop to intercede for him with the new Governor General, Henry C. Ide. Brent refused, saying that it was not his province to recommend individuals for office.[44] Wright was eventually appointed Minister to Tokyo.

Brent's relations with the Philippine Commission and especially with Dean C. Worcester continued to be stormy at times. In 1906 the Bishop preached a sermon at the Cathedral in Manila, in which he called on the Commissioners to be moral as well as political leaders. He accused them of gambling, and condemned even moderate gambling as a vice. He urged them as representatives of the United States to set a good example to the Filipinos.[45]

The sermon aroused a storm of protest. Even William Cameron Forbes, a good friend of Brent's,was indignant. "(Brent) intimates indirectly that we are gamblers, which isn't true of us--any of us."[46] Worcester was highly incensed. One purpose of the sermon had been

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[44]Brent Diary: July 5, 1906.

[45]Brent, Prisoners of Hope and Other Sermons (New York: 1915), pp. 198-99.

[46]Journal of William Cameron Forbes, LC., First Series, Volume 2; July 30, 1906.

to secure the Commission's support for Brent's proposed gambling reform movement. Worcester criticized the Bishop for calling attention to the Commission's reluctance to endorse the reform (which was not really within the Commission's jurisdiction) and for accusing the Commissioners themselves of wrongdoing without adequate facts to substantiate his charges. It would seem that Brent, who had seen the evil results of gambling among the natives, had been driven to espouse an extreme position in the hope of remedying the situation.

But the antagonism between Brent and Worcester was a long-lasting affair of which the Commissioner's reaction to the Bishop's sermon was only one instance. Their personalities were utterly incompatible; indeed many besides Brent found Worcester difficult to get along with. In addition, Brent continued to disagree with Worcester's policy toward the non-Christian tribes. Both men were outspoken in their views, and Brent accused Worcester of insolence. Worcester had also, the Bishop charged, attacked verbally his missioners at Sagada who were putting Brent's policies into effect.[47]

Fortunately the Bishop's relations with the Commission and its members were not always so stormy. One

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[47]Brent Diary: July 28, 1906.

of those who was destined to become a very close friend in the years to come was William Cameron Forbes. Brent first met Forbes in April 1905, and found him very likeable. Forbes reciprocated the Bishop's feeling, and they became confidants. They met on several occasions to discuss government matters, and Forbes became one of Brent's "inside sources" on the governmental situation. In April of 1906, after a confidential talk with Forbes, Brent reported that the situation was very serious, with friction and difficulty on all sides.[48] Later in the year, the Bishop noted that Forbes was very despondent about the political situation in Manila. The Commissioner attributed some of the difficulties to the uncertain and wavering policy of the Government at home.[49]

Leonard Wood agreed with Forbes' estimate of the ill effects of United States policy. The General as he told Brent desired that the Islands be given a definite status--either territorial or colonial.[50] Brent and Wood continued to see a good deal of each other, and the Bishop's admiration for the General increased. Brent noted in 1905 that according to rumor Wood was about to be appointed Governor General.

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[48] Ibid., April 26, 1906.

[49] Ibid., August 2, 1906.

[50] Ibid., May 25, 1906.

> If this is the case there is every reason to expect that progress will make more rapid strides than hitherto. Everything tends to confirm my earlier conviction regarding him (Wood), namely that he is a man of energy, determination and ability, and with a fuller knowledge of the mind and possibilities of the oriental than most of the men who have been sent out from America.[51]

Wood was actually appointed Governor General in 1921 and served until his death in 1927. Brent regarded him as a combination of efficient administrator and far-sighted statesman. The Bishop rejoiced when in 1906 the General was appointed Commander-in-chief of the Army in the Philippines.

Brent's friendship with Taft endured, but in 1907 the Bishop had some harsh words to say about his friend's Philippine policy.

> Secretary Taft has been playing politics a little bit too hard, and . . . he had better take a rest from them in relation to the Philippine Islands: some grave mistakes have been made recently which are going to cripple us. If the Secretary would use self-restraint, and not interfere in what I consider other peoples' business, viz. The management of details and local appointments, he would do more to advance the interests of the Islands than by keeping everything in his grip. I am saying this from inside knowledge. The Governor-General (James F. Smith) and others in high office are obliged to bend to his will, but they have done so at the sacrifice of their own judgment.[52]

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[51]Brent to Frederick G. Morgan: May 13, 1905. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[52]Brent to Bishop Satterlee: January 26, 1907. Brent Papers, Box 6.

It is interesting to speculate on the source of Brent's "inside knowledge". Most likely his informant was Forbes, but unfortunately neither man has left a record of it. It would seem from the foregoing that relations between the War Department in Washington and the Commission in Manila were very strained indeed at this time.

Brent continued to muse over Lord Cromer's proposition that the Oriental was incapable of democratic government. In 1905 he had believed that the Oriental knew only one form of government--despotism, and it was doubtful whether he could be taught democratic principles as the West understood them.

> It remains to be seen whether . . . The Western principle of government and the Western sequence of thought will assume some day lasting dominance over Oriental life or in a marked degree modify it. The most we can say at this juncture is that prevailing conditions and our brief though chequered experience are such as to convince us as a nation that there is a door opened. . . .[53]

By 1906 Brent was aware of a new spirit in the Far East. "It is significant that in various oriental nations there are stirrings of national spirit and aspiration. Is the East really awakening?"[54] By 1907 Brent had no doubt that the East was indeed awakening.

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[53]Brent, Liberty, p. 153.

[54]Brent Diary: September 21, 1906.

> The awakening East, with its cry for the recognition of nationalism, makes me feel that despite all our errors in the Philippines we somehow struck the right note. I believe that the nationalism of India, Egypt, and China so far as we get glimpses of it, is the effect of democracy, and in essence it is a democratic movement.[55]

Thus in a little over two years the Bishop's viewpoint had altered radically. He had originally been inclined to agree with Lord Cromer that democracy was impossible for Orientals. But after two more years in the Orient, he saw signs of national awakening everywhere in the Far East and, even more important, he believed that this new national consciousness which he observed was essentially democratic. Whether or not it would prove to be a permanent state rather than a temporary situation, Brent could not tell. But it existed, and the Bhsiop believed it must be dealt with seriously.[56]

This is indeed a major change in the Bishop's viewpoint. It demonstrates his flexibility and his open-mindedness. Brent was always willing to change his opinions if the facts proved him wrong. Even more important, the Bishop was fully aware of his ideological shifts and willing

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[55]Brent to Major Carter: May 30, 1907. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[56]Brent to Archbishop Davidson: February 28, 1907. Brent Papers, Box 6.

to admit that he had been wrong. He was a rare man--one who was willing to recognize and admit his mistakes.

Brent's own personal outlook had changed along with his changing views on Oriental nationalism. He revealed that he had been brought up in the belief that the Western way of dealing with Eastern life, both in religion and in government, was the only correct way. "It has been only at the cost of violence to my early convictions that I have reached a new view-point. I try to be dispassionate, and my critical faculty, as well as my experience in Far Eastern matters compel me to lay stress on these various expressions of national aspiration with which we are confronted."[57] The Bishop believed that England was making a mistake in colonial policy, that she was not aware of latent possibilities which existed among the natives in her colonies.

> We are not wholly free from a similar fault: the contemptuous expressions about Filipinos, many of which I have been guilty myself, do no good, and betray a lack of sympathy and a failure to see the other man's point of view which are fatal to a just weighing of the limitations and capacity of inferior peoples.[58]

Brent still believed in the inferiority of the Filipinos, but he now felt that they had more of a capacity for

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[57] Ibid.

[58] Brent to Major Carter: May 30, 1907.

nationalism and eventual self-government than he had previously realized.

The Bishop was also concerned with the question of leadership, especially leadership in a democracy. In the Philippines as in the United States, he believed, political leaders had listened too much to the people and as a result had deferred to them rather than leading them. The Philippine Commission had been guilty of this error. "The uncivilized peoples will never be developed, but will be pushed further back into the wilds of barbarism until the Commission ceases its absurd attempt to give them popular government and unflinchingly bends them against their own tastes in the directions in which we all want them to move in."[59] A true leader, he believed, must not follow the crowd unless he has determined that the crowd is right. And in the case of the Filipino crowd who clamored for independence, the crowd was wrong. Although Brent's opinion of the Filipinos' capacity for self-government had changed, the Bishop still believed firmly in the necessity of continuing American rule of the Islands.

Brent marked back to the historical polarity between Hamilton and Jefferson to explain his views of democracy.

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[59]Brent to Major Carter: July 23, 1906. Brent Papers, Box 6.

He admitted that he was anti-Jeffersonian and inclined more to Hamiltonian centralization. "Unmodified democracy is suited only to a perfect race and lays too much stress on the rights of the individual. I am more of Hamilton's mind: His ideal was the hive, Jefferson's the bee, Burr's the honey!"[60] The Bishop-believed that his centralism was in full accord with democracy. He felt that the United States could afford to give the central authority (that is, the President) great power without any fear of tyranny. The President would be protected from unleashed personal ambition by his own common sense and by the attitude of the people.[61]

Brent returned to the United States for a second visit on July 27, 1907. He had been asked to deliver another lecture series, this time the Noble Lectures at Harvard. In addition, his perennial shortage of funds required another series of personal appeals to his friends in America. He arrived in New York in September of 1907 and spent the next five months traveling around the country before returning to Manila by way of Europe. As he left the Philippines he penned an unforgettable description of life in the islands:

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[60]Brent to Leonard Wood: August 4, 1907.

[61]Brent to Major Carter: May 30, 1907.

> The Filipino agitator is still mouthing his highflown phrases, the Commission sits daily on its cushion of tacks, committees on entertainment are taking shape in view of the advent of the Secretary of War (to open the Assembly), the band nightly discourses sweet music on the Luneta, and the oriental world generally wags merrily.[62]

While in the United States, the Bishop took advantage of Roosevelt's standing invitation to drop in at the White House. The two men had a long discussion about PHilippine affairs and the anti-imperialist movement. Roosevelt agreed with Brent's criticism of the home government in the Islands. The Bishop believed that the President was too bound up with public sentiment, the very thing which Brent had criticized in a leader. Roosevelt in turn criticized Brent for not making clear that his position was not one of anti-imperialism. The President felt that Brent should have reiterated his belief in the essential worth of the United States Government of the Islands. We may surmise that Brent's changing opinion of the Oriental capacity for self-government has had an effect in the United States which Roosevelt had become aware of. The Bishop agreed that Roosevelt's criticism was fair, but he remarked that the anti-imperialists hated him more than ever.[63]

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[62]Brent to Leonard Wood: August 27, 1907. Brent Papers, Box 63.

[63]Brent to Mrs. George Wharton Pepper: September 28, 1907. Brent Papers, Box 63. It should have been obvious to

During this trip Brent met and was greatly impressed by Charles Evans Hughes. The Bishop had been following his career with interest; when Hughes was elected Governor of New York in 1906, Brent called it "a victory for clean government."[64] The Bishop dined with Hughes in November of 1907 and was impressed by his "quiet forcefulness."[65] Brent still hoped that his friend Taft would be the Republican Presidential candidate, but he believed that Highes would have a good chance for the nomination. He confided to Bishop Arthur Hall that he would not be upset if Hughes won over Taft, and he picked Bryan to oppose him.[66]

Meanwhile, Missionary work in the Philippines continued during 1907 and 1908 largely in Brent's absence. While in Manila for the first session of the Assembly, Secretary Taft had formally opened St. Luke's Hospital in October, 1907. By 1908 Brent's Filipino nursing school, affiliated with the hospital, had been organized. From the

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anyone who was at all familiar with Brent's views that the Bishop was not an anti-imperialist and that he approved of America's "mission" in the Philippines.

[64]Brent Diary: November 7, 1906.

[65]Brent to Merger Johnston: January 2, 1908. Mercer Johnston Papers, Box 38. Also Brent to Taft: January 3, 1908. Taft Papers, Series 3, Box 151.

[66]Brent to Bishop Hall: January 6, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 65.

start St. Luke's was able to draw on the American residents for material support, because of its usefulness to the American community.

Other medical work included Hobart Studley's mission among the Chinese in Manila. Studley had been trying to stamp out opium addiction among the Chinese in the city, and Brent reported that the church dispensary was providing medicine to help cure addiction.[67] In addition, more than thirty opium victims had accepted the free hospital treatment which the government provided for the poor, and Studley had persuaded twenty-five of these to seek aid. Studley had also been commended in Dean Worcester's annual report. His influence in the Chinese community had been very important in helping the government enforce the prohibitive law.[68]

Brent had also purchased the property on which the settlement house stood, and by the end of 1908, an orphanage for girls had been opened there. In Baguio, Brent's school for American boys had finally been organized; it was due to open in November of 1909 with Remsen Ogilby, Brent's future biographer, as schoolmaster.

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[67]"Report on Domestic Missions," Board of Missions Report (New York: 1908), p. 27.

[68]Brent, "Sixth Annual Report," Board of Missions Report (New York: 1909), p. 120.

In July of 1908, Brent issued an urgent appeal for more clergy; he stated that in both Baguio and Zamboanga other Protestant Ministers had had to take over services when Brent found himself unable to staff the Churches.[69] By the end of 1908 the situation had changed. The appeal had been met and the Bishop reported that the missionary work in general was progressing very well, owing to the presence of enough missioners to meet the most pressing obligations.[70]

In 1908 Brent's Diocese was still divided into four main sectors--English-speaking people, Chinese, Christianized, Filipinos, and Pagan Tribes. The work among English-speaking people was largely confined to Manila and Zamboanga. Among the Chinese and Christianized Filipinos, almost all Brent's missionary efforts were restricted to Manila. Among the Pagan tribes, work was under way at Baguio, Sagaba, and Bontoc.

Brent devoted a good deal of his time to active work among the Pagan tribes, an unusual procedure for a Missionary Bishop. This departure from custom may be explained in part by the continuing shortage of workers and in part by Brent's own personal preference. Despite his

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[69]Brent, "Fifth Annual Report," Board of Missions Report (New York: 1908), p. 119.

[70]Brent, "Sixth Annual Report," p. 118.

initial lack of preparation (he originally knew almost nothing about work among primitive people), the Bishop's work among the Igorots in the hill country of Luzon and later among the Moros in the South was generally acknowledged to be the most successful enterprise of his missionary career.

At Baguio work among the Pagans was limited to educational ventures. Easter School for boys was flourishing under the direction of Mrs. Alice Hargreaves, a wealthy American who had volunteered for service in the islands after reading of Brentis work. She also began a school for girls, which was not as successful. At Bontoc in 1908 there was still no church or chapel; Father Clapp had only a mission house. But the gravest problem, both at Bontoc and to a lesser degree at Sagada, was the continued presence of Catholic missionaries. The Belgian friars were by 1908 firmly established in Bontoc. This was a source of constant friction, as Bontoc was simply too small for two mission stations. But Brent's personal relations with the Belgian friars were always very cordial, and they respected his missionary labors.[71]

The Bishop had other difficulties in connection with the Bontoc and Sagada stations. Problems arose concerning Brent's title to the land in both areas. The land for

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[71]Ogilby Manuscript, Chapter VII, p. 9E.

the Missionsstations had originally been purchased from the natives, but in 1908 it was claimed by the Government. By 1909, Brent had succeeded in straightening out the question of title with the Philippine Commission.

The most important work at Sagada was the sawmill which had been established in 1904. The sawmill's original purpose had been the processing of lumber for church buildings. However as time went on, it became an important source of revenue for the mission and employment for the natives. In October of 1908 disaster struck at Sagada when a typhoon wrecked the mission. But the sawmill survived intact and by the end of the year two new houses were being built to re-establish the Sagada mission.

Spiritual progress at Bontoc was slower, Brent reported at the end of 1908, but the Bishop was satisfied with the results of his labors.[72] Bontoc at this time became the provincial capital of Benguet Province. As the government moved in, Brent realized his mission work would have to be modified so as not to duplicate the work of the government.

At the conclusion of six years in the Philippines, Brent surveyed his work and found it good. "I have never felt more sure of the Church's mission in the Philippine

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[72]Brent, "Sixth Annual Report," p. 120.

Islands," he wrote.[73] Under a different policy, he admitted, the statistics might be more impressive, but it would be a shadowy rather than a substantive gain. Brent was aware of the criticism which could be made of his work, that he had made no significant number of converts. This he believed was unimportant. He could point with pride to a change for the better intthe moral climate among the Americans in Manila. He had succeeded in establishing a Cathedral, a recreational club, and a hospital in the city. And he was bringing civilization to hundreds of Igorots in the mountain districts of Luzon. Though others might criticize, the Bishop of the Philippines was satisfied with his Episcopate.

Brent continued of course to take an active interest in local politics, although he was away from the islands for much of 1908. "As a citizen of the United States and a believer in the Devine character of good government my interest in the political affairs of the Philippine Islands is unflagging."[74] He continued to speak out for more freedom of action for the Philippine Commission and for less interference from Washington. He condemned expediency in United

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[73] Ibid.

[74] Brent, "Address to the Quill Club, Manila--June 22, 1903," Brent Papers, Box 34, pp. 2-3.

States policy, calling it "The curse of American politics."[75] And he continued to reiterate the importance of America's mission to educate the Orient in democracy and self-government.

Brent again and again stressed the strategic importance of the Orient, believing that all national questions in the twentieth century would center there. In accordance with his vision of world nnity, he emphasized the similarities rather than the disparities between East and West: "All that separates is incidental and all that unites is fundamental."[76] "We are here in the Orient . . . to dare the greatest task the world has ever set itself--to unite East and West in mutual understanding and service."[77]

The year 1908 was a time of personal crisis in the life of Bishop Brent. He had returned to the Philippines from the United States early in May. His health was not good, and so he went immediately to Baguio for a rest. It was while he was staying there at the house of Cameron Forbes that a cable arrived informing him of his election as Bishop of Washington. His good friend Bishop Satterlee had died in March and the seet had been vacant for almost two months when it was offered to Brent in early May.

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[75] Ibid., p. 3.

[76] Brent, Prisoners of Hope, p. 233.

[77] Ibid., p. 167.

The call was as much of a shock to Bishop Brent as his earlier election to the Philippine see had been. And again he was deluged with letters from friends and acquaintances. As in 1901, almost everyone urged Brent to accept the new post which had been offered him. Theodore Roosevelt cabled "Greatly pleased", and Taft also urged him to accept.[78]

Apparently the only people who did not want Brent to go to Washington were the members of his Manila congregation. On May 17, they wrote him a long letter urging him to stay on in the Islands. They argued that America should be represented in the Philippines both in Church and State by men of high character, and they believed that only Brent could fill the position of Bishop of the Islands successfully.

> We feel that it is no exaggeration to say that there is no man in these Islands today, nor has been since the American Occupation, to whom so many Americans and Englishmen turn for an exemplification of what is noblest in Western civilization; and that, humanly speaking, your life does more to inspire . . . Americans and Englishmen scattered throughout this Archipelago than any other single influence. . . . We feel it our duty to say, that such are the demands of the position you now hold as Bishop of the Philippine Islands, and so far-reaching are its possibilities, both as regards the East and West, that it is our conviction that a

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[78]See Brent Papers, Box 7, May 1908 folder for texts of letters and telegrams.

lesser man than yourself could not fill that position acceptably.[79]

Bishop Brent had an unusually difficult decision to make. The Washington Episcopate was very attractive; he had many influential friends there including Roosevelt and Taft. The new Bishop of Washington would have a great opportunity to influence the decisions of the government policy-makers and also to further the missionary work of the Episcopal Church. But after weighing all the alternatives, Brent declined the position.

Cameron Forbes, who had been Brent's confidant during the difficult days, was not at all surprised at the Bishop's refusal. On May 14 he had noted in his Journal: "I doubt if he accepts. He discussed all the pros and cons most thoroughly with me, but a rather obstinate tendency to stay was evident throughout all our discussions."[80] The basic reason for Brent's decision to stay in the Philippines was that he believed it was God's will that he stay. "With God in the Philippines or without Him in Washington, is not an untrue statement of the case."[81] Thus his sense of duty caused him to refuse a chance for tremendous political influence.

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[79]Manila Congregation to Brent: May 17, 1908, Brent Papers, Box 7.

Despite the allure of Washington, Brent was very much attached to his work in the Philippines and hated the though of leaving it. He expressed his feelings very graphically in a letter to Bishop Lawrence.

> I feel the weight of all you say regarding the importance of Washington, and more than that it thrills me to think of what could be done there, but all along I have felt like a mother by the side of a sick child who is asked to leave her baby to take up what appears to be a superior opportunity of service. It is true a good nurse might come--but the Philippine Mission is my baby. No other work can ever be what this is to me. Amid all its difficulties there is a splendid sense of freedom that I have gradually grown into. I breathe the air of the whole vast Orient; the human race rises before me as a family of which I am a member.[82]

Brent was also aware of the importance of his work in the Far East. He wanted to stay in the Philippines, he said, because he wanted to do what he could politically for the Filipinos.[83] He had found the Philippines to be "a pulpit from which I could speak to America and England to advantage as well as to the Orient. What more could a man wish."[84] And he reiterated his belief that the Orient was becoming the center of the world's gravest problems; the lands around the North Pacific, he believed, would be the focal point of the twentieth century.

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[82]Brent to Bishop Lawrence: June 21, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 7.

[83]Brent, "Quill Club Address," p. 4.

[84]Brent to Mrs. Foster: June 13, 1908.

Brent's ill health, which had plagued him since he returned to the tropics, grew more acute. In June of 1908 he consulted with doctors in Manila who advised him to return to the United States permanently. This the Bishop was unwilling to do, but he did agree to make another trip to America to consult specialists there. Word of this development reached the Episcopal Bishops who were still balloting in an attempt to elect a successor to Bishop Satterlee. In an unheard-of occurrence, they again elected Brent to the see of Washington.

Word of the second election reached Brent in mid-June as he was preparing to leave for the United States. This time the decision was more or less out of his hands. He cabled that if the doctors in America advised him not to return to the tropics, he would accept the call to Washington. Otherwise he would return to his work in the Philippines. He believed that he would be allowed to return, for in a letter published on August 1, before he consulted with the doctors, he spoke of his plans to return to the Philippines in September or October.[85]

Brent left Manila for the United States on June 30 and arrived on the west coast at the end of July. He then

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[85]Brent, "Philippine Letter," The Pacific Churchman 44 (August 1, 1908), p. 3.

journeyed cross-country to Boston for medical advice. As he had expected, the doctors contravened the advice of the Manila physicians, and said that Brent could return to the tropics with no ill effects. So in early August he once again declined the Washington election.

Many people were made unhappy by Brent's second refusal. Ogilby noted that "his work in the PHilippines had not only made him a national figure, but it had also brought out in him such an obvious interest in national affairs as to indicate that he would be happy and completely at home in the capital of our nation."[86] This is an indication of Brent's increasing fame throughout the United States. In seven years he had grown from relative obscurity to a position of national prominence, respect, and influence. Bishop Satterlee's widow and daughter, who were personal friends of Brent's, were most disappointed when he chose to return to the PHilippines. So were Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft.

Roosevelt had written Brent on June 29, urging him to accept the election. He mentioned what a great help it would have been to him as President to have a man like Brent as Bishop of Washington.[87] And in October he wrote from

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[86]Ogilby Manuscript, Chapter XII, p. 38.

[87]Roosevelt to Brent: June 29, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 7.

Washington: "I greatly enjoyed seeing you at Oyster Bay and I am glad you are to be in the Philippines; but, my dear Bishop, I can not help selfishly regretting that you are not to be here."[88]

Taft had urged Brent even more strongly to accept the call to Washington.

> No one can value more highly than I do the work that you have been doing in the Philippines, and no one can estimate more completely than I the loss which the Philippines will entertain in your withdrawal from that field of work . . . but it is quite evident that physical limitations will prevent your continuing your career in the Philippines. . . . Washington . . . will bring you closely in touch with the leaders of political thought in the Nation, and will enable you to exercise an influence much more widespread than the comparative number of churches under your pastoral guidance would indicate.[89]

But Brent replied that his work in the Orient was not yet finished and that he was sure he was making the correct decision in returning to the Philippines. He pledged his continuing support of United States policy in the Islands.[90] Taft responded, "It would have gratified me very much if you could have accepted the position of Bishop of Washington, but I quite understand and sympathize with your desire to

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[88]Roosevelt to Brent: October 3, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 8.

[89]Taft to Brent: August 4, 1908. Taft Papers, Series 8, subseries personal, Volume 22.

[90]Brent to Taft: August 8, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 7.

continue in the Philippines and to work out the problems which you long to solve and which are gradually shaping themselves under your hand."[91]

Brent did not leave the United States to return to Manila until October of 1908, and while in America he was caught up in the coming Presidential election. As early as 1907, Brent had gone on record as opposing a third term for Roosevelt, much as the Bishop admired his "vigorous and honorable" administration.[92] At that time Brent had favored Elihu Root over Taft as the Republican nominee: "I believe in Taft as a man and have great affection for him, but I would trust Root's judgment as being superior to that of any man with a temperament like Taft's."[93] This is another tribute to Brent's mental objectivity. While enjoying the closest of personal friendships with Taft, he was able to realize Taft's faults and shortcomings. Later, the Bishop had been not unfavorable to Charles Evans Hughes.

But by the summer of 1908 with Taft having won the Republican nomination, Brent was in wholehearted support of

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[91]Taft to Brent: December 22, 1908. Taft Papers, Series 8, subseries personal, Volume 33.

[92]Brent to Major Carter: May 30, 1907.

[93]Ibid.

his friend. Again, the Bishop had changed his mind. We may surmise that the dictates of party unity as well as personal friendship were responsible for his support of Taft. On at least one occasion, Bryan's campaign tactics infuriated the Bishop. The democratic candidate made political capital out of his own evangelicalism and indirectly attacked Taft's religious convictions. One of Taft's friends, General Clarence Edwards, urged Brent to submit to a press interview for the purpose of upholding Taft's religious convictions. The Bishop refused, believing that dignified silence was the best answer to such attacks. He revealed privately, however, that he was thoroughly disgusted with Bryan.[94]

Brent left for the Philippines on October 7, and arrived in Manila on November 1, so he was not in the United States on election day. The Bishop was sorry to have missed the voting, as he had missed the 1904 election, because of his residence in Manila. He would have voted, he said, for Roosevelt in 1904 and Taft in 1908.[95] Brent

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[94]See Brent to General Clarence Edwards: September 18, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 8. Also Brent to Taft: September 28, 1908. Taft Papers, Series 3, Box 195.

[95]Brent to Taft: November 4, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 8.

quickly received word of the results of the election, by telephone from Governor General Smith on November 4. He immediately wrote the President-elect, expressing his congratulations.

> I believe in you as a man and respect you as a statesman whose vision is broad enough to include the whole world, and the highest interests. . . . You have an opportunity of serving . . . not merely the American people but also the whole world, to an extent unparalleled in the history of any of our former Presidents.[96]

Brent went on to express his regret at not being in Washington to continue their former close association. He pledged himself to help the President in any way he could.[97] Taft's reply to Brent's letter illustrates the closeness of their relationship, for the new President voiced his inner feelings of inadequacy in the face of the high office to which he had been elected.

> You know and I know something of the responsibilities of the office, and know that while one may have a feeling of gratification at the expressions of confidence which such an election is from one's fellow citizens, at the same time he feels weighted down with the heavy charge he has taken up, in respect to the many interests of the people of the United States. It is a very different office from that of the Governor General of the Philippines, and I don't know whether I shall rise to the occasion or not. But I hope that will and effort will not be wanting.[98]

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[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Taft to Brent: December 22, 1908.

Thus the new year of 1909 found Bishop Brent once again in the Orient--happy in his friend's election to the presidency, satisfied with his own less exalted position as Bishop of the Philippines. He was confident that his vocation lay, for the time being at any rate, in the East, and that whether he succeeded or failed, he was grappling with the most important problems facing mankind. But he was not to remain long in the relatively obscure position of a simple missionary Bishop. Once again he was about to become an international figure in the fight against opium--this time at the Shanghai Opium Commission, the first international effort to control the opium menage.

CHAPTER IV

THE OPIUM PROBLEM 1906-1912

Following the publication of the report of the Opium Investigating Committee in 1906, Bishop Brent continued to take an interest in the problem of opium addiction, especially in the Far East and more particularly in the PHilippines. The result of his interest was a series of international conferences on opium, of which the Shanghai Commission in 1909 was the first. And it was in the process of waging his war against opium that Bishop Brent gained international renown.

Brent made the opium problem in the PHilippines his first concern. In 1906, the PHilippine Commission had enacted the high-license system of opium control in preparation for the prohibitory law which would go into effect in March, 1908. According to Brent, there was much evasion of the license law, although opium imports decreased between

1906 and 1908.[1] The Bishop also believed that the Commission did nothing to prepare the people for the prohibitory law of 1908.[2] Brent did admit, however, that the high-license system in the PHilippines worked better than he had expected.[3]

Some good work was done between 1906 and 1908.in the field of opium regulation in the PHilippines. An educational campaign against opium smoking (which had been one of the recommendations of the investigating committee) was inaugurated in 1907. A hospital was set up to treat opium smokers but lack of funds soon forced it to close. Then the government cracked down on opium smoking: arrests were made and convictions secured.

In October 1907 the Philippine Commission passed Resolution #1761 which aimed at the gradual restriction and final prohibition of traffic in opium by March 1, 1908. Later in 1907, customs officers inaugurated a careful search of all vessels and cargoes from China. By the time the prohibitory law went into effect on March 1, 1908, Brent estimated that not more than 5,000 people throughout

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[1]Brent, "The Opium Problem in the PHilippines," Brent Papers, Box 37.

[2]Brent, The Spirit of Missions 71 (May, 1906), p. 374.

[3]Brent to Major Edward Carter; July 23, 1906.

the islands were smoking opium.[4]

After prohibition became law, the number of opium smokers decreased even more. This was due to the increase in the price of opium--$90 per pound on the black market. This rate effectively made opium smoking impossible for the average Filipino. But the traffic in opium, though driven underground, continued to flourish. The two chief difficulties in enforcing the law were a lack of facilities--not enough money or men--and the ease of smuggling. Smuggling in particular was destined to become a perennial problem for Philippine customs officials.

James Rafferty, the Collector of Customs at the Port of Cebu (see map, p. 25) explained to Brent the situation as he saw it early in 1909. He reported that many efforts had been made by the smugglers to bribe the customs officers. The government had hampered the customs agents in their work by refusing to provide sufficient funds and personnel to handle the problem. Rafferty saw three effects of the prohibitory law: Many Chinese addicts returned to China where they could smoke unmolested; smoking among Filipinos ended because of the high price and difficulty in obtaining the drug; only the wealthier Chinese could afford to smoke

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[4]Brent, "The Opium Problem in the Phlippines," Brent Papers, Box 37.

opium. Rafferty believed the law was working well; however he urged that penalties for addicts be lightened and those for smugglers and sellers strengthened.[5]

Rafferty and others pointed out that smuggling was on the increase. A great deal of contraband opium was coming into Philippine ports from Amoy, Hong Kong, Singapore, and British North Borneo. Since it was impossible to police the whole Philippine coast, the obvious alternative was to stop it at the source, that is, forbid its export from Chinese and other neighboring ports. Rafferty believed this was absolutely essential to the eradication of the drug from the Philippines.[6] But such measures demanded international gooperation.

Bishop Brent was well aware of this need for international cooperation to control the opium traffic. On July 24, 1906 he wrote a memorable letter to Theodore Roosevelt:

> I am going to make bold to suggest that which I venture to think might be fruitful of great good if you can see your way clear to initiate the movement. It is this: recently as of course you are aware the question of England's share in the opium traffic has been re-opened in official circles in the Old Country.

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[5]James Rafferty to Brent: January 9, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 8.

[6]Ibid.

> My experience on the Philippine Opium Investigating Committee leads me to believe that the problem is of sufficient merit to warrant an endeavour to secure international action. From the earliest days of our diplomatic relations with the East, the course of the United States of America has been so manifestly high in relation to the traffic in opium, that it seems to me almost our duty, now that we have the responsibility of actually handling the matter in our own possessions, to promote some movement that would gather in its embrace representatives from all countries where the traffic in, and use of, opium is a matter of moment. Why could we not hope to have an investigation on the basis of science as well as of practical observation of actual conditions, in which England, France, Holland, China and Japan should take part with ourselves?[7]

Roosevelt liked the idea, and promised to take it up with Secretary of State Root as well as securing Taft's opinion. Wrote Roosevelt: "It seems (italics Roosevelt's) to me that such an international consideration of the opium traffic would do far-reaching good."[8]

Taft agreed that the idea of an international commission was worth trying. He stressed the importance of the problem: "I do agree with Bishop Brent that the opium question in China is one of the most important in the improvement of Chinese and Oriental civilization."[9] Roosevelt consulted with Root, and the State Department heartily approved

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[7]Brent to Roosevelt: July 24, 1906. Brent Papers, Box 60.

[8]Roosevelt to Brent: August 28, 1906. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[9]Taft to Roosevelt: September 1, 1906. Archives: Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, Numerical File 774. Hereafter referred to as NA, RG 59.

of the idea. The final result was the commission which met at Shanghai in 1909.

Thus the genesis of the idea of an international conference on opium was Brent's. As a friend of Roosevelt's, he was able to go right to the top and write directly to the President. This is a most important example of the Bishop's influence in high governmental circles. Both the press and official government sources gave Brent full and sole credit for the idea of an international conference on opium. The Bishop's idea grew naturally out of his work on the Opium Investigating Committee and his observation of the need for international cooperation in the Philippines. It also arose from his growing vision of world unity.

Brent continued to seek support for his idea. His personal correspondence during this period is full of references to the opium question and the proposed conference. In April and May of 1907 he attended a missionary conference at Shanghai for the purpose of securing the support of the missionaries and of the Chinese people for the proposed opium conference.

> My chief object in going to the Chinese Conference was to press the matter of an i nternational opium commission, and I succeeded in having certain resolutions passed to this end; I also appended one

appealing to the Peace Conference at The Hague to promote the scheme.[10]

Brent had meanwhile been active in securing support in Britain as well as in the United States and the Far East. As he had indicated in his letter to Roosevelt, public opinion in Britain had been aroused against the Indian Opium Traffic. Shortly after writing the President, Brent wrote to the Archibishoppof York and also to his friend Archibishop Davidson of Canterbury. He repeated the suggestion of an international meeting which he had made to Roosevelt, and added: "I earnestly hope that you will see fit to lend your influence to the promotion of such a movement."[11] And on August 18 Brent noted that the Anglican Bishops had appealed to the British Government for action on the basis of the opium investigating committee's report.[12]

The result of the agitation in Britain, in which Brent had taken part, was a revision of the treaty agreements between Britain and China. In place of the old laws which had allowed free entry to Indian Opium, India agreed to reduce her export of opium into China by 1/10 each year

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[10]Brent to John W. Wood: May 20, 1907. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[11]Brent to the Archbishop of York: July 30, 1906. Brent Papers, Box 6.

[12]See Brent Diary: August 18, 1906.

and China was to reduce her poppy-growing areas in the same proportion. This was the famous Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement, which would later cause trouble at the conference table. The fight for treaty revision in the House of Commons was led by Lord Morley, who told Brent that the report of the opium investigating committee had been of invaluable assistance to him.[13] It is difficult to ascertain the extent of Bishop Brent's influence on the drafting of the Ten Year Agreement, but Morley's statement indicates that it was significant.

During his absence from the Philippines in 1907-08, Brent spent some time in Britain in February and March of 1908. During this period he worked hard trying to interest the British public in the project for international action on the opium question. He was afraid that little could be done at that time to stimulate public opinion. "It is a delicate subject with the British but I think if I take the subject of making China believe in herself I can work it in so that it will stimulate constructive thought."[14]

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[13]Brent to Edith: June 8, 1910. Brent Papers, Box 49.

[14]Brent to Mrs. George Wharton Pepper: February 11, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 58.

While in Britain, Brent also made a point of discussing the question with various British statesmen, including Lord Morley. He wrote to Elihu Root, urging that the conference be organized as quickly as possible. The British, he said, were favorable to the idea; however, there was a need of a new impetus. The United States was in a position to exercise leadership, he believed, because of her legislation in the Philippines.[15] Brent knew that Britain would never take the initiative because of the British stake in the Indian opium trade. Despite the Ten Year Agreement, opium revenues continued to bulk large in the Indian budget.

Meanwhile, official preparations for the proposed international meeting continued. By February of 1907 the State Department had contacted Britain and Japan, and by May Britain had consented to the meeting and Japan had given evidence of willingness to join. By July of 1908, Britain, France, Germany, Holland, Portugal, China, and Japan had all agreed to the proposed conference. The meeting was officially entitled the Joint International Opium Commission: It was

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[15]Brent to Elihu Root: February 11, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 58. Also in NA, RG 59, Numerical File 774/163.

also known as the Shanghai Opium Commission.[16] It was scheduled to meet at Shanghai on January 1, 1909.

In July of 1908 the United States delegates to the Commission were chosen. Those originally named were Hamilton Wright, Charles C. Tenney, and Judge Thomas Burke. Burke, however, declined the nomination and the State Department suddenly woke up and realized that Bishop Brent, the inspirer of the movement, would be the ideal man to head the American delegation. Accordingly, on July 8, 1908 the State Department cabled Brent:

> The international movement for the suppression of the opium habit in the Far East having its origin in your inspiration, the President tenders you appointment as Senior United States Commissioner to the Joint International Opium Commission to investigate opium, including cultivation, use and traffic, in the Far East, which will meet Shanghai January first. . . . Dr. Hamilton Wright and Charles C. Tenney are our other Commissioners.[17]

The cable reached Brent in Yokohama on his way to Boston to consult with physicians about his health. He sent word that he could not decide until after he had reached the United States. On July 23, while still en route, he wrote

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[16]Brent had desired a conference rather than a Commission, since according to international law a commission could only inquire and recommend. But in the preliminary diplomatic correspondence the British preferred a commission and the other nations agreed.

[17]Robert Bacon (acting Secretary of State) to Brent: July 8, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 7.

Theodore Roosevelt, congratulating him on the Commission and explaining the problem of his health.[18] On August 4, having been given a clean bill of health, Brent accepted the appointment. But he was more interested in the implications of an international meeting, which was something of a novelty at that time, than in the honor which had been paid to him. "It is a great thing to have got the nations together on a purely moral question."[19]

Brent and Hamilton Wright were the most prominent members of the United States delegation. Wright worked in close connection with the State Department in arranging the particulars of the meeting. From the Philippines, Brent continued to take an active interest in the proceedings. Both men believed that Persia and Turkey, as producers of opium, and Russia with her large Chinese population, should be invited to the meeting. Both took the matter up with the State Department, and the invitations were duly issued.[20]

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[18]See Brent to Roosevelt: July 23, 1908. NA, RG 59, Numerical File 774/273.

[19]Brent to Mrs. Foster: July 22, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 49.

[20]See 1) Hamilton Wright to Robert Bacon: August 18, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 7. 2) Brent to Robert Bacon: August 8, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 7. 3) Hamilton Wright to Brent: August 22, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 7.

Another problem arose in the fall of 1908, with regard to Japan. Brent reported that the Japanese were continuing to smuggle morphine into China. The State Department was aware of the situation and had already spoken sharply to the Japanese ambassador to China. The Bishop urged that an even stronger stand be taken. He thought the Japanese should be made to realize what their position would be if they refused to join in the general agreement to stop the traffic in morphine.[21] Eventually the Japanese did back down on this point.

In preparation for the meeting of the Commission, each delegation was requested to gather data on opium as it affected the countries represented. For the United States, Wright was to study opium abuse in the United States in general, Tenney was to investigate the medical aspects of opium and also its use by Orientals on the west coast, while Brent was to survey the situation in the Philippines. Brent was also asked to make a general study of opium throughout the Far East, with reference to its commercial, medical, and humanitarian aspects.

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[21]Brent to A. A. Adee (acting Secretary of State): September 14, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 8.

[22]See Robert Bacon to Brent: August 3, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 7.

Brent accordingly surveyed the State Department data and studied the situation in the Philippines with help from the Philippine Commission. In December of 1908 Hamilton Wright joined him and together they toured the southern islands. Brent became even more convinced that prohibition was the right solution to the problem in the islands. It was obvious, however, that smuggling remained the chief obstacle to its enforcement.

Having completed their preparatoryyinvestigations, Brent and Wright joined Tenney at Shanghai. The Commission was originally scheduled to meet January 1, 1909, but owing to the deaths of the Emperor and Empress Dowager of China the meeting was postponed until February 1 at the request of the Chinese delegation. At that time the Commission was formally opened by the Chinese Viceroy Tuan Fang. To Brent, as Senior United States Commissioner, had gone the responsibility of calling the first meeting and preparing for the organization of the Commission.

The United States, as the organizer of the movement, had already indicated thescope of the Commission's work. In identical letters to Brent and Wright, Elihu Root had expressed the views of his department as to the object and goals of the Commission.

> The object of the proposed investigation is to devise means to limit the use of opium in the possessions of each country and to ascertain the best means of supressing the opium traffic, if such now exists, among the nationals concerned in the Far East. To this end the representatives of the Powers concerned are now undertaking investigations on the part of their respective Governments to the end that when the Commission meets in Shanghai it may be possible for all the Commissioners to cooperate and after full interchange of views to offer jointly or severally definite suggestions of measures which their respective Governments may adopt for the gradual supression of opium cultivation, traffic, and use within their Eastern possessions, thus assisting China in her purpose of eradicating the evil from her Empire.[23]

Therefore the ultimate goal of the Commission was the eradication of opium addiction and complete stoppage of the opium traffic. It was hoped that the countries involved would cooperate in these efforts, since as Brent had long realized results would be achieved only through international cooperation. In accordance with the Open Door Policy, the United States emphasized the idea of disinterested assistance to Chian.[24] It is important to note, however, that the Shanghai meeting was a commission, not a conference. As

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[23]Elihu Root to Hamilton Wright: June 20, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 7. Elihu Root to Brent: August 3, 1908. Brent Papers, Box 7.

[24]In connection with the Open Door Policy, it is interesting to note that in a conversation with Brent in 1916, Mrs. W. W. Rockhill claimed that her husband was the real author of the Open Door Policy, which he then presented to John Hay who accepted it. Later research has borne out her assertion. See Brent Diary: September 11, 1916.

such it did not have the authority to draw up an international convention which would require action by the signatory powers. It could only make suggestions and recommend actions which the individual governments were perfectly free to disregard if they so desired.

The first order of business before the Commission on February 1 was the election of a permanent President. This had been the occasion of some diplomatic maneuvering behind the scenes. Hamilton Wright quietly polled the Commissioners and found that they were favorable to the idea of Brent for President. Wright then consulted the State Department. The Department replied that the British had also been interested in Brent for the post. In a series of discussions between Whitelaw Reid, United States Ambassador to Britain, and Sir Edward Grey of the Foreign Office it was agreed to leave the final decision up to the Commissioners, but both Britain and the United States regarded the choice of Brent favorably. Robert Bacon, the acting Secretary of State, passed this conclusion along to Hamilton Wright.[25]

When the question arose on February 1, Brent was nominated by the Chinese deligate Liu Yuk-Lin and seconded

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[25]For the correspondence between Wright and the State Department, see NA, RG 59, Numerical File 774/537-8. For Whitelaw Reid's role in the discussions in Britain, see Ibid., Numerical File 774/509-11.

by Sir Cecil Clement: Smith of Britain. He was then elected unanimously. Even before the session began, Brent had heard of the possibility of his election and shrank from it. "How glad I would be to retire into obscurity! It is my discipline to be conspicuous, not my joy."[26] He had hoped that someone else would be elected, but accepted the position when it came to him. And despite his realization of the responsibilities of the post and the difficulties which lay ahead, he retained his sense of humor. "I was unanimously elected President and since have been repenting at leisure as I struggle with the problem of how to preside over thirteen different Nationalities, but joking apart, it is a most interesting experience and I find the Commissioners ready to respond to leadership."[27]

In his opening address to the Commission, delivered on February 1, Brent stressed the difficulty and complexity of the opium problem. He emphasized the nature of the Commission as a fact-finding body with no power to negotiate binding agreements. He urged that all the resolutions of the Commission be passed unanimously, so that they would have the greatest possible weight. And he pleaded

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[26]Brent Diary: January 28, 1909.

[27]Brent to Mercer Johnston: February 9, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 8.

for an avoidance of all "useless historical questions beneath which a great deal of controversy lies hidden . . ."[28]

Despite his realization of the difficulties involved, Brent was hopeful that the Commission would have a successful outcome. He believed that his fellow commissioners were excellent men, well informed on the question. Eventually he hoped that an international conference would be called which would result in a definite and binding convention to outlaw the traffic in opium as well as all nonmedical use of the drug. His hopes were to be realized some three years later when the Hague Opium Convention was drawn up.

Meanwhile the session at Shanghai proceeded, with Brent presiding. Theodore Roosevelt cabled the Commission his best wishes and hopes for a fruitful outcome.[29] The American delegates were delighted to hear that on February 9 the United States Congress had passed a bill prohibiting the importation of opium into the country except for medical purposes. As Brent expressed the reaction of the American delegation: "Our skirts are clean at any rate as far as

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[28]Brent, Address to Shanghai delegates: February 1, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 37.

[29]See Robert Bacon to Brent: February 2, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 8, for the text of Roosevelt's message to the Delegates at Shanghai.

Legislation is able to make them so."[30] The bill had originally been drafted at the urging of the United States delegates, especially Hamilton Wright.

As the session progressed, difficulties arose among the various delegations. Many of the delegates lacked information. The Japanese had hoped to secure a scientific discussion of opium, but the Commission ruled out any scientific investigation as most of the delegates were not prepared to conduct such an examination. The French were interested only in trade and commerce. But the biggest headache of all was the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement.

The British were determined to keep the Ten Year Agreement out of the discussions. They felt that such discussion would impugn the binding authority of a bilateral treaty, but even more important they were satisfied with the agreement as it existed and wished no changes to be recommended by the Commission. The Chinese on the other hand desired a shortening of the time of the Agreement in order to exclude Indian opium from the Empire as soon as possible.

The question of the Ten Year Agreement arose when the United States introduced a resolution that would have allowed any country (such as China) to prohibit the importation of opium if home cultivation had already been stopped.

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[30]Brent to Mercer Johnston: February 9, 1909.

The British, aided by the French and Japanese, refused to discuss the question. In anticipation of such a resolution, the British had gotten the Chinese to agree not to discuss the Ten Year Agreement.

Brent had already cabled the State Department regarding the situation, saying that the Chinese pledge of silence was threatening to defeat the aim of the Commission.[31] The State Department made inquiries and the British retracted their statement, saying that China had expressed satisfaction with the existing state of affairs, but that the question of the Ten Year Agreement was not closed to discussion.[32] In the interests of harmony, however, the United States did not press the matter. Brent did not wholly agree with this policy nor was he happy with the British attitude.

> While I sympathize deeply with the sad entanglement in which Great Britain is involved, politically especially, in India and the protected States, she must be made to understand in as clear terms as may be that the rest of the world is not going to remain passive in a matter where universal contamination may be the result of half measures.[33]

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[31]See Brent to the State Department (Cablegram): January 27, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 8.

[32]Whitelaw Reid to the State Department: Quoted in Robert Bacon to Brent, January 30, 1909 and February 19, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 8.

[33]Brent to Taft: December 29, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 61.

The proceedings of the Commission took the form of resolutions introduced by the various delegations, resolutions which were discussed, amended, and re-discussed. The American delegation introduced eight resolutions in all. Their chief import was that the only legitimate use of opium was medical and that all non-medical uses of the drug should be prohibited.[34] In the American view, the only barrier to a solution of the problem was revenue considerations. The British disagreed; they refused to admit that opium smoking was a vice and preferred regulation to prohibition. They introduced their own series of resolutions, as did the Chinese. Out of these three sets of resolutions came the compromise measures which were ultimately adopted by the Commission. Nine resolutions were eventually adopted.

Be it resolved:

1. That the International Opium Commission redognized the unswerving sincerity of the Government of China in their efforts to eradicate the production and consumption of opium throughout the Empire: the increasing body of public opinion among their own subjects by which these efforts are being supported; and the real though unequal progress already made in a task which is one of the greatest magnitude.

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[34]For the text of the American Resolutions, See Report of the International Opium Commission (Shanghai: 1909), Volume 1, pp. 44-48. They may also be found in Arnold Taylor, "The United States and Narcotic Traffic", pp. 84-85. Taylor also gives a thorough and detailed account of the day-by-day proceedings of the Commission.

2. That in view of the action taken by the Government of China in suppressing the practice of opium smoking, and by other Governments to the same end, the International Opium Commission recommends that each delegation concerned move its own Government to take measures for the gradual suppression of the practice of opium smoking in its own territories and possessions, with due regard to the varying circumstances of each country concerned.

3. That the International Opium Commission finds that the use of opium in any form otherwise than for medical purposes is held by almost every participating country to be a matter for prohibition or for careful regulation; and that each country in the administration of its system of regulation purports to be aiming, as opportunity offers, at progressively increasing stringency. In recording these conclusions the International Opium Commission recognizes the wide variations between the conditions prevailing in the different countries, but it would urge on the attention of the Governments concerned the desirability of a re-examination of their systems of regulation in the light of the experience of other countries dealing with the same problem.

4. That the International Opium Commission finds that each Government represented has strict laws which are aimed directly or indirectly to prevent the smuggling of opium, its alkaloids, derivatives, and preparations, into their respective territories; in the judgment of the International Opium Commission it is also the duty of all countries to adopt reasonable measures to prevent at ports of departure the shipment of opium, its alkaloids, derivatives, and preparations, to any country which prohibits the entry of any opium, its alkaloids, derivatives, and preparations.

5. That the International Opium Commission finds that the unrestricted manufacture, sale, and distribution of morphine already constitute a grave danger, and that the morphine habit shows signs of spreading: the International Opium Commission, therefore, desires to urge strongly on all Governments that it is highly important that drastic measures should be taken by each Government in its own territories and possessions to control the manufacture, sale, and distribution of this drug, and also of such other derivatives of opium as may

appear on scientific inquiry to be liable to similar abuse and productive of like ill effects.

6. That as the International Opium Commission is not constituted in such a manner as to permit the investigation from a scientific point of view of anti-opium remedies and of the properties and effects of opium and its products, but deems such investigation to be of the highest importance, the International Opium Commission desires that each delegation shall recommend this branch of the subject to its own Government for such action as that Government may think necessary.

7. That the International Opium Commission strongly urges all Governments possessing concessions or settlements in China which have not yet taken effective action toward the closing of opium divans in the said concessions and settlements, to take steps to that end, as soon as they may deem it possible, on the lines already adopted by several governments.

8. That the International Opium Commission recommends strongly that each delegation move its Government to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Government with a view to effective and prompt measures being taken in the various foreign concessions and settlements in China for the prohibition of the trade and manufacture of such antiopium remedies as contain opium or its derivatives.

9. That the International Opium Commission recommends that each delegation move its Government to apply its pharmacy laws to its subjects in the consular districts, concessions, and settlements in China.[35]

The first resolution had been introduced by the British and was adopted without amendment. In general, the other eight resolutions represented a midway point between the United States and China on the one hand and Britain,

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[35]Report of the Shanghai Opium Commission, Volume 1, p. 84.

France, and Holland on the other. In most cases, the wording was not as strong as the American delegation had desired. An exception was Resolution 4 which reflected the experience of the United States in the Philippines and was a step towards preventing smuggling at the Port of Departure. It was adopted as originally proposed by the United States, and the American delegation regarded it as the most important of all. The Americans had called for an international conference to conventionalize the resolutions of the Shanghai Commission; the formal resolution to this effect was dropped on the tacit understanding that the United States would call such a conference.

On February 26, 1909 the Commission held its final session. The resolutions were formally adopted, and a unanimous vote of thanks was given Brent for "the dignity, impartiality, and ability with which he has discharged the duties of President of the International Opium Commission."[36] Brent gave a short closing address summing up the work of the Commission and thanking the delegates for their co-operation. The commission then adjourned sine die.

The work of the Commission was greeted with mixed reactions. Many criticized it for not going far enough, not

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[36] Ibid., p. 81.

realizing that a commission had powers only of recommendation, as Brent so often pointed out. The reaction in the United States was that the American and Chinese delegates had achieved results despite British interference. The State Department was especially pleased; Elihu Root was surprised that the meeting had not broken up in complete disagreement.[37] Brent's biographer believed that only Brent's influence prevented the disaster of an international squabble.[38] Brent himself feared at times that the Commission was headed for trouble; he confided to a co-worker in the Philippines that at one time he had feared that Britain would break up the Commission by withdrawal.[39]

Brent's personal reaction to the Commission was also mixed. While feeling that it had not achieved all he had hoped for, he felt that it had come to a satisfactory conclusion. "Though I am well aware that the International Opium Commission fell short of what might have been accomplished; on the other hand, it surpassed the expectations

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[37]See Brent to Taft: December 29, 1909.

[38]Ogilby, Address delivered at Trinity College Hartford June 16, 1929. Brent Papers, Box 58, p. 4.

[39]Brent to Mercer Johnston: June 1, 1909. Mercer Johnston Papers, Box 40.

of most men who were intimate with the conditions."[40] He was particularly pleased that all the resolutions had passed unanimously. This had originally been his idea and, as President, he had persuaded the Commission to accept it. The result, he believed, was a moral obligaton on all governments represented to make effective the resolutions adopted at Shanghai.

Despite the good work accomplished by the Commission, Brent felt that even more could have been done had it not been for Britain's obstructionist tactics. "The British lost a great opportunity for constructive leadership. Their commission was divided but the conservative official attitude which was set upon protecting Indian political and financial interests won the day."[41] The Bishop was furious with what he considered Britain's deviousness in obtaining the Chinese pledge not to discuss the Ten Year Agreement. He felt that the Chinese were unfortunately weak, but that China had suffered much at the hands of Western nations, including Britain. One indirect effect of the Commission which he looked for was a stronger China.

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[40]Brent to Taft: December 29, 1909.

[41]Brent to Mercer Johnston: June 1, 1909.

Results of the Shanghai Opium Commission, both tangible and intangible, are difficult to assess. One which can be pinpointed was the broadening of the scope of the whole opium question. What had been an Anglo-Chinese problem was now a matter of international concern. "It was brought out in the deliberations that the opium question had ceased to be local and in one phase or another touched the peoples of two hemispheres. . . . The International Opium Commission has sealed the fact from which there is now no retreat, that it is a problem for universal and joint consideration."[42]

Brent pointed out other effects of the Commission's work. In the practical sphere the passage of the United States opium law, which was in turn prompted by the work of the Commission, had caused the Macao opium farm to go bankrupt. Thus at least one source of opium had been removed. Brent also believed that public sentiment in China had been aided and stimulated by the Commission. The Bishop noted that Resolution 4 (stopping smuggling at the Port of Departure) represented a new feature in International

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[42]"Report to the Department of State by the American Delegation to the International Opium Commission at Shanghai." Brent Papers, Box 37. Hereafter referred to as "Report of the American Delegation."

Law. As soon as it could be put into effect, smuggling into the Philippines would virtually cease.

The Bishop also viewed with satisfaction some of the more intangible results of the Opium Commission. The caliber of men involved, he believed, had been excellent, and for the most part they had worked in harmony. The Bishop emphasized the moral victory which had been won:

> It is something that thirteen nations have recognized that opium smoking is an evil that requires suppression. It is not long since that Great Britain pronounced it a legitimate influence. The non-medical use of opium and its derivatives in any form is now recognized by all civilized peoples to be a menace, and calls for prohibition or careful regulation.[43]

The Shanghai resolutions indeed reflected a change in attitude on the part of many of the Powers. And the man most responsible for this mere moral attitude was Brent himself. From the start he had viewed the problem of opium addiction in terms of morality. A major portion of his fight against addiction was devoted to bringing both individuals and nations to an awareness of the moral character of the problem. "A man of great moral conviction tempered by an ability to analyze issues realistically, he gave the international movement against the drug evil the character of a moral crusade."[44]

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[43]Brent to Sam Drury: March 19, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 8.

[44]Arnold Taylor, "The United States and Narcotic Traffic," Loc. Cit., p. 70.

The Shanghai resolutions represented partial success; a full acknowledgment of the moral iniquity of opium addiction would come three years later with the Hague Convention.

Another and a more tangible effect of the Shanghai Opium Commission was an improvement in China's status. China could still not be called a sovereign nation, but at the Commission she was for the first time granted equal status with the other powers. This was largely due to United States insistence, as America again demonstrated her concern for China's welfare. The Opium Commission forged a new link in the chain of Sino-American friendship.[45]

What was the overall effect of the work of the Shanghai Opium Commission? It was perhaps best expressed by Bishop Brent's friend and co-worker Mercer Johnston. "You have at least made it increasingly difficult for any nation to traffic in opium and feel comfortable. You may not have succeeded in hanging anybody, but you have erected a mighty ominous looking gibbet."[46]

The final outcome of the Opium Commission was the call issued by the United States for a conference to conventionalize the Shanghai resolutions. The American delegation

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[45] Ibid., p. 101.

[46] Mercer Johnston to Brent: April 15, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 8.

had introduced a formal resolution to this effect at Shanghai, but when doubts arose as to which power should call the conference, the resolution was dropped. The United States was nonetheless committed to the idea of calling such a conference. The American delegates urged the State Department not to lose time but to issue invitations immediately. The United States government, everyone believed, was in a better position than any other government to take this step.

By May of 1909, just three months after the Shanghai Commission had adjourned, the State Department had fully determined to call a conference. On June 9, Hamilton Wright wrote to tell Brent that the Department had already drafted a letter to the various Powers, calling for a conference. The Department however desired Brent's views on the matter and so the letter was being held up. Meanwhile the State Department had cabled Brent on May 25, asking him to outline a draft convention which would incorporate the Shanghai resolutions. According to Wright, the State Department was anxious to hear Brent's views because he would very likely be asked to head the American Delegation at the forthcoming conference.[47]

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[47]Hamilton Wright to Brent: June 9, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 8. See also State Department to Brent: May 25, 1909. NA., RG 59, Numerical File 774/625. Wright formally joined the State Department in April, 1909.

Brent did not receive the State Department's cable until June 26, having been away on a trip in the hill country. He replied to the cable on July 2, recommending that: The conference should include all Powers which had accepted the invitation to Shanghai. The general purpose should be to "ratify and conventionalize" the Shanghai resolutions and to consider further actions in accord with those resolutions. An authoritative scientific investigation should be undertaken by each nation, and each delegation should include one scientific expert. The conference should frame a general treaty providing against shipment of opium from opium-exporting countries to areas where it is prohibited. Joint action should be taken to suppress morphine, cocaine, and other similar drugs. Treaty obligations and private agreements between nations should be restudied and if necessary amended intthe light of the Shanghai resolutions (that is, the Ten Year Agreement). The conference should take place at The Hague.[48]

Brent realized that the government would look to him for leadership in the conference. The Bishop was not overjoyed at the idea of more hard work, but he realized that he

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[48]For the full text of Brent's cable, see Brent to State Department: July 2, 1909. NA., RG 59, Numerical File, 774/646.

had the necessary experience to do the job well, as well as a moral duty to do all he could in the fight against opium addiction. "I swore (to myself) after the Commission that I would not undertake any further work of the sort. But it is true that I have the matter in hand as probably no one else has, and my experience at Shanghai would make it possible for me to take part in or preside over a Conference successfully. The question is so important that it can hardly be overestimated."[49] Thus the Bishop of the Philippines was recognized by his government as an international authority on opium addiction.

Plans for the conference were put in motion in September of 1909, when the State Department approached the other Powers through diplomatic channels. A tentative program based on the Shanghai resolutions was sent to the various nations, and so began two years of diplomatic maneuverings of proposals and counterproposals. Even some of the State Department officials were not particularly interested in the conference, as Wright revealed in November 1909, but Secretary Knox favored it.[50] Wright suggested that Brent write both Knox and President Taft, urging them to push the

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[49]Brent to Bishop Hall: July 2, 1909. Brent Papers Box 8.

[50]Hamilton Wright to Brent: November 12, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 8.

conference. Brent did so, on this and many other occasions.[51]

Except for the United States and China, no government wanted an early conference and some wanted no conference at all. Securing the agreement of the various Powers was destined to be a long and involved procedure. By February of 1910, only China, Portugal, and the Netherlands had accepted the invitation. The Netherlands, however, had expressed a desire that the conference be held at The Hague, so at least the place if not the time of the meeting was definitely set.

Brent grew somewhat discouraged as time went on and no definite agreements were reached. The Bishop feared that the whole idea would fail because of a lack of agreement among the Powers. The State Department on the other hand took an overly optimistic view, expecting daily to receive affirmative replies from Britain, France, and Japan. As events actually worked themselves out, it took a year to secure even tentative agreements from these nations.

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[51]See for example Brent to P. C. Knox: June 30, 1909. NA., RG 59 Numberical File 774/645. Also Brent to Knox: December 29, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 8. And Brent to Taft: December 29, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 61.

The greatest stumbling block to an early conference was the dilatory attitude of Great Britain. The British still retained a large financial stake in the opium traffic and were by no means eager to see an early meeting of a conference dedicated to outlawing this traffic. To Bishop Brent must go a good deal of the credit for securing ultimate British adherence to the Conference.

Brent used his personal and unofficial influence on the occasion of a visit to Britain for the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh between June and August 1910. In January of that year, Brent commented upon the opposition in England to the idea of an opium conference. "It is to the interest of Great Britain to delay the matter as long as it can be done. . ."[52] The cause of the delay was, as Brent realized, the Ten Year Agreement, which was due for renewal late in 1910. The British wanted it settled and out of the way before a conference met.

In February 1910, the Bishop planned his visit to England. He decided to speak to Sir Edward Grey and Lord Morley, as well as to anyone else the Archbishop of Archbishop of Canterbury deemed it advisable for him to see.[53]

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[52]Brent to Hamilton Wright: January 19, 1910. Brent Papers, Box 9.

[53]Brent to Colonel Carter: February 21, 1910. Brent Papers, Box 9.

He hoped to persuade the British to agree on an early date for the proposed conference. In April he wrote to Secretary Knox, explaining the purpose of his visit and asking the Department's approval, since diplomatic relations were involved.[54] Knox replied that the department was all in favor of Brent's proposed discussions with the British, provided that he did so only as a private citizen and did not attempt to speak for the United States government.[55] Thus, although Brent spoke unofficially while in Britain, the British realized that the State Department agreed with him.

Hamilton Wright was delighted with Brent's proposed visit to London. He pointed out that while the ministers delayed, anti-opium sentiment in Britain was on the increase.[56] The United States had decided not to pressure the London government until affirmative replies had been received from all other Powers. By May of 1910 everyone had accepted except Britain and Turkey, and the United States was about to start applying pressure. Brent's visit would thus come at a most opportune time, and Wright believed that his influence would tip the scales in favor of the conference.[57]

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[54]Brent to P.C. Knox: April 12, 1910. Brent Papers, Box 9.

[55]P.C. Knox:to Brent: May 25, 1910. Brent Papers, Box 9.

[56]Hamilton Wright to Brent: May 12, 1910. Brent Papers, Box 9.

[57]Ibid.

Brent arrived in Britain on June 4, and immediately started to set up meetings with various British officials. In the course of his visit he spoke with Sir Edward Grey, Lord Crewe, Sir Thomas Holderness, and Lord Morley. The most important meeting was one arranged by Whitelaw Reid, the United States Ambassador to Britain. It occurred at a luncheon on July 7, and involved Reid himself, Bishop Brent, Lord Morley, and Sir Edward Grey.

Brent reported that he "spoke freely regarding the relation of India and China";[58] that is, he urged the British to meet with the Chinese and modify the Ten Year Agreement so as to stop Indian opium traffic as soon as China stopped domestic production. The British were very reasonable according to Brent, especially Lord Morley who had been working for some time to limit or abolish the Indian opium traffic. The British statesmen said the Ten Year Agreement could not be reopened, nor could they see it become a matter for international discussion at the conference table. Hamilton Wright had warned Brent that the United States did not want to interfere in the matter of the Ten Year Agreement, that the initiative would have to come either from Britain or from China. America, he wrote,

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[58]Brent to his Sister Helen: July 12, 1910. Brent Papers, Box 49.

should act as an intermediary only, lest the success of the conference be jeopardized.[59] Brent followed Wright's line of policy and made the position of the United States clear to the British.

The question of the Ten Year Agreement also came up in a private interview between Brent and Sir Thomas Holderness, the author of the agreement. Brent agreed with Sir Thomas that it would be undesirable to discuss the agreement at the conference table, but the Bishop again urged that Britain reopen the question with China. Brent realized, however, that his words would probably have little effect. He did believe that Britain would soon consent to the conference, and that she would have no reservations apart from the matter of the Anglo-Chinese Agreement. He was also convinced that Britain's delay had not been due to any desire to temporize but rather to a careful consideration of the entire opium problem.[60]

Brent returned to the United States on August 10, 1910. On September 19, Britain finally agreed to join the

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[59]See Hamilton Wright to Huntington Wilson (acting Secretary of State): June 29, 1910. NA, RG, 59, Record Group 43, Entry 36. Also Wright to Brent: June 27, 1910. Brent Papers, Box 9.

[60]See Brent to P. C. Knox: July 8, 1910. NA, RG 59, Numerical File 774/765 (filed under Decimal File 511.4A1).

conference. However, she imposed the expected condition that the Ten Year Agreement as well as all other Anglo-Chinese treaties be exempt from discussion. The United States agreed to these British reservations, specifically disclaiming any desire to discuss the Anglo-Chinese agreements. British co-operation, the important point, had been secured. While we may be fairly certain that Britain would have agreed to the conference in any event, it cannot be denied that Brent's discussions in London, representing even though unofficially the attitude of the State Department, were in part responsible for the British decision to adhere to the conference.

Bishop Brent was again in Britain, en route to Manila, in December, 1910. He reported to Hamilton Wright that he had had no chance of reopening the question of the Ten Year Agreement with the British.[61] Owing to elections and the Christmas holidays, the British were not interested in discussing the opium problem. Aside from talking to Ambassador Reid and Archbishop Davidson, Brent did not allude to the topic.

However, in May of 1911 the British did agree to a modification of the Ten Year Agreement. According to the

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[61]Brent to Hamilton Wright: January 24, 1911. Brent Papers, Box 9.

terms of the new treaty, the Indo-Chinese opium traffic was to end not later than 1917, but earlier if the Chinese suppressed domestic production. This was the goal which Brent had urged, and Hamilton Wright believed the Bishop's talks had a decisive effect upon Britain's final decision to modify the treaty. Brent himself did not agree:

> I tried to get Sir Edward Grey and Lord Morley to consent to a reopening of the question of the Ten Year Agreement but they said they could not. However less than a year later they did so, though I do not think my influence had anything to do with it.[62]

It is impossible to determine just what influence, if any, Brent did have on the British decision to modify the agreement.

In addition to his visits to Britain, Brent was also active in the anti-opium cause in the Philippines. The biggest problem in the islands was that of smuggling; it was the chief difficulty in all attempts made to enforce the prohibitory law of 1908. Brent wrote both to the State Department and to various colonial officials in the Far East urging legislation in accord with Resolution 4 of the Shanghai Commission.[63] In addition to writing, the Bishop talked

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[62]Brent to Mrs. Foster: August 13, 1911. Brent Papers, Box 50.

[63]See 1) Brent to P. C. Knox: April 12, 1910. Brent Papers, Box 9. 2) Brent to P. C. Knox: June 1, 1910. NA, RG 59, Numerical File 774/753 (Filed under Decimal File 511.4A1). 3) Brent to A. A. deJongh: October 26, 1909. NA,

personally with William Cameron Forbes, the Governor General of the Philippines, and with Sir Henry May, the acting Governor of Hong Kong. Both men promised to do all they could to stop the traffic into the islands.[64]

While smuggling in the Philippines continued to be a problem, the anti-opium campaign waged by Brent and others did bring about some changes in the situation. In 1910 the Government of Hong Kong, acting in conformity with Resolution 4 of the Shanghai Commission, prohibited the export of opium to countries prohibiting its import. This of course included the Philippines. In the fall of 1911 the Indian government did likewise. But the chief trouble spot and smuggling center as far as the Philippines were concerned, British North Borneo, did nothing to stop its export of opium.

While Brent was busy fighting opium in the Philippines, the proposed opium conference was running into more delays in Europe. The United States had suggested October 15, 1910 as the starting date for the conference. This was not feasible, as the delegations would not be able to complete their preliminary investigations by this time. The Dutch

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RG 59, Numerical File 774/676. 4) Brent to F. D. Lugard: April 9, 1910. Brent Papers, Box 9.

[64]See Brent to Knox: June 1, 1910. Also Brent to Hamilton Wright: January 24, 1911. Brent Papers, Box 9.

Government suggested May 30, 1911, then July 1. At this juncture the British insisted on further preliminary studies, and the Dutch postponed the conference sine die.

The United States then suggested October 16, 1911, and the Dutch refused, claiming that even this date was too early. They suggested the spring of 1912, which made the State Department rather unhappy. Hamilton Wright intervened with the Dutch minister, threatening to issue the invitations for a conference to be held in Washington, D. C. if necessary. However, the Dutch finally agreed to December 1, 1911 as the starting date.

Behind all the delays and postponements lurked the profitable opium traffic in the Far East. Not only the British, but also the French and Dutch had a stake in this traffic. In fact, the Dutch Government received revenues of several million dollars a year from the opium traffic in the Dutch East Indies. The State Department believed that the British were supporting the dilatory tactics of the Dutch. " . . . This conference is a bete noire to many of the interested powers. For that reason it is the more earnestly to be hoped that an early convening of the conference may be brought about. . . ."[65]

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[65]F. L. Huidekoper (Secretary to the United States Hague Delegation) to Brent: August 25, 1911. Brent Papers, Box 9.

The continuing postponements created problems for the United States delegates to the conference. The American delegation had been chosen in March 1911 and consisted of Bishop Brent (the chairman of the delegation), Hamilton Wright, and Doctor Henry J. Finger of California. Secretary of State Knox explained why Brent was chosen to lead the delegation:

> Bishop Brent was the chairman of our delegation to the Opium Conference which was held at Shanghai in 1909. He was also selected to be the presiding officer of that conference. Because of his knowledge of the subject and of his position, both in the Shanghai, Conference and in the world in general, his appointment is considered highly desirable.[66]

To these qualifications may be added Brent's unofficial diplomatic work in London and the Far East, and his letters of encouragement to Taft and Knox.

Wright and Finger, who lived in the United States, were not seriously inconvnienced by the delays in the conference, but with Brent it was another story. His Episcopal work often took him out of reach of even the long arm of the State Department. As a consequence, he twice had to cancel his reservations on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and the Third time he arranged for reservations, he suggested that

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[66]P. C. Knox to Charles D. Norton (Taft's secretary): March 3, 1911. Brent Papers, Box 37.

the railroad retain his deposit fee until such time as he actually made the trip. He finally left Manila for the Hague on November 3, 1911, nearly a year after he had originally planned on traveling to Europe.

The delegates gathered at The Hague during the last days of November, and on December 1, 1911 the long-postponed conference finally got under way. Again the first order of business was the election of a President and this time the election was a mere formality. Brent, as he had suspected, received another unanimous vote, The Bishop realized that as the inspirer of the movement he was the logical choice for President, but he had hoped to avoid a position of leadership. He had not even wanted to lead the American delegation. As he wrote to Hamilton Wright, "If I have my own way, it will be you who will lead the delegation and not I. . . . I am doubtful about my skill in leadership. I am perhaps too much inclined to compromise and not ready enough to fight."[67] Wright did in fact become the leader of the American delegation after Brent was elected President of the conference.

In his opening address to the delegates, the new President defined the scope and object of the conference.

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[67]Brent to Hamilton Wright: April 12, 1910. Brent Papers, Box 9.

They had assembled, he told them, for the purpose of conventionalizing the resolutions passed at Shanghai and dealing with other relevant issues.[68] The questions of cocaine and Indian help, which the British had insisted on including in the conference, must be considered. Brent again urged international co-operation, emphasizing the point that no nation could hope to control the opium menace alone. The convention which would eventually be drawn up must represent a universal conviction, relegating opium and all other habit-forming drugs to the sphere of medicine.

On another occasion the Bishop reviewed the history of the anti-opium crusade leading to the Hague Conference. The anti-opium campaign began, he believed, in an effort on the part of foreigners in sympathy with them. But the opium evil had spread far beyond the Celestial Kingdom. The conference was a concerted attack on a widespread evil, the nations hoping to protect themselves by protecting one another. The Bishop warned, however, that "legislation, however drastic and thorough, will never efadicate the abuse of opium . . ."[69] No law can escape abuse; all that can be done is a modest attempt to improve the situation. When the opium convention

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[68]Brent, opening address at Hague Conference, Brent Papers, Box 26, p. 3.

[69]Brent, "The Years that are Past, Part IV," The Churchman 109, p. 416.

would finally be signed by the nations, Brent believed, "we shall have accomplished well-nigh all that international action is capable of doing."[70]

The session proceeded with the reading of the usual congratulatory telegrams from heads of government, and then the delegates got down to business. Rules of order were adopted and committees appointed on December 4. Then the sessions began to grow stormy. At Shanghai the British had caused the most trouble; at the Hague the distinction of chief troublemaker went to the Germans. On December 27, Brent was still optimistic. "I think we will reach a good convention with fair unanimity and there is little doubt that our various governments will ratify duly the agreement we have drawn up."[71] But by January 6, 1912, problems had arisen. "Comite de Redaction is in difficulties. Germans, I fear, are going to cause trouble."[72]

And the Germans did indeed cause trouble. The chief bone of contentionwas the question of international controls of morphia and cocaine. The British desired stringent controls, while the Germans, who were engaged in a very

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[70] Ibid., p. 417.

[71] Brent to Mrs. Foster: December 27, 1911. Brent Papers, Box 50.

[72] Brent Diary: January 6, 1912.

profitable business manufacturing these drugs in the Far East, were not anxious to see the traffic controlled. An Anglo-German deadlock ensued, which lasted for eight days. Meanwhile, the Persians, Chinese, and Siamese engaged in a quarrel of their own.[73]

On January 16 the Anglo-German deadlock was broken by a very unsatisfactory compromise. Brent offered to resign the Presidency and fight from the floor for the original British articles which would put careful controls on morphia and cocaine. The British refused to support him in this move, fearing that Germany would withdraw from the conference, effectively wrecking any positive accomplishments. Eventually Brent and the rest of the American delegation, as well as the British, signed the compromise for the sake of unity.

A new complication arose when Wright and Finger agreed to propose two separate conventions, one embodying all the agreed-upon points and the other to be concerned exclusively with the controversial morphine-cocaine compromise. Brent

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[73]See Ibid., January 11, 1912. The quarrel concerned what would become Chapter 4 of the final convention (control of the drug traffic in China). Persia and Siam wished to refrain from taking a position on this subject, as these resolutions did not apply to them. They sggested that Chapter 4 be embodied in a separate convention. Hamilton Wright strongly opposed this idea as being detrimental to Chinese sovereignty. A compromise was eventually reached: all the powers signed the final convention with Persia and Siam attaching a note excepting them from those articles not applying to them.

strongly opposed the idea as one that could do no good and would only cause further trouble. The proposition was voted down on January 18 but was brought up again the following day. On this occasion Brent apparently lost his customary presidential impartiality.[74] Nothing came of the two-convention proposal, but it caused a good deal of friction within the American delegation as well as on the floor.

Finally the agreements which had been reached were embodied in a convention to be signed by the delegates on behalf of their governments and then submitted to the governments themselves for final ratification. The convention, which was signed by the delegates at the close of the conference on January 23, was necessarily a result of controversy and compromise. As Brent bluntly expressed it, "We . . . have an unsatisfactory convention, thanks to the Germans."[75]

The convention was drawn up in five chapters, plus three supplementary articles which concerned ratification procedure. Chapter 1 represented a significant achievement. It called for regulation and restriction of raw opium, but

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[74] Ibid., January 19, 1912.

[75] Brent to General Edwards: January 18, 1912. NA, Bureau of Insular Affairs, 12848-12.

unfortunately did not mention the suppression of poppy-growing. Prepared opium was the subject of Chapter 2. Traffic in prepared opium was to be controlled and gradually suppressed, but no time limit was set.

Chapter 3 dealt with morphine and cocaine, and was the weakest section of the entire convention. An attempt was made to control traffic in cocaine and other opium derivatives, but the wording was so vague as to make the chapter virtually worthless. This was of course the result of the German compromise. The Chapter as finally stood represented a triumph for Germany and a defeat for Britain. One of Britain's chief objects in attending the conference, and one in which the United States had supported her, had been the regulation of the traffic in morphine, cocaine, and other opium derivatives. This goal was not achieved.

Chapter 4 concerned the control of the drug traffic in China. Here the Chinese won a significant victory: they were given the right to exclude all foreign opium except that specifically covered by the Ten Year Agreement. Chapter 5 dealt with the problem of domestic legislation. All countries were urged to pass such legislation, regulating the manufacture, sale and transportation of opium and its derivatives. The nations also agreed to a free exchange of information on the subject of opium.

The three supplementary articles setting up ratification procedures were unusual but necessary. The first article provided for the adherence to the convention of non-signatory powers through a special protocol. The second article stated that ratification would occur after all powers had signed the convention. If all the nations had ratified by December 31, 1912, the Dutch would invite all signatory powers to another conference to deposit the ratifications. By the terms of the third supplementary article, the convention was to go into effect three months after ratification.[76]

The convention was greeted with a mixed reaction. On the one hand it was hailed as a distinct advance in the anti-opium movement. It marked the inauguration of a new standard of international morality, in that the powers agreed to co-operate with one another. British co-operation was especially important. The conventionaalso signalized a step forward for China in her relations with the West. Again, as at Shanghai, she was treated as an equal rather than as an inferior.

In the United States, both the President and the State Department expressed satisfaction with the convention.

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[76]For a detailed discussion of the Hague Convention, see Arnold Taylor, "The United States and Narcotic Traffic," Loc. City,,pp. 126-38. A copy of the convention may be found in the NA, RG 59, Record Group 43, entry 36.

So did the members of the American delegation, although they were aware of its shortcomings. As Brent put it, "though in the chapter bearing on morphine and cocaine the convention is disappointing, the conclusions of the conference are in other respects highly satisfactory."[77] The United States was pleased with the condemnation of all non-medical uses of opium which the convention embodied. Americans were also happy that Resolution 4, prohib iting the export of opium to countries which forbade its import, had been conventionalized.

However, there were many drawbacks to the convention, as was soon realized. Chapter 2 was weakened by the omission of any time limit for suppressing the traffic in prepared opium. This was, in fact, a major weakness of the whole convention. Chapter 3 was the worst of all. No distinct pledges were made to control morphine and cocaine, only hollow promises. Another drawback to the convention as a whole was the lack of administrative machinery to supervise the implementationoof the convention and to control the opium traffic effectively.

The convention was therefore a rather imperfect instrument, one with which no power was completely satisfied.

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[77]Brent, 1911 Annual Address. Brent Papers, Box 26.

It was of necessity a compromise. And yet, as Arnold Taylor points out, it was "probably the best that could be obtained at the time and under the circumstances."[78] The Hague Convention remained the basis of United States international drug policy until 1931.

The final ratification of the convention, in which Brent played no role, was the cause of further delays. By the end of 1912 the European powers had still not signed the convention, although at the request of the United States all the Latin American nations except Peru had sone so. Eventually after a second and a third conference had met to discuss the problem, the recalcitrant European powers signed the convention. The Hague Convention was formally put into effect by the United States, China, and the Netherlands on February 11, 1915.

Meanwhile Brent had returned to the Philippines and was once more engaged in combating opium in the Far East. In the Philippines, the major problem was still that of smuggling. Smuggling increased in 1912, and Brent suspected some Chinese businessmen residing at the port of Cebu of complicity.[79]

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[78]Taylor, "The United States and Narcotic Traffic," Loc. Cit., p. 140.

[79]See John S. Stanley to the Governor General (Forbes): September 4, 1912. Brent Papers, Box 10.

The chief source of the contraband opium was British North Borneo. Hong Kong and Singapore, two former trouble spots, had put an end to smuggling, but in Borneo nothing was done. Brent again pointed out that it would be far easier to stop the traffic in Borneo than to police the whole Philippine coastline. But the situation remained unchanged and until the end of Brent's episcopate in the islands, Borneo continued to supply the Philippines with contraband opium.

The opium problem was complicated further by the situation in China. With the revolution and downfall of the Manchu dynasty in 1912, the former anti-opium edicts were no longer enforced. As a result large areas of China reverted to poppy cultivation. This of course affected the Ten Year Agreement, since the amount of Indian opium allowed into China was equal to the amount which China grew domestically. With the revolutionary turmoil in China, it was impossible to secure accurate information as to the extent of poppy cultivation.

In August of 1912 Archbishop Davidson wrote Brent asking for information on the situation and Brent's opinions.[80]

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[80]Archbishop Davidson to Brent: August 2, 1912. Brent Papers, Box 10.

Brent replied that as far as he could tell, poppy cultivation was on the increase in several Chinese provinces. He blamed the situation on conniving local authorities, not on the revolutionary government in Peking. The Bishop urged the British to bring to an end the Indo-Chinese opium traffic, despite China's relapse into poppy cultivation. Brent believed that the Powers, especially Britain, could bring enough pressure to bear on China to force her to stop cultivation, if the opium traffic were halted. According to the Bishop, an effective minority of Chinese truly desired reform, and China's moral sentiment as a whole was awakening. Brent urged the British to act morally and not succumb to the economic temptation of increased opium revenues.[81] The archbishop agreed with Brent's analysis and hoped that the British statesmen "may prove able to deal worthily with what is indisputably a difficult and trying matter."[82] By 1913 China had managed to suppress opium cultivation to such an extent that to all practical purposes the Indo-Chinese trade ended in that year. The British statesmen had indeed been faithful to their trust.

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[81]See Brent to Archbishop Davidson: September 21 and October 22, 1912. Brent Papers, Boxes 50 and 10, respectively.

[82]Archbishop Davidson to Brent: December 11, 1912. Brent Papers, Box 10.

The outbreak of World War I put a temporary halt to the anti-opium campaign, but in the prewar years Bishop Brent had risen to the position of the world-renowned leader of this crusade. To him must go the credit for realizing the broader implications of the problem.

> We found it (smoking opium) in the Philippines as a local custom. In the course of studying it we were aroused to the realization that it was of moment to every nation of the world, civilized or uncivilized, and that we could hope to cope with it only by universal attack.[83]

Brent found himself led to this universal attack on the opium evil. He led the fight publicly as the head of the United States delegation to the Shanghai Opium Commission and the Hague Opium Conference, and as the President of both meetings. He fought privately, as he suggested the idea of a conference to Roosevelt and the State Department, and as he used his moral influence in Britain with the leaders of the British government. His dual citizenship gave him a tremendous strategic advantage; he was accepted as a spokesman of the anti-opium interests on both sides of the Atlantic.

But the greatest force which Bishop Brent brought to bear on the opium evil was the moral force of his own personality. It was he who more than any other raised the

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[83]Brent, The Churchman 109, p. 397.

struggle to a high moral plane and kept it there. He refused to be swayed by economic or material arguments, and because of his own personal integrity his moral arguments were accepted. His contributions to the crusade against opium were tremendous. The credit for the success of both the Shanghai Opium Commission and the Hague Opium Conference must go largely to Brent. As his biographer expressed it, "Almost single-handed he undertook to arouse the conscience of civilized nations to a social evil of international dimensions and to lay foundations for remedial effort which should endure."[84] To Bishop Brent truly belongs the title Father of the International Crusade Against Opium.

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[84]Remsen Ogilby in the Dictionary of American Biography, Volume XXI, p. 116.

CHAPTER V

LATER YEARS IN THE PHILIPPINES 1909-1914

Brent returned to the Philippines from the Shanghai Opium Commission on April 2, 1909. For the next year, until he left for yet another visit to the United States and Europe in April of 1910, he was able to devote all his efforts to his island episcopate. During this year he initiated no new ventures, but concentrated on consolidating the work he had begun. By April of 1910, the nursing school in Manila was an established success, and another new wing had been added to St. Luke's hospital. The orphanage was also prospering, and at the settlement house the bishop had gathered a native congregation and was holding services in Tagalog. Studley's Chinese mission was making slow but steady progress.

At the mission stations of Bontoc and Sagada, the work had been carried forward. The girls' school at Sagada was prospering, and schools had finally been established at Bontoc. The chief difficulty was still the completion of Catholic missionaries in the area. At Sagada, Brent reported

in 1910, the problem was minor, but at Bontoc the Catholics had erected a very imposing church which was attracting members of Brent's congregation.[1] The Catholics had taken over Brent's idea of a chain of mission stations reaching north from Manila into the hill country. Brent was not bitter about this, but he did wish that the Episcopalians had seen fit to contribute the men and money necessary to implement his idea. And he continued to resent the Catholic habit of deliberately setting up missions in areas where his missioners were already established. "It would not have been so disturbing had they (the Catholic missionaries) gone to other parts of the Igorot country, but to raise altar against altar deliberately, passing by the unshepherded and neglected to do so, seems to me the height of ecclesiastical wickedness."[2]

Brent's missionary work also embraced the area around Zamboanga, in Mindanao. He was still engaged in plans to open a hospital there. Medical missions, he believed, were necessary if Christianity were ever to have an effect on the Moslem Moros in the south.

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[1]Brent, "Seventh Annual Report," Board of Missions Report (New York: 1910), p. 158.

[2]Brent to Leonard Wood: May 28, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 63.

Brent reported in 1910 that the Baguio School for American boys had had a successful first year.[3] This school became very popular among American residents in the islands, as it was the only one of its kind. The bishop continued to be concerned about the entire educational system in the Philippines. He hoped eventually to establish student hostels for Filipinos in Manila and other educational centers. Repeatedly he stressed the importance of educational institutions in preparing the Filipinos for ultimate self-government. (among the non-Christian tribes also.) He was ever conscious of the value of education. He believed that it was the single most important work which Americans could do in the Philippines.

Bishop Brent was also concerned about the whole range of relations between Americans and Filipinos. In 1909, he feared that a deterioration was setting in. "The race feeling between Americans and Filipinos is very strong--worse than at any time since the American occupation. I am apprehensive for the future."[4] In addition to a buildup in racial tension, the bishop also saw evidence of a decline in social relations. There seemed to be less goodwill on both sides although he

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[3]Brent, "Seventh Annual Report," p. 158.

[4]Brent to Mrs. Pepper: May 27, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 58.

noted that there was still a good deal of pleasant social intercourse.[5]

Politically too the outlook was not encouraging. Brent continued to complain of expediency in government appointments, a lack of policy in Washington, and too much interference with local government. However, some progress had been made. ". . .the rank and file of young Americans out here is enormously in advance of that which it was five years ago. There is greater efficiency and less profligacy."[6] The complaints of Brent and others in the islands had thus borne some fruit. Brent again urged a longer term of office for officials in the Philippines. "Give us a man who is willing to be Governor General for twenty-five years, do not jog his elbow every ten minutes, let him cast the policy and the administration endorse it--this is the only hope for better days."[7] The bishop believed that the Philippine government should be modelled on the example the British had set in India. Ideally, he hoped for a day when the Philippine civil service could be fairly compared for integrity

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[5]Brent, "Life and Work in the Philippine Mission," The Pacific Churchman 45 (November, 1909), p. 3.

[6]Brent to Leonard Wood: May 28, 1909.

[7]Ibid.

and efficiency to the Indian civil service.[8]

Brent continued to feel a pastoral responsibility for the government officials who resided in the islands. As he had insisted from the beginning, he regarded the American personnel as his primary responsibility. The friendship with William Cameron Forbes became one of the bright spots in Brent's life. In 1909 Forbes was appointed governor general, and he asked Brent to officiate at his inauguration. Brent had great influence with the new governor general, and later in the year the bishop was instrumental in getting Forbes to remove a dishonest office-holder.

Brent had high hopes for Forbes' administration. "I am inclined to think he will do at least as well as any of his predecessors--better than some. He has definite ideas and when his mind is set he is fearless."[9] The bishop's hopes were realized, for Forbes was, in the opinion of most historians, one of the best of all those who held the post of governor general. But if Brent was pleased with the new governor general, he was not happy with the situation of the Philippine Commission. He continued to urge that the War

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[8]Brent to Newton S. Gilbert: February 17, 1910. Brent Papers, Box 9.

[9]Brent to Mercer Johnston: November 8, 1909. Mercer Johnston Papers, Box 40.

Department in Washington allow the Commission more freedom of action.

Brent's feud with Commissioner Worcester finally came to a close in 1909. They fought a pitched battle over Worcester's Igorot policy, and Brent was ready to write to the President when they agreed on an interview and decided to bury the hatchet. "The fight has cleared the air and I anticipate no further trouble," Brent reported.[10] This proved to be the case; the two men never became close friends, but their future relations were at least amicable.

On April 30, 1910, Brent left the Philippines to represent the Episcopal Church at the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh. This was also the occasion on which he interceded with British officials on behalf of the proposed Hague Opium Conference. (Ante, pp.). At the Edinburgh conference, Bishop Brent's main concern was with the subject of church unity. His years of service in the East had aroused in him a desire for unity. "It was while resident in the Orient, on the frontier of Christianity, that the desperate need for a united Christendom impinged forcibly on Bishop Brent's still forming mind."[11]

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[10]Brent to Mercer Johnston: February 9, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 8.

[11]Frederick W. Kates, Charles Henry Brent, p. 15

In the course of the Edinburgh conference, Brent preached a sermon on the promotion of unity. This marked the start of the so-called "Faith and Order Movement" of which Brent was the inspirer and leader. By October of 1910, Brent's ideas had crystallized and he was convinced that an interfaith conference should be held to discuss points of disagreement. It would be called the World Conference on Faith and Order, and plans for its organization were begun in 1910, but it did not meet until 1927.

Though the Faith and Order Conference was a future rather than a present goal, Brent continued to preach unity. In a sermon at St. Paul's Cathedral, London, in December, 1910 he emphasized the idea of organic unity rather than reunion. And in 1911 he wrote, "sober effort is to be made to pave the way for a really ecumenical Conference, an effort which can only be made by really ecumenical methods."[12] Brent's idea of ecumenism was to include all Christians, even Roman Catholics--a step which most Protestants were unwilling to take at that time. The bishop realized that Catholicism had much to offer the rest of Christianity. However, he still distinguished between the Catholic people as a whole and the Vatican hierarchy. The bishop never understood or appreciated

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[12]Brent to Dr. Manning: 19th Sunday after Trinity, 1911. Brent Papers, Box 9.

the Vatican. This is understandable in the light of his Anglican heritage. And the organization of the American Episcopal Church at that time, although hierarchical to an extent, was much more democratic than the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Brent was not out to minimize differences; he was aware of difficulties and divergences; his approach to the problem of unity was essentially realistic. This combination of idealistic vision and realistic appraisal of difficulties made the bishop an ideal leader of the Faith and Order movement.

From Edinburgh Brent travelled to America and spent the months of August through November in the United States. He then returned to Manila by way of Europe. While in the United States, he renewed his friendship with Taft and also with Theodore Roosevelt. The bishop dined at the White House with President Taft and they had a pleasant reunion. Brent also visited the Roosevelts, spending a night with them at Sagamore Hill. The bishop continued to admire Roosevelt; on this occasion he referred to the ex-President as "a nobel hearted man, conscious of his strength, determined to use himself to the best advantage for his nation's good."[13]

Brent sailed from Europe for Manila on December 30,

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[13]Brent Diary: August 12, 1910.

1910; by the end of January he was back in the islands and hard at work. Throughout most of 1911, until he left for the Hague Opium Conference in November, the bishop was occupied mainly with missionary work. In 1911, a bishop's house was constructed in Manila, made possible by the donation of a personal friend. A student hostel for boys was under construction and Brent hoped to erect one for girls also. The bishop proudly claimed that the nursing school which he had founded in connection with St. Luke's Hospital was the best in the Philippines.[14]

Brent appealed for more funds to continue the work at Baguio. A chapel for the natives was under construction there. The Baguio School for American boys had done extremely well. Elsewhere among the pagan tribes, new mission stations had been established at Tukukan near Bontoc, and at Besao and Bagnen near Sagada.

Brent was at this time eager to begin work among the Moros in the southern islands, but lacked both funds and facilities. He seemed fascinated by the problems which the Moros posed for Christian missioners. Many had tried and failed to win their confidence. Brent was realistic enough to appreciate the difficulties involved; he realized that

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[14]Brent, "Eighth Annual Report," Board of Missions Report (New York: 1911), p. 154.

specially trained missioners would be necessary. Nothing could be done at the time, but Brent was able eventually to begin work in the Moro country, and this work was destined to be one of his most spectacular successes.

Politically, the situation in the Philippines went from bad to worse in 1911. According to Brent, "we are in the worst mess we have been in since the American occupation."[15] Cameron Forbes had discovered evidence of dishonest proceedings in the auditor's office; that official was suspended and an investigation confirmed the judgment of the governor general. The resulting scandal further lowered American prestige in the eyes of the Filipinos. The Assembly, taking advantage of the situation, stepped up its demands for independence. Eventually the situation quieted down, but the whole affair put an added strain on the already overburdened American officials.

Despite the problems which arose in connection with American rule of the islands, Bishop Brent continued to believe in the ultimate worth of that rule. ". . .in the whole history of Colonial administration in the Orient, no dependency has ever approximated that measure of self-government which the Philippine Islands now enjoy."[16] The task of the United States

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[15]Brent to George Wharton Pepper: January 7, 1911. Brent Papers, Box 9.

[16]Brent, The Inspiration of Responsibility and Other Papers (New York: 1966), p. 161. (Originally published 1911)

was the moral regeneration and unification of the Filipino people. These steps, Brent believed, were prerequisites for self-government.[17] The United States must work at her task "without academic regrets that cripple effort, or impatient haste which causes an appearance of progress rather than progress itself."[18] Then at some future date America could hand over the torch of civilization and progress to the Filipinos whom she had helped to civilize.[19]

The bishop also believed that involvement in the Philippines had been in the nature of a learning process for the United States as well as for the Filipinos:

> I am of the opinion that our nation would never have been shaken out of its placid self-conceit and serene ignorance of the Orient if a direct responsibility in the Far East had not been thrust upon us. We needed the sort of discipline which ensued when it was determined by our Government to retain the Philippines. . .[20]

By 1911 the bishop believed that because of this learning process Americans were on the whole better informed about the Orient. They were also more sympathetic towards other colonial powers such as Britain and Holland.

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[17] Ibid., p. 157.

[18] Ibid., p. 164.

[19] Ibid., p. 165.

[20] Ibid., p. 156.

Brent continued to take an active interest in other nations of the Far East in these immediate prewar years--among them Japan, China, and Russia. The bishop had first visited Japan with the Opium Investigating Committee in 1903, at the time of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. By 1909, another tense situation was developing, this time between Japan and the United States. And a key pawn in a possible chess game might be the Philippines.

At the end of 1909 and the beginning of 1910, Brent reported a Japanese scare among army men in the Philippines.[21] The bishop admitted that grounds for apprehension might exist; he reported a good deal of pro-Japanese agitation among the Filipinos, including secret meetings and arms smuggled into the islands from Japanese sources.[22] But, in Brent's opinion, the military men were somewhat inclined to exaggerate the situation. He had not found sufficient evidence to believe that the Japanese government was deliberately fomenting sedition among the Filipinos, and so he refused to credit the idea of imminent war. "Although I fear there is a considerable racial antagonism to separate Japanese from American

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[21]See Brent to Mrs. Leonard Wood: December 31, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 8. Also Brent to Leonard Wood: February 17, 1910. Brent Papers, Box 53.

[22]Brent to Leonard Wood: February 17, 1910.

interests, the prospect of any hostilities seems to me remote."[23]

While discounting the possibility of war between Japan and the United States, the bishop continued to keep a wary eye on Japan. He disliked the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and wished that Britain's Far Eastern policy were less pro-Japanese.[24] He also noted that most of the British whom he had met personally, both in England and in the Far East, were opposed to the alliance.[25] All of this represents a change in Brent's view of the Japanese. At the time of the Russo-Japanese war he had favored Japan. But by 1910 his years in the Philippines and his observations of the Japanese had convinced him that Japan was the most likely candidate for the role of aggressor in the Far East.

In 1911 the bishop mentioned that the local newspapers had reported Japanese spies mapping the fortifications at Corregidor which guarded the entrance to Manila Bay. With a realism unusual in a churchman, he commented, "this is only what every nation is doing to every other nation."[26] In the

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[23]Ibid.

[24]See Brent to Mrs. Davidson (wife of Archbishop of Canterbury): December 1, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 49.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Brent to his sister Evelyn: January 6, 1911. Brent

field of international relations as well as church unity Brent's views were essentially practical and realistic. He was well aware of the warlike tradition and temperment of the Japanese. He urged a buildup of trade relations between America and Japan as the surest way of keeping the peace. He prophesied an eventual Japanese domination of China, a day when "the Chinese will be as clay in the hands of the potter, Japan being the potter."[27] But he continued to believe that Japan had no immediate designs on the Philippines, and events proved his estimate correct.

Bishop Brent had less knowledge of the Russians than he had of the Japanese. However in the course of his journey to the Hague Opium Conference he travelled across Russia via the Trans-Siberian Railroad, thus gaining some first-hand impressions. He was enchanted by the Siberian countryside and very much interested in the people of the region. He saw them as a people with a rich future and great latent capacities. But he believed that they were so oppressed by the Tsarist government that they had little sense of individual liberty.[28]

Papers, Box 50. It is interesting to speculate whether these maps played any part in the Japanese occupation of Manila in 1942.

[27]Brent to Leonard Wood: February 17, 1910.

[28]For a description of Siberia in 1911, and a expression of the bishop's attitude toward the Russians, see Brent to Edith: November 23, 1911. Brent Papers, Box 50.

Brent was even more concerned with the situation in China than he was with that of Japan. This was in large part due to his efforts to halt the opium vice, which centered in China. He observed with an anxious eye the Chinese revolution of 1911-12 which overthrew the Manchu dynasty. He feared that the new republic would be short-lived. "Of course I am in sympathy with any change that will decrease the corruption of the Manchu dynasty, but China is no more ready for a republic than Russia is."[29]

The bishop was particularly concerned about the effect which the revolution would have on foreigners in China, especially fellow missionaries. This was only natural as Brent had many friends in the Celestial Kingdom--fellow missionaries, United States diplomats such as the Rockhills, and other diplomatic personnel whom he had met in the course of his anti-opium work. Brent reported that the revolutionists had avowed their intention of protecting Europeans and Americans, and that there had been no unfriendliness towards foreigners. But he questioned the ability of the revolutionary leaders to control the great masses of the Chinese people seeking vengeance.[30]

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[29]Brent to Mrs. Reid: November 16, 1911. Brent Papers, Box 60.

[30]See Brent to Evelyn: October 19, 1911. Also Brent

As late as 1913, China was still in turmoil and Brent was discouraged at the lack of positive programs to emerge from the revolution. The bishop believed that the conservative element, some of whom were his personal friends, should organize and take the lead in such questions as the framing of a constitution. But they seemed unable to take positive action, preferring to sulk in their tents, as Brent put it.[31] "The trouble with the Chinese is that they will not stand straight in the face of a serious difficulty."[32]

The years which Bishop Brent spent in the Far East made him ever more aware of the strategic importance of the Philippine Islands. He pointed out that geographically and racially the islands belonged to the East while religiously and politically they belonged to the west.[33] Christianity and Western rule had estranged the Filipinos from their Eastern neighbors without giving them a substitute. Democracy, he believed, was more a vague idea than a definite form of government to the Filipinos. The islands were therefore in

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to Edith: November 8, 1911. Both in Brent Papers, Box 50.

[31]Brent to Malcolm Peabody: April 18, 1913. Brent Papers, Box 58.

[32]Brent to Edith: April 30, 1913. Brent Papers, Box 50.

[33]Brent, The Inspiration of Responsibility, p. 159.

danger of alienation from both East and West. Brent was convinced that a native society could not be reconstituted on an Eastern model: "The new foundations must be of the Western, not of the Eastern type."[34]

But the situation in the Philippines was only part of a larger problem--the whole question of East-West relations and the impact of Western civilization upon the Orient. The problem was at once political, social, religious, and industrial. The duty of the West in general and the United States in particular was to help and not to exploit. The entire Oriental question was much more important and immediate, in Brent's opinion, than were European tensions. The bishop proved a poor prophet when he said in 1910 that Oriental matters rather than a European crisis would precipitate the coming world war.[35] Perhaps it should rather be said that Brent was too far-sighted, for his prophecy had a certain long-run validity.

Brent's views had indeed changed radically during his years in the Orient. Instead of believing that any Western way of doing things was ipso facto correct, he now felt that Western civilization was a menace to the Oriental which only

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[34]Ibid., p. 160.

[35]Brent to Leonard Wood: February 17, 1910.

Christianity could fortify him to resist.

> I have been enough in the East to believe that a great deal of what we are pleased to call Western civilization is a deadly thing, and that one purpose of Christian Missions should be to block its progress. I should like to see a purer, less complicated Christianity blossom forth in China and Japan than we are accustomed to, of a sort which would lead its adherents to scorn and reject some of the conventionalities, customs and ideas in which we have settled down as though they were wholly commendable.[36]

The bishop's vision of a unified Oriental world was thus predicated upon the base of Christianity. But it was to be a Christianity very different from that of the Western world, a Christianity which most of his contemporaries could not even imagine. Unfortunately Brent never worked out in detail his plan for an Oriental Christianity. It is likely that the details were not clear even to him; his vision of a new Christianity in the East was more ideal than practical.

The Philippines continued to occupy a strategic position in Brent's cultural outlook as well as in his view of world geography. He believed that the islands were peculiarly well situated, both geographically and historically, to form a bridge between East and West. And American rule was helping to build that bridge. The bishop continued to reiterate his

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[36]Brent to Mrs. Reid: June 10, 1909. Brent Papers, Box 60. It is unfortunate that the bishop never specified which conventionalities, customs, and ideas he wished the Orientals to reject.

conviction that American rule in the Philippines was beneficial to both parties. "America's conception of and influence in the Asiatic world to-day is as intelligent and powerful as it is largely by virtue or the fact that, rightly or wrongly, wisely or unwisely, the Philippines are under American rule."[37]

Throughout his years in the Philippines, Bishop Brent enjoyed a special relationship with military and naval men. Apart from civil service personnel, the military formed the bulk of his parishioners, and he was always ready to help them in any way possible. "As you know, I have always been a friend of the Army and I shall continue to be so as long as I live. As far as I am able in my personal or official capacity to aid its highest interests, I shall do so."[38]

As a churchman, Brent was especially interested in the subject of army and navy chaplains. This interest prefigures his work during World War I. In October of 1909, Brent drew up a memorial to Congress petitioning for an increase in the number of naval chaplains. The memorial was duly presented in Washington, but Congress took no immediate action. The bishop then endeavored to bring the subject to

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[37]Brent, The Pacific Churchman 45, p. 3.

[38]Brent to Leonard Wood: July 17, 1912. Brent Papers, Box 10.

the attention of the general public. In a letter to the Outlook in July 1910 he stressed the need for more chaplains in the navy, and more permanent churches on army posts.[39] The nation, Brent believed, owed the army and navy the duty of providing quarters for religious services, and this responsibility had not yet been discharged. Brent also urged his army friends to press for an increase in chaplains; on one occasion he discussed the subject with Leonard Wood and other army men in Washington.[40]

Many of Brent's closest friends in the Philippines were army personnel. Some mention has already been made of General Leonard Wood. Acting in his official capacity, Brent confirmed Wood, and also Generals Daniel Bush and John J. Pershing. Brent and Pershing became especially close friends. They first met in 1909, and corresponded regularly until Brent's death twenty years later. After Pershing followed in Wood's footsteps as governor of the Moro province, Brent joined the general and a group of his men on a punitive expedition in the Moro country. (1910) When Pershing's wife and children were killed in a fire in 1915, the bishop immediately telegraphed his sympathy. Later, Pershing invited

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[39]Brent, "Letter to the Editor," Outlook 95 (July 9, 1910), pp. 537-9.

[40]See Brent Diary: September 9, 1913.

Brent to join his force in Mexico but the bishop was unable to do so. But when Pershing asked Brent to come to France in 1917, the bishop quickly agreed.

When Brent returned to Manila from the Hague Opium Conference in April 1912, he again took up his missionary and episcopal duties. And again, he stayed only a year in the islands before returning to the United States in April of 1913. However during this year he expanded many of the Episcopal institutions in Manila, and prepared to undertake new work among the non-Christian tribes.

In Manila, the Columbia Club had long been a tremendous influence for good and was now in the process of expansion. Also under expansion were Baguio School for American boys, St. Luke's Hospital, and the nurses' house. New projects in Manila included an orphanage for boys at the settlement house, a school for girls similar to the Baguio school, a physicians' house in connection with St. Luke's, and a student hostel. The hostel opened on January 1, 1913; the Cathedral School for girls in the fall of 1913.

In the hill country, both Bontoc and Sagada prospered during 1912 and 1913. At Bontoc, dormitories for both boys and girls were under construction. Sagada was doing especially well: the sawmill was flourishing and Brent hoped to establish both a hospital and a boy's school. (Neither project succeeded.)

A new school had been opened at Besao, near Sagada.

Further to the south, Brent was at last able to put into operation his cherished project of work among the Moros. In September of 1912, the bishop reported that a missionary, Father McCutchen, was training to work among the Moros.[41] Enough money had been raised to purchase the land for a hospital at Zamboanga, in the heart of the Moro country. By the time Brent left for the United States in April of 1913, a temporary hospital was in use at Zamboanga and a permanent building was being constructed. The bishop also hoped to establish two industrial schools among the Moros; one of the chief purposes of his trip to America was to raise funds for this purpose. Since the Episcopal Board of Missions had been unable to allocate funds for Brent's Moro work, he had to depend entirely on private contributions. Although the reason given by the Board for the refusal was a simple lack of funds, we may surmise that there was a basic disagreement between Brent and the Board of Missions officials in the United States. The Board had always desired that the bishop devote more of his time to proselytizing among the Christianized Filipinos. Board officials were obviously not interested in financing work among the Moros who had already proved difficult if not

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[41]Brent, "Ninth Annual Report," Board of Missions Report, (New York: 1912), p. 131.

impossible subjects for conversion to Christianity.

Bishop Brent was naturally extremely interested in the three-party Presidential campaign of 1912. The race took shape in February of 1912 when Roosevelt announced his candidacy on the Progressive platform. Brent felt that Roosevelt was making a tremendous mistake.

> My judgment of the situation is that the Republican party is in for a bad licking. Roosevelt might have saved the day by standing for Taft--taking the ground, as he could have done, that though not endorsing every position of the present administration there was not enough of an issue between himself and Taft to make a split.[42]

Bishop Brent was in the United States in February and March of 1912, and spoke to both Roosevelt and Taft. One of the divisive issues between Roosevelt and Taft was the question of the recall of judges,which the Progressives favored and Taft opposed. When Brent questioned Roosevelt directly, the ex-President said he was opposed to judicial recall, but he later hedged on the question.[43] Brent had previously lunched with Taft and they had discussed the President's Toledo speech on the subject. Brent believed that it was a complete answer to Roosevlet's arguments in favor of judicial recall.[44] Brent's

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[42]Brent to Mrs. Reid: March 22, 1912. Brent Papers, Box 60.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Brent to Mrs. Foster: Palm Sunday, 1912. Brent Papers, Box 50.

own opinions on the subject corresponded to Taft's.

By April of 1912 when Brent was on his way back to Manila, he felt that Roosevelt was losing ground. He saw traces of demagoguism in Roosevlet's speeches, which he disliked. "The flattery of 'the people' never does good. Representative government is the only safe government for such a meterogeneous nation as ours. Referendum, initiative, recall may be all well enough on a small scale among a homogeneous people."[45]

From Manila, Brent continued to watch the developing campaign. By July he had completely reversed his position: "Home politics disgust me. I would vote for Wilson were I in America. Taft has altogether disappointed me. He has had bad advisors and is too easily influenced."[46] By October, the bishop had somewhat clarified his position. He admired Roosevelt but disliked the policies he was advocating and believed he would lose the election. Toward Taft, his feelings were mixed. "When I was in America my personal regard for Taft and my feeling that he had not be fairly treated led me to support him. Since then his descent to personal attack has

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[45] Ibid.

[46] Brent to Bishop Hall: July 20, 1912. Brent Papers, Box 56.

has given me pause."[47] Of Wilson, he said: "Though I do not know Wilson I incline to his political programme. I believe he would make a good President."[48]

Again the bishop had refused to let personal friendship interfere with political judgment. Though both Taft and Roosevelt were old friends, Brent disagreed with many of the policies of the Progressives, and he could not countenance Taft's personal attacks on his opponent. He therefore gave his allegiance to Wilson, although he was skeptical of the Democrats' ability to solve the country's problems. The initial reaction of Bishop Brent to the news of Wilson's election was that the Republican party was hopelessly split and would never be reunited. He felt, however, that Roosevelt's Progressive Party had a large popular following and would loom large in subsequent elections unless the Democrats took a more constructive course than they previously had.[49] He had hopes that Wilson would prove to be the leader everyone was looking for, but was alarmed by reports of Wilson's political instability.[50]

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[47]Brent to Mrs. Forbes: October 21, 1912. Brent Papers, Box 10.

[48]Brent to Mrs. Foster: October 21, 1912. Brent Papers, Box 50.

[49]Brent to Mrs. Reid: November 12, 1912. Brent Papers, Box 60.

[50]Ibid.

Brent was thus initially very well disposed towards the President-elect. He also continued in his admiration for Roosevelt and warm friendship with Taft. An interesting interchange occurred between Brent and Roosevelt following the election. Brent wrote: "I am afraid of some of your programme for America . . . (because) increase of privilege means an increase of selfobedience which I do not believe we are ready for."[51] Roosevelt replied in a long letter, justifying his position. The Progressives, he said, were trying to give the people an increase in privilege which had been usurped by the political bosses and trust magnates. He added, "there were certain men whose absence from our ranks I deeply regretted, and I regretted the absence of no-one more than yours."[52] There were apparently no hard feelings on either side, and Brent continued to admire the ex-President's ideals while disagreeing with many of the policies of the Progressives. The bishop summed up his attitude towards Roosevelt when he wrote: "Even if I am no longer his follower, I shall never cease to be his admirer."[53]

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[51]Brent to Roosevelt: December 6, 1912. Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 1, Box 234.

[52]Roosevelt to Brent: January 14, 1913. Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 2, Volume 94.

[53]Brent to Mrs. Reid: August 8, 1914. Brent Papers, Box 50.

Brent's personal friendship with Taft also continued unabated. In October of 1913, the bishop wrote: "He (Taft) is as unspoiled and sweet a nature as I have ever known."[54] Taft too continued to think highly of Brent. When he heard that the bishop was being considered for an honorary degree at Harvard, he wrote an unsolicited letter to advance Brent's cause.

> . . . There is no man in the country whom Harvard might more properly honor than this pioneer Bishop. . . . He has done great work, has secured the confidence of all, and has devoted himself to the improvement of the people of the islands with a singleness of purpose and a disregard of his own health that may involve him in martyrdom. Certainly he is entitled to the highest gratitude of his countrymen.[55]

For all of Brent's initial good feeling towards Wilson, the bishop realized that the change to a Democratic administration would inevitably mean a new regime in the Philippines. As early as March of 1912, he had noted that if the Democrats won the election, they would probably put through a bill like the Jones Bill (which had been introduced in Congress) granting probationary independence to the islands for some number of years.[56] Brent believed that the details of such a policy

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[54]Brent Diary: October 31, 1913.

[55]Taft to Bishop Lawrence: February 10, 1913. Taft Papers, Series 7, File 522. Brent received the degree.

[56]Brent to Mrs. Reid: March 22, 1912.

would be very difficult to work out. He also decided that if the Democrats won and put through their platform promise of immediate independence, he would resign his episcopal position. Believing that his chief duty was to minister to the Americans in the islands, Brent felt that his work would end with the end of American rule.

Brent and Manuel Quezon, the fiery Filipino independence leader, naturally did not see eye to eye. At the time of the Presidential election they exchanged letters which highlighted the issues involved. Quezon wrote first, upbraiding Brent for his statement that the Filipino people were not yet ready for self-government. Brent characterized his letter as "peevish and careless."[57] In his reply, Brent again defined his position. "I am for Philippine independence, but not immediate, for I have yet to see indications of that general sense of responsibility and intelligence regarding the means of liberty, which alone make democratic government possible."[58] The bishop went on to emphasize the existing evils of peonage and caciquism and to stress the need for education, always a primary prerequisite for independence in his opinion. Probationary independence, he believed, entailed more dangers than

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[57]Brent to Colonel Rivers: October 21, 1912. Brent Papers, Box 10.

[58]Brent to Manuel Quezon: December 7, 1912. Taft Papers, Series 7, File 522.

benefits both for the Philippines and for America. The bishop ended his long letter by stressing that their differences arose over the question of means, not ends. "The ideal, a free and independent state, is the common goal, yours and mine. How to reach it, whether by a headlong plunge attended by unjustifiable risk, or by regulated steps with prudent safeguards, is the rock on which we split."[59]

When news of Wilson's election reached the islands, Brent and other American personnel speculated as to what his Philippine policy would be. Despite the platform promise of independence, the future of the Philippines had not been one of the issues of the election and Wilson had expressed himself very little on the subject. Brent reported that the Filipinos were expecting immediate independence.[60] The bishop himself expected sweeping changes on the Philippine Commission. Forbes, he said, was winding up his affairs in the expectation that Wilson would not continue him in office.[61]

The Philippine situation continued to be uncertain. In January of 1913 word reached the islands that Wilson would personally visit the Philippines before determining policy.

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[59] Ibid.

[60] Brent to Mrs. Reid: November 12, 1912.

[61] Ibid.

Brent was jubilant, but the news turned out to be only unfounded rumor. At the end of January Dean Worcester resigned, but President Taft refused to accept his resignation. Worcester discussed his action with Brent, an indication of their more cordial relationship. The bishop offered to stand for Worcester's retention if attacked.[62] Worcester, however, preferred to stand solely on his record. Previously, in a letter to Taft, Brent had lauded Worcester's integrity and industry.[63] But when Woodrow Wilson took over in March of 1913, the commissioner's resignation was accepted.

Bishop Brent continued to have considerable influence in government circles, both in Manila and in Washington, during this transition period. Several times the bishop discussed the whole situation with Forbes, and in April reported that Forbes would soon resign.[64] Taft was also aware of Brent's widespread influence. In January the President had urged the bishop to write a circular letter to all the Episcopal bishops, testifying to the unreadiness of the Filipinos for self-government.[65]

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[62]See Brent Diary: January 26, 1913.

[63]Brent to Taft: December 20, 1912. Taft Papers, Series 7, file 522.

[62]See Brent Diary: April 5, 1913.

[63]Taft to Brent: January 31, 1913. Taft Papers, Series 7, File 522. Although there is no record of Brent

Brent's position at this time was, as we have seen, one of opposition to immediate or probationary independence. He repeatedly urged that nothing be done impetuously, that the Democratic administration make a thorough investigation of the situation before attempting to determine policy. Brent hoped that Wilson would be conservative and not attempt to overturn radically the existing policy. ". . . I do feel that the general lines upon which the Islands are being administered are the best for present needs to-day. Any considerable change would be disastrous to the Philippine people."[66] He strongly opposed the Jones Bill and fought it in every way possible. As a result, he remarked wryly, "I am not persona grata with the Filipinos."[67]

Brent also continued to be persona non grata with the group in America known as the anti-imperialists. One of their number, Erving Winslow, had written a piece accusing Cameron Forbes of enormous extravagance and also charging the Americans in the islands with responsibility for withholding

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ever writing such a letter, the bishop did express his views on the subject to a number of Episcopal bishops with whom he corresponded regularly.

[66]Brent to J.T. Addison: February 3, 1913. Brent Papers, Box 54.

[67]Brent to Mrs. Foster: March 3, 1913; Brent to Mrs. Markoe: March 7, 1913. Both in Brent Papers, Box 50

independence from the Filipinos. In a scathing reply to Winslow, Brent charged him with carelessness and inaccuracy, and demanded that he either justify his accusations or withdraw them. The bishop characterized the anti-imperialist movement as "faulty in its conception, unfair in its methods, and disastrous in its consequences."[68] Most Americans in the islands, Brent indignantly asserted, were sincerely interested in the welfare of the Filipinos, and their characters should not be besmirched by "irresponsible persons", by "partisan and ignorant opposers." The bishop concluded, "by your habit of impugning motives you have forfeited all claim to be heard by serious men."[69]

Brent returned to the United States in April 1913 and was absent from the Philippines for nine months, but he continued to keep a close watch on the political situation in the islands. In an article published in the New York Tribune on April 21, Brent again defined his position on Philippine policy. He urged that Wilson appoint a nonpartisan commission to investigate the situation. The bishop called for a study of the Malolos government of 1899, provincial and municipal government in the islands, the Assembly records, the franchise,

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[68]Brent to Erving Winslow: March 29, 1913. NA, Bureau of Insular Affairs, 13149-41.

[69]Ibid.

the existence of peonage, and the constructive works accomplished by the United States. Brent believed that "the Philippine policy should stand or fall upon its record."[70]

While in Washington in June of 1913, Brent saw President Wilson twice--on June 2, and again on June 12. Their conversation, as far as can be known, was entirely concerned with the situation in the Philippines.[71] On the second occasion, Brent also spoke with Lindley M. Garrison, the Secretary of War. The bishop was reassured by their fairness and reasonableness; he was left with the impression that there would be no precipitate action.[72] He did fear, however, that Wilson was playing party politics in his appointments of Philippine personnel. Under the Republicans, Brent believed, men had been appointed to positions in the Philippines because of their fitness for the job, not their political affiliations. (For instance, of the five men who had held the office of governor general, only one--Taft--was an avowed Republican.) Brent feared

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[70]Brent, "Filipinos, if Free, Prey to Invaders," New York Tribune Monday, April 21, 1913, p. 1.

[71]See Brent Diary: June 12, 1913. Once again, no records have been left of the exact conversations.

[72]See Brent to Archbishop Davidson: July 15, 1913; Brent to Colonel Rivers: July 16, 1913. Both in Brent Papers, Box 10.

that Wilson's appointments were purely political and he voiced his opposition because he felt they jeopardized the future of the islands and also lowered the prestige of the United States.[73]

During this same visit to Washington, Brent also took part in a meeting of the Philippine Society on June 10. The principal speakers were Manuel Quezon, Bishop Brent, William Howard Taft, and Luke E. Wright. As Brent reported the evening, Quezon spoke first and made a strong plea for independence. Brent followed and tried to be conciliatory. Taft then took the floor and blasted Quezon, losing his temper in the process. Wright also spoke "in angry tones," and the meeting was a disastrous affair.[74]

Later, Brent had a quiet talk with Quezon, who at that time was serving as the Philippine resident commissioner to the United States. Brent was convinced that the United States government should take some constructive step with a minimum of delay. He was not sure just what step should be taken--territorial government, a senate, or some other alternative. But Quezon said that he would support whatever

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[73]See Brent to Murray Bartlett and to James Bryce: July 23 1913. Both in Brent Papers, Box 10.

[74]Brent to Colonel Rivers: July 16, 1913.

definite policy the United States announced.[75] The Bishop spoke frankly, as was his habit, and was surprised by Quezon's good temper. "He certainly is a clever man, whatever his faults may be and in his dealings with me since I came over to America has been square."[76] The bishop again demonstrated his objectivity; he was willing to change his opinion of Quezon when presented with evidence of the Filipino's good faith, despite their previous stormy interchange.

Brent believed that whatever policy was decided, Quezon would take a conservative course. In the bishop;s opinion, the Jones Bill was "as dead as a doornail,"[77] and the United States would not relinquish the islands immediately. Brent also wished that it were possible to govern the islands by executive order, without having to get every measure through Congress.[78] Evidently the bishop was more inclined to thrust the executive than the legislative branch of government.

During the summer of 1913, it became apparent that the new administration would appoint a new governor general

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[75]Brent Diary: June 10, 1913.

[76]Brent to Colonel Rivers: July 16, 1913.

[77]Brent to William Cameron Forbes: June 13, 1913. Brent Papers, Box 63. Also Brent to Mrs. Forbes: July 26, 1913. Brent Papers, Box 55.

[78]Brent to Forbes: June 13, 1913.

for the Philippines. Brent had occasion to speak at Harvard, as the recipient of an honorary degree, and he used the opportunity to speak of the past work of the United States in the Philippines. He emphasized the non-political nature of the appointments, and gave special praise to William Cameron Forbes.[79]

It was obvious that Brent, though realizing that personnel changes would be made, hoped that the Democrats would retain Forbes. This was perhaps wishful thinking on Brent's part, but it is understandable in the light of Forbes' excellent record in the Philippines and Brent's espousal of the Republicans' Philippine policy. The close personal friendship between the two men must also have been a factor in Brent's desire for Forbes' retention, although the bishop had repeatedly demonstrated his refusal to be swayed solely by the claims of personal friendship. Brent made his views clear in a letter to the Secretary of War on June 21. Brent prefaced his remarks by stating that Forbes himself had no idea that the bishop was pleading his cause. He wrote that he would like to see credit given to "the constructive work so honestly and ably done by men who have

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[79]See Brent, untitled address accepting degree at Harvard, in Brent Papers, Box 26.

been patriots and gentlemen."[80] He went on to suggest that on-the-spot training would be helpful for the new governor general. Forbes could remain in the islands for approximately a year and break in his successor; this would not only help the new man but would save the Republicans' record in the Philippines from being discredited. Brent concluded rather wistfully of saying that Forbes could support "any reasonable progressive policy" of the new administration.[81]

Brent was not the only one to be upset at the thought of Forbes' losing the governor-generalship. Forbes noted in his journal in August: "Governor Wright, ex-President Taft, and Bishop Brent have all been urging most strongly my retention here--this wholly without my asking or even intimating to them that such a thing was needed."[82] Taft had previously written Brent saying that the Democrats were determined to remove Forbes and commenting on their pretence of non-partisan reform.[83] Before returning to the islands, Brent found time

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[80]Brent to Lindley M. Garrison: June 21, 1913. NA, Bureau of Insular Affairs 12848-20.

[81]Ibid.

[82]Forbes Journal, Series 1, Volume 5, August 10, 1913.

[83]Taft to Brent: July 27, 1913. Brent Papers, Box 10.

to talk the whole situation over with Taft and also with Elihu Root, but nothing further could be done.

When Wilson finally announced his choice for Governor General in August, many people were surprised. Francis Burton Harrison was an undistinguished Democratic representative from New York, who had had no previous experience in the Philippines. Brent was furious. He made a point of seeing Harrison and telling him that both he and Forbes had been unfairly treated by the administration. The bishop judged Harrison to be "a bright fellow . . . (who) knows how to keep quiet."[84] Brent warned Harrison against the Filipino politicians, and impressed him with the fact that he had taken on a hard task. "He will be a conservative in six months--that is my prophecy."[85]

In addition to appointing Harrison, Wilson also altered radically the composition of the Philippine Commission. The nine-man Commission had previously consisted of five Americans and four Filipinos who were pro-American. Wilson replaced all nine with new men, giving the Filipinos a five to four majority. The new Filipino members were more radical and the new American commissioners were totally

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[84]Brent to John J. Pershing: September 6, 1913, John J. Pershing Papers, Box 34.

[85]Ibid.

inexperienced--none had had any colonial experience and none could speak Spanish.

Brent believed that this was probably the least radical step towards self-government that the Democrats could have taken in view of the platform promise of independence, although he regarded it as a slightly hazardous experiment. The bishop believed that the administration was headed for trouble in the Philippines because its actions would be misinterpreted by the Filipinos who expected immediate independence. Brent saw no difference between the new Democratic policy and the old Republican policy, except that a little speed had been added. The attempt to differentiate between the two policies, he was convinced, had been injurious to national interests.[86]

Brent spent much of his time in America touring the country in an attempt to raise funds for his Moro work. But just prior to sailing for the Philippines in November, he found himself once again in Washington. He again called on the President, and also had the opportunity of talking with Colonel House. Brent was very much impressed with the Colonel; he called him "a man of great and subtle strength."[87] Colonel

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[86]Brent to Taft: October 25, 1913. Taft Papers, Series 3, Box 262.

[87]Brent to Edith: November 7, 1913. Brent Papers, Box 50.

House offered to act as an intermediary between Brent and Wilson if the bishop ever wished to bring anything to the President's attention.[88] Brent decided to try to keep in touch with the colonel.

The interview with Wilson did not go quite so well, although Wilson was very cordial and responsive. Wilson went on record as being in favor of speedy independence for the islands, but took pains to dissociate himself from the anti-imperialists.[89] Brent deprecated the lack of a national policy in relation to the Philippines, and urged the President to speak out in unequivocal terms. Wilson asked whether the younger Filipinos did not feel grateful towards America, but Brent quickly convinced him that there was very little gratitude, owing to the sway of native politicians who desired immediate independence. Wilson then mentioned his former conviction that the Philippines would need a long tutelage under American rule, but stated that he had since changed his mind. Brent endeavored to change it back, repeating his conviction that it would take at least a generation before the Filipinos would be ready for self-government.[90] And in fact

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[88]Brent Diary: November 7, 1913.

[89]Ibid., November 10, 1913.

[90]For a detailed account of Brent's conversation with Wilson, see Brent to Forbes: November 30, 1913. Brent Papers Box 63.

Wilson made no attempt to free the Philippines from American rule during his two terms of office, although Brent's personal influence with the new President was slight.

Even though the new American members of the Philippine Commission were inexperienced in colonial affairs, Brent approved of Wilson's choices and told the President of his approval. The bishop was especially impressed with Winfred T. Denison, the new Secretary of the Interior, who was to succeed Worcester. Brent urged Wilson to appoint Andrew J. Peters, who had just withdrawn from the race for mayor of Boston, as vice-governor. (Wilson later refused to appoint him because of his alleged anti-imperialist bias.) The bishop believed that with the addition of Peters, America would have strong and able representatives in Manila.

Brent also took the opportunity to warn Wilson to be wary of Quezon;[91] apparently the Filipino radical had not entirely convinced the bishop of his good intentions. Brent then said good-bye to Wilson, and wished him success in his high office. "He impressed me as being a great man, desirous of being a great servant."[92]

Brent sailed for Manila on November 19, arriving

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[91]Brent Diary: November 10, 1913.

[92]Ibid.

December 30. Harrison had already taken over as governor general in October. The bishop had approved of Harrison's inaugural address, but heard that Harrison was proceeding to display incompetence and ineptitude. According to Dean Worcester whom Brent visited just prior to sailing for Manila, Harrison had made a mess of affairs and was doing nothing except playing politics.[93] The bishop predicted disaster if he continued on this course.

Brent had a chance to talk with Harrison in January of 1914 and they discussed the political situation. The bishop believed that despite Harrison's habit of playing politics, many of his appointments had been good. Brent particularly praised Harrison's Moro program.[94] The bishop took a special interest in the Moro country, owing to his missionary work there. Carpenter, the newly-appointed governor of the area, was in Brent's opinion doing a good job. The bishop regretted the military occupation of the Moro country which had been necessary but had left much bitterness behind. He hoped that his missionary work would help heal some of the wounds.[95]

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[93]See Brent to Mrs. Reid: November 18, 1913. Brent Papers, Box 50.

[94]Brent to Mrs. Foster: January 10, 1914. Brent Papers, Box 50.

[95]Brent to Mrs. Reid: February 20, 1914.

The bishop also saw what he considered another hopeful sign in the Philippine political situation. This was a reaction among the Filipinos against an extreme independence policy. According to Brent, the average Filipino had never advocated immediate independence anyway.[96] But in 1914 he saw signs of the growth of a conservative movement among some of the leading Filipinos who did not want to see the United States abandon the islands. Brent was also heartened by the fact that Quezon had returned to Manila and told his friends that the bishop was a true friend of the Filipino.[97] Previous to this time there had never been much contact between Brent and the Filipinos, so it is not surprising that they had misunderstood his position on Philippine independence. But Brent had always had the welfare of the Filipinos at heart, and it must have been gratifying to gain this unexpected recognition.

One feature of Harrison's and Wilson's Philippine policy to which Brent was utterly opposed was the rapid Filipinization of the civil service which was carried out after Harrison took office. Brent supported the general policy of Filipinization; what he opposed was the rapidity with which

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[96]Brent, Central Methodist Church address. Brent Papers, Box 57.

[97]Brent to Mrs. Reid: December 24, 1913. Brent Papers, Box 50.

it was being effected. "According to my mind, Filipinization is both logical and inevitable . . . . My fear about Filipinization is in its rapidity, and the danger for Filipinos' sake."[98] The bishop still held the conviction that long technical training was necessary to prepare a people for democratic government. Brent wondered why there were still so few Filipinos able to handle positions of governmental responsibility. Either America had failed to prepare them or they had not had enough time to gather the necessary experience and knowledge, he believed.[99]

Harrison in reply to Brent's objections agreed that a system of Filipino "understudies" would be a very useful step to take.[100] He affirmed that he was working towards this goal, although he had not been able to inaugurate the system in all the bureaus for fear of upsetting existing conditions. But the governor general did not agree with Brent as to the unfitness of the Filipinos for government office. "The Filipinos seem to me to have done admirable work in office this winter, and I am more than ever convinced that the only way to try a man is to try him."[101]

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[99] Ibid.

[100] Francis Burton Harrison to Brent: June 25, 1914. Brent Papers, Box 10.

[101] Ibid.

Filipinization in the Moro province involved special dangers, because the Moros hated the Christianized Filipinos as much as they hated the Americans, if not more. Brent was utterly opposed to the idea, believing that it would bring nothing but trouble. He feared, among other things, an outbreak of violence on the part of the Moros which would endanger his missionary work in the area. The bishop personally protested to Governor Carpenter in the hopes of securing some change in policy.[102] Brent feared that the movement for Filipinization of the Moro province was a result of Filipino demands for more self-government and not of a carefully-studied policy. But despite his protests, rapid Filipinization continued to be the official policy of the new American regime in the Philippines.

Brent's thoughts on Philippine independence were approximately the same in 1914 as they had been in 1901. The question was one that would plague him for the rest of his life, even after he left the islands permanently. In considering his views on the subject, we must remember that he approached the problem from an *a priori* point of view. "The urge which impelled him to accept his position as Bishop of the Philippines was a passionate desire to take part in

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[102]Brent to Mr. Fallows: July 8, 1914. Brent Papers, Box 10.

America's great altruistic adventure overseas."[103] This modified his conclusions and so he opposed immediate independence in the belief that the Filipinos were not yet ready for it. Then too his friends and associates, as well as the people he ministered to, opposed independence and favored American rule. Most of his close friends in the islands were Americans involved in the government of the Philippines, who were naturally averse to the idea of independence. The bishop had refused to proselytize among Filipino Catholics, so the sphere of his direct influence and contacts with Filipinos was limited. Among the pagan tribes, the Moros hated the Filipinos and the Igorots were afraid of being exploited by them. And so most of the people with whom Brent came in contact in the islands tended to reinforce his original ideas as to the unreadiness of the Filipinos for independence. The major modification in his views was his growing awareness of nationalism among Orientals, and his increasingly firm conviction that Orientals, including Filipinos, were definitely capable of understanding democracy and democratic processes. However this did not change the

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[103]Ogilby, "Brent on Philippine Independence," Brent Papers, Box 57. I am greatly indebted to Mr. Ogilby for this analysis of the influences which shaped Brent's thought on Philippine independence.

bishop's conviction that a long period of tutelage under American rule was the necessary prelude to Filipino independence.

Brent continued to speak out against immediate independence for the Philippines. He believed that the Democrats were making the old mistake of "applying democracy as suited to present conditions in the United States, to the vastly different conditions which obtain in the Philippine Islands."[104] Bishop Brent also regarded with disfavor several of the alternative solutions to the Philippine problem which had been proposed. Among these were neutralization and the compromise of a limited protectorate. To these schemes the bishop was unalterably opposed.

> Finally it must be recognized that the Philippine problem cannot be settled without reference to its international bearing. Neutralization has been proposed. But can American or any other diplomacy secure the neutrality of the Powers? Would it mean anything if promises of neutrality were made? Is it not so, that though no existing military power, East or West, would fight America in order to secure possession of the Philippines, there are at least two nations which would seize the first opportunity for interference if American sovereignty ceased? Can America afford to protect a government halfway around the world, which she does not actually and constructively control? She has found it difficult enough with one near at

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[104]Brent to Mrs. Reid: July 27, 1914. Brent Papers, Box 50.

> hand. It appears to me that it would be a measure of quixotry beyond the most altruistic administration, to stand sponsor for the order of an experimental government of more than doubtful stability ten thousand miles from our coasts. When the Philippines achieve independence they must swallow the bitter with the sweet, and accept the perils as well as the joys of walking alone. There are national risks involved even in a limited protectorate to which I trust America will never expose herself.[105]

There were only two choices which America could take--either get out completely, leaving the islands with a poor native government, or continue the task of educating the Filipinos along national lines. As far as Brent was concerned, continued education was the only answer. He prophesied that the islands would be ready for independence "when the present school-age generation reaches maturity."[106] Independence would come eventually, but it could not come immediately.

When Brent returned from the United States in December of 1913 he again took up the interrupted lines of his missionary work in the islands. He was destined to remain in the Philippines until March of 1916, one of his longest uninterrupted periods of missionary and episcopal work. During the first part of this time, from January to August of 1914, his

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[105]Brent, The Inspiration of Responsibility, pp. 170-171.

[106]Brent, "National Awakening in the Philippines," Missionary Review of the World 37 (February, 1914), p. 124.

work centered on the Igorots in the north and the Moros in the south.

Among the Igorots Brent's endeavors continued to meet with success. In July of 1914, the bishop reported that he had 634 Igorot communicants.[107] In particular, the Sagada mission had been very successful. At other stations, Easter School at Baguio had been enlarged, and a new school opened at Besao. Brent believed that great things could be accomplished among the pagan tribes, but there was a great need for more missioners.

The problem of Catholic competition continued to plague the Bontoc and Sagada missions. Brent stuck to his policy of non-interference and non-proselytization, but the Episcopal Board of Missions did not agree. As early as 1910, the Board of Missions had commented upon the Catholic encroachment at Bontoc and Sagada; after saying that the Catholics had attracted many of the natives, the Board continued: "We are stronger, however, in medical work . . . if we can get our hospital built and equipped we shall maintain the supremacy."[108] At the same time Brent in speaking of the situation at Bontoc

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[107]Brent, "Eleventh Annual Report," Board of Missions Report (New York: 1914), p. 60.

[108]"Report on Domestic Missions 1910," Board of Missions Report (New York: 1910), p. 49.

admitted that there was a temptation to compete, but no need of friction. He asked for added facilities "not to compete with our sister Communion, but because they are necessary for good work anywhere."[109]

We can see evidence here of a basic difference in viewpoint which in fact permeated all of Bishop Brent's missionary work. It was the source of misunderstanding and friction between the bishop and church authorities at home. This fundamental difference in attitude perhaps accounts for the fact that very often the Board of Missions had no money to spare for Brent's missionary ventures.

The bishop realized that his attitudes were not shared by the majority of the authorities of his church, or indeed by most missionaries of any demonination. At the end of 1912 he had written to Bishop Hall: "Of course I cannot consider any change of policy. If the Church expressing herself through General Convention, or even the House of Bishops, desires a different policy I shall gladly step aside and let a man of their own sort undertake that for which I have no vocation."[110] But although there was no official change of policy by the Episcopal Church, the majority of its members

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[109]Brent, "Seventh Annual Report," p. 158.

[110]Brent to Bishop Hall: Christmas Eve, 1912. Brent Papers, Box 56.

remained dedicated to a policy of competition and proselytization and were unable to comprehend Brent's ecumenism.

In 1913 a further problem arose, as Gregorio Aglipay once more entered Brent's life. Aglipay paid a visit to the Sagada mission and insulted one of Brent's missioners to such an extent that the two men came to blows. Brent sent the account of the affair on to the Secretary of Was as "a side light on the capacity of the Filipino for self-government."[111] In his letter to the secretary, the bishop reviewed the history of the Aglipayan movement. At one time, Brent estimated, Aglipay had won approximately one-third of the total Filipino population to his cause. But his whole history had been a history of trickery. "Had it not been for the power of the Roman Catholic Church, Aglipay to-day would have been one of the commanding figures in the Philippine Islands."[112] Though the Aglipayan church would continue to exist in attenuated form for many years, the era of its greatest power and prestige had passed, as Aglipay now passed out of Brent's life.

The years 1913 and 1914 saw the firm establishment of what was to be one of Brent's most enduring achievements, his missionary work among the Moros of Mindanao and Jolo. By

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[111]Brent to Lindley M. Garrison: July 22, 1913. Brent Papers, Box 10.

[112]Ibid.

July of 1914 the hospital at Zamboanga was in operation. The institution, renamed Brent Hospital in 1917 when Brent left the islands, endured until 1942 when the Japanese invasion of the Philippines forced it to close. Brent continued to supervise its financial support in later years, and after his death the work was carried on through a memorial fund.

In addition to the hospital, Brent succeeded in establishing an agricultural school for boys at Indinans on the island of Jolo (see map, p. 32). The school was purely agricultural and industrial; no attempt was made to proselytize among the Moros. This was in accord with the bishop's conviction that among the Moros doctrinal propaganda was doomed to failure and only by good example could any progress in civilization be made. Both past and future events in the Moro province tended to prove the truth of the bishop's ideas. All direct attempts at proselytizing met with failure, while the hospital and agricultural school which the bishop had founded were universally recognized as powerful civilizing influences.

The most acute problem which Brent faced in the organization of his Moro work was that perennial problem of all missionaries--lack of funds. As he commented to Forbes at a particularly trying moment: "Much of my life has been devoted

to making bricks without straw. A missionary is supposed to do wonders with funds which at home would be considered inadequate for anything much."[113] Brent had asked the Board of Missions for money but since the project was not evangelical, no funds were forthcoming. The bishop then decided to undertake the work as his own personal venture.

Brent was convinced that he could get financial backing from the United States, and this was a major reason for his trip to America in 1913. A committee was set up, but by May of 1914 he had still received no money. At this time he received word of his election to the bishopric of New Jersey. The decision was not quite as hard to make as it had been in the case of his election to Washington, and Brent decided to accept the New Jersey position if the funds for his Moro work were not forthcoming. But on June 6 he received a cable from the committee that the money was on its way, and so he declined the election and stayed on in Manila.

Along with Brent's missionary work among the Moros went an avid interest in the political situation in the Moro province. The bishop believed firmly in the efficacy of American rule in the area; this was one reason for his

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[113]Brent to Forbes: February 26, 1914. Brent Papers, Box 55.

opposition to Filipinization of the Moro province. In his opinion the Americans had restored order in the area, and a reversion to former disorderly conditions would occur if American control were withdrawn.[114] When John J. Pershing was appointed governor of the Moro province in 1909, Brent advised him: "Mindanao needs a guiding hand. Stability and patience will do more for those Moros than anything else."[115]

Between 1909 and 1913 a change in attitude occurred on the part of various American administrators in the islands. Formerly, the prevailing belief was that only military government could keep order among the fanatical Mohammedan Moros. Brent intimated that he himself shared this belief to some extent.[116] But as time went on Brent and others began to advocate a more positive, constructive policy to take the place of repression. "A policy of violence and repression is in my judgment quite useless. We must be constructive. Otherwise our work is of no value to civilization or anything else."[117]

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[114]See Brent, The Inspiration of Responsibility, p. 170. Also Brent, "Notes of a Cruise on the 'Gilbert'", Brent Papers, Box 34, p. 4.

[115]Brent to Pershing: September 8, 1909. John J. Pershing Papers, Box 34.

[116]See Brent to Colonel Rivers: October 21, 1912.

[117]Brent to Edith: January 14, 1913. Brent Papers, Box 50.

In 1912 Forbes and Pershing recommended that the next governor of the Moro province be a civilian rather than a military man. Harrison agreed and in 1913 appointed Frank W. Carpenter, who served effectively for eight years. Brent was pleased with the change from military to civil government; he knew and liked Carpenter and approved of Harrison's choice. The bishop claimed that his influence had played a part in shaping the new policy.

> Entre nous the present policy of construction is what I urged upon General Pershing more than a year ago. I do not wish to take any special credit for it or wish to label it with my name but it is a satisfaction to know that whether or not my work as planned receives sufficient support to put it through, it has been a factor in bringing about the only effective policy that there is.[118]

It is impossible to determine just how decisive were Brent's missionary work and his personal influence with Forbes and Pershing in determining the new policy. However, in the light of the close personal friendships among the three men, we must allocate to Bishop Brent a share in the credit for inaugurating the new policy of civil government for the Moro province.

Brent's missionary work among the Moros thus coincided with a new era of government administration. Though there was

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[118]Brent to Mrs. Reid: Easter Eve, 1914. Brent Papers, Box 50.

some further bloodshed, the war of the Moros against civilization was virtually ended. But as Bishop Brent went about his pacific work in the islands, the war clouds were gathering in Europe. The resulting upheaval would place its irrevocable stamp on the bishop's life, as it did on so many men of his generation.

CHAPTER VI

WORLD WAR I, THE CATALYST 1914 - 1917

In the years immediately preceeding the outbreak of World War I, Bishop Brent had often pondered the questions of war and peace. In 1911, writing of the Mexican Revolution, he said:

> War is the negation of everything, so childish, so cruel, so capable of breaking up the moral nature . . . . The temptation is to let every bad passion loose in the excitement of war . . . . Think of the weak natures that meet and succumb to this temptation. The glory of war has faded into a black and dull red.[1]

Speaking of peace, he wrote in 1913:

> I am a peace man though not peace at all costs . . . . If a course is right, it is so in spite of consequences . . . . I am for peace but the world of men is not verile enough for peace. To many if not most it would be as a pearl to swine. Nevertheless I labor for peace, peace within which will work its way outward and find adequate expression presently.[2]

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[1]Brent to Mrs. Markoe: March 15, 1911. Brent Papers, Box 57.

[2]Brent to Mrs. Forbes: November 21, 1913. Brent Papers, Box 55.

When news of the outbreak of war reached the Philippines in August 1914, Brent was in the mountains of Luzon on a visit to his missions in the area. The first news was received by telegraph at Bontoc on August 9. Brent noted his initial reaction in his diary. "The outlook is extremely bad. War news received by phone alarming. I fear the German army."[3] On August 9, he wrote to Mrs. Reid in London:

> Today has been one of dreadful news - the outbreak of the European war that threatens to be an Armageddon. It may be that there are justifiable wars but surely not this. It is the contradiction of Christianity - almost the rejection of Christ, the Prince of Peace. The Balkan states are indeed fulfilling their prophetic destiny in setting a whole continent in flame.[4]

Those were the terrible days of the German advance through Belgium and the drive toward Paris. Tropical rains kept Brent isolated in the hill country, but through the telegraph at Bontoc he arranged for daily war bulletins to be sent from Manila. He then passed on the news to the Belgian Catholic priests in the area, who had no telegraph. Together they pored over the news from Belgium, trying to decipher the Flemish and French names after they had passed through the hands of the Filipino cable operator in Manila.

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[3]Brent Diary: August 9-10, 1914.

[4]Brent to Mrs. Reid: August 8-18, 1914. Brent Papers, Box 50.

No finer example of Brent's ecumenism can be found than these daily conferences with the Catholic priests whose homeland was being devastated.

Overland communications with Mainla were eventually restored and Brent was able to return to the city in late August. But war news continued to occupy most of his attention, and his diary during this period is filled with adjectives like "desparate", "incredible", and "appalling". His biographer commented: "At first, like many other Americans, he was outraged by the very idea of war in these modern times . . . ."[5] Brent feared Germany and German militarism. But he also feared the materialism and nationalism of the Allies which he believed to have been an equally important cause of the war. "I find myself hoping that no one nation will come out conspicuously victorious but that all will be so exhausted as to be ready to start out fresh on a Christian basis."[6]

The Bishop viewed the war as more than a worldwide upheaval; it was a declaration of the failure of Western civilization. "We, the sharers of the civilization that is contradicting itself on the battlefield of the West, have

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[5]Ogilby Manuscript, Chapter XIII, pp. 6A-7A.

[6]Brent to Mrs. Foster: 12th Trinity, 1914. Brent Papers, Box 50.

reason to ask whether all our vaunted advance in science, in intellectual achievement, in material prosperity, is not rotten at the core."[7] The war, as the Bishop realized, was a contradiction of everything he was trying to do in the Philippines. The Oriental world in general was questioning the right of the Occidental to teach its way of civilization. Brent confessed that he was tempted to go off and live with the Igorots "whose worst atrocities are mild compared with this storm of destruction which is desecrating Europe."[8]

Brent, a man of peace, was close to despair in the first weeks of the war. His natural reaction was one of horror and dismay. He abhorred everything which the European war represented--greed, gruelty, materialism, and unbridled nationalism. He saw it as a judgment, a condemnation of Western civilization. He also mourned its effect on East-West relations, fearing that it would prove a serious setback to Oriental-Occidental understanding. As a clergyman the Bishop was particularly appalled at the role the churches had played in the disintegration of civilization.

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[7]Brent, Prisoners of Hope, p. 4.

[8]Brent to Bishop Lawrence; September 18, 1914. Brent Papers, Box 56.

"I wonder how much our divided Christianity is responsible for this outbreak. Only a united Church can inspire a unity of nations."[9] He believed that the war would never have occurred had Christianity been united; the questions of world peace and Christian reunion were irrevocably intertwined. The war of the churches was the most serious of all; if there were no reconciliation among them, then there was no hope for democracy or for the world.[10] Christianity alone was capable of uniting mankind.

But Brent did believe in an eventual reconciliation among the Christian churches, and he hoped that the war with its horrors would help to bring about that reconciliation. "There is One who is brooding over the waste and void of our present civilization. . ."[11] And with Christian unity would come world federation. America would have the opportunity to take the lead in promoting such an organization. But regardless of the post war situation, a retreat into isolation was unthinkable. "We can never again consider apart the concerns of Europe and of America, of East and of West. We must forever hereafter think in terms of the whole.

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[9]Brent to Mrs. Davidson: August 22, 1914. Brent Papers, Box 50.

[10]Brent Diary: April 24, 1917.

[11]Brent, "America at the Crossroads," The Challenge (February 16, 1917), p. 275.

No longer can there be . . . self-chosen national isolation. . . ."[12]

The Bishop thus began to take a more hopeful view of the world situation. The war had at least ended, so he believed, the possibility of further isolation, In his thinking, the European war forged a link between Christian unity and world federation; for the first time he saw the two causes as intertwined. Brent's vision of unity had at last become truly universal; he hoped to see in the postwar ear a new vital Christian world arise from the ashes of Europe's devastation.

Although the European situation occupied a great part of Brent's attention, the Bishop continued to take an interest in the political situation in the Philippines. The war had little direct effect on life in the islands; the Bishop noted in November of 1914 that the only observable difference was a slight increase in the cost of living.[13] Politics went on as usual, and Brent became ever more discouraged over the local political situation. He continued to

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[12]Brent, "The Whole, Part II," The Churchman 111 (May 8, 1915), p. 597. Unfortunately, America proved in the twenties that self-chosen national isolation was still possible. It took a second world war to make it impossible.

[13]Brent to Bishop White: November 24, 1914. Brent Papers, Box 65.

voice his objections to the administration's policy of rapid Filipinization. The Bishop also persisted in his belief that immediate independence would mean ruin for the islands, but by December of 1914 the political situation was so bad that he on one occasion advocated complete independence rather than a continuation of the current policy.[14]

Bishop Brent's attitude towards the Jones Bill was ambiguous. The new bill of that name, which provided for enlarging the scope of Philippine self-government but unlike the previous bill contained no provision for independence, was debated in Congress for three years before finally becoming law on August 19, 1916. In its final form it provided for a bicameral elective legislature with large powers. The only appointive offices retained were those of the Governor General, ViceGovernor, and members of the Philippine Supreme Court. Thus the Philippine Commission passed out of existence. The preamble of the Act, its most controversial section, promised independence as soon as a stable government could be established. An amendment proposed by James P. Clarke, which called for independence or neutralization of the islands within four years' time, was defeated.

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[14]Brent to Mercer Johnston: December 27, 1914. Mercer Johnston Papers, Box 41.

Brent in general supported the Jones Bill, though he by no means believed it to be ideal and hoped that the preamble would be eliminated.[15] But when the new year 1915 brought signs of increasing unrest among the Filipinos, the Bishop hoped that the bill would pass and put an end to uncertainty. However, another year and a half were required to get it through Congress. In the meantime the situation eased somewhat, although Brent continued to predict trouble. By June of 1915 the Bishop was rejoicing in the defeat of the Clark Amendment and pointing out that the official policy line of the Democrats had changed from immediate independence to eventual independence.[16] The Bishop characterized the Clarke Amendment as "unintelligent in conception, cowardly in motive, and unjust to the Philippines in substance."[17] Brent's own views on Filipino independence were unchanged: "I would advocate continuance for the present of the existing relationship between the two countries as being highly advantageous, if not necessary,

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[15]See Brent Diary: November 6, 1914.

[16]Brent to Forbes: June 20, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 63.

[17]Brent, "Tutoring the Philippines," Yale Review 6 (July, 1917), p. 724.

to the order, wellbeing and ultimate autonomy of the Filipino people . . . ."[18]

But in his concern with the local political situation in the Philippines, Brent did not overlook the impact of the war on the Orient as a whole. He realized that its outcome would require a readjustment of the entire Far Eastern question, with particular attention to Japan. The Japanese, so the Bishop believed, were preparing to control the world through a mixture of German efficiency and Oriental subtlety.[19] Ascendancy on the world stage was passing from West to East. "In fifty years from now Japan and China will have multiplied industrial and perhaps military power to an extraordinary degree."[20]

Despite the war in Europe, Brent's missionary work continued as before. In Manila, the orphanage, St. Luke's Hospital, the Columbia Club, and Studley's Chinese mission were thriving. The usual church work of ministering to scattered groups of Americans continued, and a new mission had been established at Caloocan, a Manila suburb. Brent

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[18]Brent, Address to the Theological School at Cambridge, Mass. Brent Papers, Box 29.

[19]Brent to Mrs. Davidson: September 23, 1915. Brent Papers, Box 50.

[20]Ibid.

was unsure, however, about the future of the Cathedral School for Girls and the school for American boys at Baguio.[21]

For the Christian Filipinos, the Bishop had founded St. Luke's church in Manila. Its pastor was the Reverend Loreto Serapion, a Filipino. Among the Igorots, the Sagada mission continued to be a spectacular success. Bontoc was still crippled by lack of personnel, but some progress had been made. At Sagada, Father Staunton was carrying on Bhsiop Brent's policy of cordial personal relations with the Catholic missionaries in the area.

In 1916, Brent reported that his various enterprises among the Moros were progressing well.[22] The agricultural school was formally opened on January 12, 1916, with the provincial governor (Frank Carpenter) and 750 guests attending the ceremonies. Bishop Brent was especially pleased with the founding of the school, since it represented an answer to one of the chief needs of the Moros--stable agricultural communities. But he pleaded for more funds and more personnel, especially doctors and nurses for the Zamboanga hospital.[23]

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[21]Brent, "Thirteenth Annual Report," Board of Missions Report (New York: 1916), p. 44.

[22]Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[23]Brent, "Giving the Moro-Americans a Chance," Independent 82 (April 26, 1915), p. 147.

Brent saw signs of history repeating itself in the Moro missions. As with the Belgian priests at Sagada and Bontoc, Jesuit missionaries were moving into the Moro province, and would probably in time take over Brent's missionary ventures there.

> There was a time when the thought of our being unable to put through the plan would have depressed me. Now I realize the underlying unity of the Church's work. It is all one and I am glad to contribute something to the evangelization of people even though the form of Christianity which will prevail will be other than that which I represent.[24]

This is a truly remarkable statement, and by it we can gauge the growth of Brent's ecumenism. The war had forced him to look beyond the diversity among Christian churches to an acceptance of the essential unity of Christianity. He put his belief into practice with his acceptance of the Jesuit activities in the Moro country. But unlike the missions among the Igorots, the Catholic missions among the Moros never attained the success of Brent's institutions in Samboanga and Jolo.

The Bishop continued to take an interest in the political affairs of the Moro province. Brent and Carpenter were good friends, and Brent admired Carpenter's work and his administrative capabilities. The Bishop could not give

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[24]Brent to J. T. Addison: December 2, 1915. Brent Papers, Box 54.

his approval to the Governor's policy of Filipinization, but he did admire Carpenter's skill in handling a delicate job.

Carpenter carried on the policy which Pershing and Forbes had advocated: the new governor began to remove American troops from the Moro province and replace them with native scouts and police under the supervision of American officers. In this instance, there is no doubt of Brent's influence: "He (Carpenter) said that he had taken his cue from me and that he had simply applied the policy which I had outlined, that I had really initiated the whole work in the Department."[25] Brent's missionary work among the Moros had thus had a decisive effect on government policy in the Moro province. The Bishop was justly proud of the results of his work.

Despite Brent's preoccupation with his missionary work, he continued to follow the course of the war closely. The Bishop was particularly interested in possible peace negotiations; he saw the negotiations period as an opportunity for further international action on the opium issue. In January of 1915 Brent wrote to Secretary of State Bryan, suggesting that the State Department consider bringing up the opium question and also the question of the liquor traffic

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[25]Brent Diary: September 17, 1915.

at the peace conference.[26] The Department in the person of Robert Lansing replied that Brent's suggestion would be carefully considered. However, it was clear that the policy-makers believed the United States had already done its part in the movement to suppress the opium traffic.[27]

Brent's attitude towards Germany during the early years of the war was ambiguous. There was much in the German character that he admired. "The Teutons have made some of the greatest contributions that the world of men has ever received, in letters, industry, science, and government."[28] During 1914 and 1915 the Bishop was careful to distinguish between the rulers and the people of Germany. He did not believe that democracy would die if Germany won the war; he desired rather that neither side emerge overwhelmingly victorious. In his horror of war, he desired a speedy end to the European conflict rather than an overwhelming allied victory. The Bishop believed that England was just as guilty as Germany. "For my part, I can see no difference between naval militarism, of which England is the great exponent,

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[26]Brent to William Jennings Bryan: January 26, 1915. NA, RG 59, Decimal File 800.114/17.

[27]Robert Lansing to Brent: March 15, 1915. NA, RG 59, Decimal File 800.114/17.

[28]Brent to Greville Haslam: November 16, 1914. Brent Papers, Box 56.

and army militarism, of which Germany is the leader."[29]

Brent did hope for an Allied victory, but he declined to condemn Germany unequivocably. He refused to believe the reports of German atrocities until he could hear the evidence of both sides. And he even found a partial excuse for Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality: ". . . it was a despicable thing, but unfortunately, Lord Kitchener is quoted as having said some two years back that England in case of necessity would have done similarly."[30] Thus during the first two years of the war Brent, while favoring the Allied cause, did not condemn Germany.

It is interesting to note that Bishop Brent saw certain similarities between the German Kaiser and the Pope of Rome. "Of late I have thought deeply on the spirit of papalism. Both consider that they have a monopoly on their particular form of culture. The only difference between them is that one is national and the other ecclesiastical."[31] Despite his acceptance of the unity of Christianity, Bishop Brent never freed himself from his anti-Vatican bias, nor was he ever able to understand the workings of ecclesiastical Rome.

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Brent to Malcolm Peabody: August 24, 1915. Brent Papers, Box 58.

By 1916 the Bishop's attitude towards the Central Powers had changed. "Germany must not be dealt with otherwise, than sternly. Her whole method is so base. Her propaganda is full of treachery and lies, like her warfare. . . . She is as clever as the devil and plays on every evil tendency in human nature."[32] Two reasons for this change in attitude may be postulated. The first is the course of the war itself, and the German use of unrestricted submarine warfare. The second is that by September of 1916 Brent had returned to the United States. Here he came into more immediate contact with the war and its effects, and also was more exposed to pro-Allied sentiments and propaganda.

Brent left the Philippines for the United States on March 29, 1916, arriving in America on April 26. His trip was necessitated by the death of his brother, who had named the Bishop as the executor of his estate. In addition to family business, the tenseness of the war situation had communicated itself even to the Far East, and Brent was happy to have the opportunity to inquire more closely into the situation from a nearer vantage point. There are also indications that his poor health was a factor in his decision

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[32]Brent to Mrs. Markoe: September 21, 1916. Brent Papers, box 63.

to return to the United States.[33]

During the course of his stay in America, Brent visited his Canadian homeland. Here he fully realized the immediacy of the conflict, for Canada had followed Britain into the war with Germany. While in Canada the Bishop visited various divisions of the Canadian troops, and interviewed recruiting officers and other army men. This was his first experience among troops under wartime conditions, and it foreshadowed the role he would later play with the American troops in France.

Among the Canadian troops Brent's status was that of a chaplain-at-large, and he was most concerned with the moral issues which arose in wartime. The most serious moral (and medical) problem which the Canadian authorities faced was that of venereal disease among the troops in Britain and France. The condition was widespread, and the British authorities at first ignored it. Brent spoke to Lord Aberdeen about the situation and also took the matter up with Archbishop Davidson.[34] The archbishop interviewed many government officials about the problem, including the Prime

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[33]Brent's health had apparently deteriorated steadily during his years in the tropics, though he alluded to it so seldom that it is difficult to form an accurate estimate. Apparently the Bishop had become subject to mild heart attacks in 1915. See his diary for the period and also Pier, American Apostles to the Philippines (Boston: 1950), p. 150.

[34]Brent to Mrs. Warren: July 11, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 12.

Minister. Eventually, after a good deal of public agitation had been aroused in Britain, parliamentary measures were taken to regulate prostitution more stringently.

On his return from Canada, Brent joined Leonard Wood at his preparedness camp near Plattsburg, New York. Wood was one of the leaders in the preparedness campaign, and had set up the camp to drill volunteers in preparation for America's entry into the war. Brent had been in touch with Wood throughout the summer of 1916 and was in full agreement with the General's project. "The whole movement of preparedness seems to me both necessary and conducted along wise and conservative lines."[35] The Bishop had formerly hoped that America could stay out of the war, but by the summer of 1916, influenced perhaps by his visit to Canada and by the course of the war, he had apparently come to the conclusion that the entry of the United States into the conflict was inevitable. He still detested war and all that it represented, but German policies from 1914 to 1916 had convinced him that Germany must be defeated to ensure his dream of a united Christian world.

Brent stayed at the camp for most of the month of August. He had no official position, being simply a guest

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[35]Brent to C. W. Clash: August 19, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 12.

of the General, but he served as Chaplain. He thus gained more experience which would prove very valuable later in France. Perhaps he realized that with his many highly placed army friends it was quite likely that a chaplain's post would be offered him. In November of 1916, General Pershing wrote to ask if Brent could visit his punitive expedition command in Mexico.[36] Brent had to decline because of lack of time. But a year later he accepted Pershing's invitation to France.

Politics continued unabated even in wartime and the Bishop was caught up in the excitement of the 1916 Presidential campaign. His friend William Cameron Forbes had accepted the Presidency of the Alliance for Hughes in support of the Republican candidate. In October Forbes asked Brent to contribute an article for publication in support of Hughes. Brent replied that it would be a physical impossibility since he was already working fourteen hours a day.[37] He also believed that there existed at that time a strong prejudice against a churchman's taking an active part in politics and that therefore an article from him would do more harm than good.

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[36]Pershing to Brent: November 2, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 13.

[37]Brent to Forbes: October 26, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 63.

The Bishop did nowever reveal that he was working privately for Hughes' election.

> I frequently address groups of business men, as for instance, a few days ago at the City Club here (St. Louis). I told them frankly what my position was and gave my reasons for desiring a change of administration.[38]

Brent earnestly desired such a change, although he feared that Wilson would win re-election. Forbes disagreed, believing that Hughes' campaign was going very well.[39] But events proved the Bishop right.

Both Brent and Forbes were extremely disappointed at the outcome of the election, especially after Hughes came so close to winning. However the Bishop's attitude was strangely contradictory. To Forbes he wrote, "His (Hughes') manifestly upright character has won him many friends. I felt from the beginning that he lived by principle not by expediency, so that we could trust the country in his hands."[40] Yet less than a month later in a letter to Remsen Ogilby, Brent stated in reference to the election: "While I am not reconciled to the results, my lack of enthusiasm for Hughes

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[38] Ibid.

[39] Forbes to Brent: November 2, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 13.

[40] Brent to Forbes: November 10, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 13.

helps me to accept the situation philosophically."[41] Thus it would seem that Brent was more anti-Wilson than pro-Hughes but realizing the extent of Forbes' commitment to Hughes kept his feelings to himself. This would also explain his reluctance to come out publicly in support of Hughes.

But whatever his feelings toward Hughes may have been, Brent was not enthusiastic over the prospect of a second term for Wilson. He hoped that Wilson had "learned a lesson" and that his administration would improve, but doubted the possibility. "I fear that a leopard cannot change his spots."[42] The Bishop believed that since the Democratic administration was weak, it was up to the Republicans to take the initiative in formulating issues, and "to put into practice our convictions relative to national preparedness in the broadest sense."[43] Only in this way, he believed, could they discharge their duties as citizens.

It is interesting to study the metamorphosis of Brent's attitude towards Woodrow Wilson. As we have seen, the Bishop's original reaction to Wilson was favorable. He

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[41]Brent to Ogilby: December 1, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 13.

[42]Brent to Forbes: November 10, 1916.

[43]Brent to Forbes: November 22, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 63.

supported him in 1912 and would have voted for him had he been eligible. But he opposed Wilson's policy of Filipinization and as a result viewed Wilson with somewhat less favor. After the outbreak of the war, the Bishop swung back to a more approving attitude.

> Wilson seems determined to wait and watch. Peace at all costs is cowardly but I think thus far he has been wise and saved the country from complications at a moment in history when for the sake of the nations the preservation of peace is vital.[44]

But as the war years passed, Brent found himself more and more in direct opposition to Wilson and his policies. In December of 1915 he wrote: "I fear President Wilson is an opportunist--a man without vision but with a gift of rhetoric which enables him to deal cleverly with things as they arise."[45] Wilson was less and less a man to be trusted. Brent felt that he was not taking a strong enough stand against German outrages. The Bishop hoped at this time that America could avoid war, but not at the price of giving in to German aggression on the high seas. "Democracy today is being weighed in the balance--and found wanting."[46]

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[44]Brent to Bishop White: November 24, 1914.

[45]Brent to J. T. Addison: December 2, 1915. Brent Papers, Box 54.

[46]Brent to Mrs. Reid: December 15, 1915. Brent Papers, Box 12.

Throughout 1916 Wilson's character deteriorated steadily in Brent's eyes. The President lacked moral judgment; he became a man who bandied words rather than one who announced a consistent policy. In April, the Bishop noted that "Wilson in a speech had asked whether the country wished to enter into a struggle that was coincident with humanity. Is this some more of his frenzy of fine words?"[47] The President was a bungler and a muddler, nothing more. By the time of the election, as we have seen, Brent regarded Wilson as a bad choice for the Presidency, and was disappointed to see how many Americans wished to continue him in office.

Immediately after the Presidential election, Brent was involved in a verbal controversy with Anson P. Stokes which illustrates perfectly the Bishop's changing attitude towards wilson. At a dinner Brent had claimed that Wilson had debauched the United States. Stokes later wrote the Bishop, protesting his choice of words and defending Wilson's policies.[48] In reply to stokes, Brent said:

> No one feels more reluctant than I to register such a conviction as I expressed to you regarding the effect

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[47]Brent Diary: April 16, 1916.

[48]Anson P. Stokes to Brent: November 13, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 13.

> of President Wilson's policy. Unfortunately, I was driven to it and cannot shake myself free from it. I began with full confidence in him as a man, and as a leader, and do not question the fact that he has done good things. Napoleon did good things also, and so did Bismarck. My confidence in either of these men would not justify my support of them were they alive today. If feel just the same way about Mr. Wilson.[49]

Apparently the Bishop hoped that despite all indications to the contrary, Wilson would pursue what he regarded as a more honorable policy for the country.

Brent's attitude towards American neutrality tended to correlate with his view of President Wilson. At first the Bishop favored America's neutral course, while admitting that force was perfectly justificable as a last resort: "But I feel that there is something to be said for the position . . . that America is not called upon to be neutral when the principles which form the foundation of her Government are attacked."[50] Thus from the beginning the Bishop realized and could visualize the circumstances under which the United States would eventually feel compelled to enter the war.

Brent's main concern was for the motives behind American neutrality. "If it (American neutrality) is of a

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[49]Brent to Anson P. Stokes: November 28, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 13.

[50]Brent to Malcolm Peabody: January 20, 1915. Brent Papers, Box 58.

selfish sort the fact of our being at peace will not be of service to the nations. So far as I can see we are neutral because we hate the inconvenience rather than the wickedness of war."[51] The Bishop urged that the moral implications of neutrality be recognized.

> Neutrality may be a necessity for the State where moral issues are absent or indistinct but it is impossible for State or individual where elemental principles of justice, truth and righteousness have been ruthlessly and deliberately trampled under foot. Neutrality at all costs is as pernicious a doctrine as peace at all costs. Neutrality (is) at all times difficult. It involves that poise which is the result of a right judgment in all things.[52]

In January of 1916 news of the sinking of the Persia reached the Philippines. Brent's reaction was: "Let it be war, then; anything is better than a damnable neutrality that is afraid boldly to rebuke the crime of crucifying Belgium and the slaughter of innocents, and which only cries aloud when an American is killed."[53] The Bishop was tired of a neutrality of self-interest. America had a duty to protest against unjust aggression, and not only aggression against Americans. Brent deplored the lack of preparedness of the United States Armed Forces, a lack which he believed

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[51]Brent Diary: January 31, 1916.

[52]Brent, Notes on Neutrality. Brent Papers, Box 26.

[53]Brent to Mrs. Markoe: January 5, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 51.

responsible for the wishy-washy statements of the President and State Department. He believed that if America had by plain speaking and defense of principles provoked a declaration of war, it would have been far better than to be forced into war by the dictates of self interest. The traditional American policy of isolation and neutrality was condemned in no uncertain terms: "We have tested neutrality with all loyalty to America's traditional policy of aloofness. It has been a ghastly failure which never again can we afford to risk."[54] Thus the Bishop once again changed his views, in the light of changing circumstances. Along with many other Americans, he refused to advocate neutrality when in his opinion neutrality had become an untenable position.

In accordance with his changing beliefs, Brent signed several petitions to President Wilson in 1916 and 1917. One, entitled "A Plea for a Lasting Peace", was a protest against the peace at all costs movement. It urged that peace be accomplished with honor, and that the desire for peace might not blind people to the wrongs which Germany had committed and which must be punished.[55] Thus German outrages overcame

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[54]Brent to Mrs. Reid: January 5, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 12.

[55]For the complete text of the Petition, see copy in Brent Papers, Box 45.

Brent's horror of war. In the Bishop's opinion, it would be a greater evil to allow Germany's crimes to go unpunished than to enter the war with all its horrors. The Bishop signed other petitions also, for example, a statement urging Wilson to break off diplomatic relations with Germany and another protesting against Germany deportations of Belgians.[56]

Brent viewed Wilson's final peace drive in January, 1917 with disfavor. The Bishop realized that America was on the verge of war, and feared that the President had joined the "Peace at any price" group. But while disagreeing heartily with the President's policy, Brent did admit that he was perhaps misinterpreting Wilson's actions.[57] The Bishop continued to advocate America's entry into the war, and early in 1917 he once again took a more active part in the international situation.

In January of 1917 Brent sailed for Britain, arriving January 21. The purpose of his trip was similar to that of his 1910 visit. On the former occasion he had gone as an unofficial representative of the State Department. This time however his position was rather than of an unofficial ambassador of the American people, at least that segment of

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[56]See Brent Diary: January 3, 1917.

[57]Brent to Helen: January 4, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 13.

the American people who were openly pro-Ally. Brent himself spoke of his presence in England as a noncommissioned representative of America whose purpose was to assert the fundamental unity which joined the two countries.[58] The Bishop thus acted as an unofficial interpreter of America to England, much as he had done in 1910. And again his dual citizenship, Canadian and American, proved of inestimable value. The London Guardian perhaps summed up his mission most accurately: ". . . The work he is doing here is very much that of an unofficial Ambassador of the people of America to the people of England, and as such it is of the utmost value to both."[59] Once again Brent was acting as an apostle of unity among nations.

In a series of speeches and sermons, the Bishop attempted to describe the reaction of himself and other like-minded Americans to the events of the war and to official United States policy. And it may be added that their reaction to official American policy prior to the United States declaration of war was largely unfavorable. In most of his speeches Brent emphasized the unity between America and the

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[58]See Brent, Sermon onotes, Brent Papers, Box 29. Also text of sermon delivered on February 11, 1917, in Brent Papers, Box 54.

[59]The London Guardian, February 15, 1917, p. 1. Copy in Brent Papers, box 54.

allies. Time and again he repeated the message that England and France were fighting for America as well as for their own homelands. Whatever the attitude of official Washington, the Bishop assured his listeners, the majority of Americans were pro-Ally and were grateful to the Allies for fighting their battles. He pointed out that public opinion had always favored the Allies and that even though America was still officially neutral, Americans were even then fighting and dying in France.

Brent continued to criticize Wilson, although he did admit that the President had been subjected to great trials and therefore criticism should be tempered with sympathy.[60] But when Wilson delivered his "peace without victory" speech on January 22, the Bishop commented: "Wilson has not earned the right to preach to the nations."[61] And a few days later he added: "In the circumstances peace without victory would be as wrong as victory without peace."[62] He thus repudiated his earlier position, when he had desired that neither side win an overwhelming victory. Brent regarded Wilson's desperate attempts to achieve peace as the

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[60]Brent to C. W. Clash: January 4, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 63.

[61]Brent Diary: January 23, 1917.

[62]Ibid., January 25, 1917.

waverings of a man governed by expediency rather than principle. The Bishop had long since been converted to the "Peace with victory" viewpoint.

In February of 1917 the United States at last broke diplomatic relations with Germany, and Brent was elated. "In breaking relations with Germany the United States took the first step to redeem her honor and declared herself a defender of the human race."[63] The general reaction in England to the news of the diplomatic rupture was one of relief and enthusiasm. The Bishop reported that the British were much more favorably disposed towards the United States than previously.[64] In Brent's opinion, America was showing a new sense of unity, and he hoped that it could be maintained. He also hoped that Wilson had finally learned his lesson and would show himself to be a man of action.

On February 11, the Bishop preached a sermon on the topic of "America in Relation to the War." Brent repeated his declaration of American sympathy with Britain's struggles. The United States, he said, would fight for principles and ideals, and not out of mere expediency.

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[63]"U. S. Redeeming Honor, Bishop Brent Declares," New York Tribune Monday, February 11, 1917.

[64]Brent to Miss Holt: February 9, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 13.

> America hitherto has tried to secure honor with safety, but now she is determined to secure honor with peril. . . . It is not a case of ships; it is a case of righteousness. It may be that the diplomatic break came through some local irritation, but America is fighting with all the power of her moral life at this present moment that eventually there may be a peace with victory over the foes of the human race. (Italics mine)[65]

The Bishop went on to speak of his dream for the future, the new and better world which would emerge from the ruins of the old.

To the country at large, the rupture of diplomatic relations meant war with Germany. But President Wilson continued to try to find a way out of the corner into which he had maneuvered himself. It was during this time that Brent lost all patience with the President.

> America is halting and losing prestige. Unified for a moment she is now through our watchful, waiting President wobbling. . . . Oh, if he would only take his stand on Principle!! He is an apostle of expediency. (Italics Brent's)[66]

While Brent was preaching international unity in Britain during January and February, a movement toward church unity was underway at the Vatican. Brent, who felt ever more deeply the disunity of the Christian churches in the face of international disunity, hoped that progress could

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[65]Transcript of Brent's sermon of February 11, 1917 in Brent Papers, Box 54.

[66]Brent Diary: February 7, 1917.

be made. Perhaps this would mark the start of the movement which would ultimately join together all Christian churches and ensure the realization of the Bishop's fondest hope. The Vatican had appointed a commission on unity, and there were rumors that a similar commission might later be sent to the United States. There was also a possibility, according to rumor, that Rome would recognize the validity of Anglican orders. Brent at the time was working very closely with Anglican leaders on the World conference on Faith and Order, and the Bishpp believed that the Vatican's efforts were a direct result of their work.[67]

It was proposed that Brent go on a free-lance mission to Rome, as the representative of the Faith and Order movement. The Bishop was convinced that the Pope and others of the Catholic hierarchy were deeply disturbed by the spectable of a divided Christendom, and Brent felt sure of a sympathetic hearing from at least some of the cardinals. Brent secured a letter of introduction from Cardinal Gasquet but decided that it was an inauspicious time to push the negotiations. Apparently the possibility of America's entry into the war was what changed his mind. He had originally planned to stop in Rome on his way back to the Philippines. However after

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[67]Brent to Robert H. Gardiner: January 5, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 13. Brent Diary: January 5, 1917.

America broke diplomatic relations with Germany he decided to return instead to the United States to do his part in the war effort there.

Before returning to the United States, Brent secured permission to visit the troops on the Western front. Permission to visit the Canadian troops was granted by the British military authorities and once again the Bishop found himself in the position of Chaplain-at-Large to troops under wartime conditions He hoped that his past experience and present status would help to make his visit a productive one.

> Of course I recognize that anything I could do would be but a drop in the bucket; nevertheless I am willing to do it. My long experience with troops and my understanding of military life will come to my aid. I feel that I have some sort of a status which will give me the entree to military circles where otherwise entrance would be difficult.[68]

Brent spent almost seven weeks in France, from February 26 to April 7, again acting as an unofficial ambassador of the American people.

It was this trip which brought home to him as nothing else could have done the horrors of modern warfare. "My chief hope of permanent peace, humanly speaking, is that those best acquainted with war and its concomitants, have a single word to denominate its character--hell. It is probably the commonest

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[68]Brent to Doctor Roper: January 4, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 13.

word at the front."[69] The Bishop hoped that as more and more people realized the true nature of war, they would find a way of putting a stop to it for all time. He realized, however, that something would have to fill the vacuum left by the banishment of war. Nationalism and democracy had proven insufficient and had even contributed more to war than to peace. America seemed to him to be sunk in lethargy, satisfied with things as they were and disliking war because of its inconvenience. "Unless some vision is revealed which demands the utmost exercise of all our powers similarly to war, the future holds out little hope."[70]

The Bishop himself was destined to do his part in revealing this vision. His own postwar life would be devoted for the most part to the cause of Christian unity; we know of his belief that mankind would find unity only in Christianity. He correlated this with a new democratic ideal:

> Democracy, which in the last analysis is a principle of Christianity rather than a form of government, has hardly passed its experimental stage. Its chief victories are still to be won. France has proved that democracy can be splendid in war, and presently with other nations will demonstrate that it is the adequate foundation of the permanent peace of the world.[71]

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[69]Brent to Mrs. Davidson: April 27, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 51.

[70]Ibid.

[71]Brent, Speech delivered in Paris on March 16, 1917. Copy in Brent Papers, Box 59.

Brent always saw a connection between the spiritual and temporal worlds, between Christianity and democracy. As a result, his experiences during the war years made him ever more aware of the importance of establishing a postwar order which would be essentially Christian. Only the existence of a truly Christian world would, he believed, prevent future warfare. This would be his vision, his dream, his goal.

While in France, Brent continued to urge his homeland to take action, and he continued to castigate Wilson. France needed American men and money, and the Bishop believed that America should contribute from her vast storehouse of manpower and of material wealth. "If through further dallying of halfhearted action France should be beaten, we would merit the scorn of creation."[72] The French, according to Brent, were being very patient and understanding, but they desperately wanted American aid. However, there was wilson . . . "The President seems to have a hiatus between intellectual conviction and logical action. There is a defect somewhere in his motor area. He seems to have the grippe now so we can excuse momentary sluggishness."[73] Brent's own feeling was that Germany would be defeated by the winter of 1917, but

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[72]Brent to John W. Wood: March 29, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 63.

[73]Brent to Mrs. Davidson: March 15, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 55.

he realized that German resources and determination might prolong the war.

After a tour of the front lines, Brent gave a speech in Paris on March 16. He stressed the traditional historical friendship between France and America, and the fact that France in fighting Germany was fighting America's battles for her. The Allies, Brent admitted, had occasionally infringed upon the rights of neutrals, but these had been civil rather than criminal offenses. "If my reasoning is true, a debt of more than gratitude is due the Allies by America for having borne the burden and heat of a schorching day in behalf of her freedom and integrity."[74] The Bishop also emphasized the universality of the Allied cause, and the unity of ideals and interest between the Allies and America.

> In Breaking with Germany we have declared who are our enimies and why. Now we must declare to the world who are our friends and why. . . . The break with Germany is not a misunderstanding but an understanding.[75]

The Bishop went on to speak of the League to Enforce Peace, which would one day become the League of Nations. Brent believed that the Allied nations would have to be the nucleus of any league. The purposes of the future League would be "to prevent Nationalism from running amuck, to protect

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[74]Brent, Paris speech, Brent Papers, Box 59.

[75]Ibid.

the weak and the backward peoples of the world, and to demand of all nations great and small, East and West, the fulfillment of international duties and responsibilities."[76] Bishop Brent was more realistic in his approach to the League than was Wilson, and the bishop was naturally suspicious of Wilson's vague idealism. He saw the League as a possible instrument for the promotion of a more Christian postwar order. But he did not, as Wilson did, regard it as the only solution to the world's problems, the "parliament of man" which would usher in the millenium. Bishop Brent knew too much of human nature to take so optimistic a stand, and Wilson's uncritical acceptance of his fellow man irritated the Bishop.

Brent closed his speech with a plea for a higher and purer nationalism than that which had prevously been known. Mankind, he believed, was more important than the nation, and the nation must interpret its life and ideals in terms of the human race. Both neutralization in peace and neutrality in war were dead.[77] But the idea of nation was a heritage and a trust from the past, which must be handed on to future generations. The new nationalism could not afford to be exclusive as it had been in the past; it must be founded upon

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[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

universal service both in peace and war. This new nationalism, imbued with the spirit of Christian charity, would be the foundation of a better world.[78] Brent showed great insignt in his retention of the term "nationalism" which had such a powerful emotional appeal at the time. But the Bishop's "new nationalism" was essentially different from the old in that it was founded upon universal service and the universal values of the whole human race.

Brent returned to Britain on April 7, just one day after the United States declared war on Germany. The Bishop rejoiced in America's decision to join the struggel. Of Wilson's war message he said: "The President's Message is worthy and will hasten the end of the war. Would God it had come two years ago! I feel happier about the country than I have for many months."[79] America, he believed, was fighting for democracy, for the right of nations to govern themselves, and especially for the rights of small nations.

> Our choice was between a national peace with an ignoble motive and a fattening of our material resources out of the misfortunes and miseries of our neighbor nations holding ideals common with our own, or war with a world wide outlook and a noble motive giving free play to all

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[78] Ibid.

[79] Brent to George Wharton Pepper: April 4, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 59.

> our most generous activities even to the laying down of life.[80]

Brent rejoiced at the end of America's isolation and neutrality. He claimed that he himself had never been neutral: "Personally, I have never, after the first few days of the war, been of a neutral frame of mind."[81] "I am proud to be an american--prouder never to have been neutral."[82] And in May of 1917 he noted that for two years he had believed in intervention.[83]

This is perhaps an example of self-deception on Brent's part. He had certainly approved America's neutral course at the outset of the war, and had not desired an overwhelming Allied victory.

But his Canadian birthright had predisposed him to favor the Allied cause, and Germany's prosecution of the war had completed the task of turning him into a partisan of the Allies. There is no doubt that after the summer of 1916 Brent, while continuing to deplore the war, wholehartedly supported the Allied cause and hoped that America would join the side of the angels. Having come to embrace the Allied

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[80]Brent, Sermon notes on World War I. Brent Papers, Box 26.

[81]Brent to Sir Williams Collins: August 19, 1916. Brent Papers, Box 12.

[82]Brent in New York Tribune, February 11, 1917.

[83]Brent Diary: May 8, 1917.

position, the Bishop was irritated by Wilson's slowness in coming to the same conclusion.

Brent pointed out that ever since 1914 there had been a strong and growing minority in America who could not be neutral. The press also had favored intervention. "Sympathies and emotions could not be controlled by a command. . ."[84] Now America had finally ceased to be officially neutral. Germany's action in renewing unrestricted submarine warfare was a threat to American interests. But as the Bishop pointed out, Wilson had intimated in his war message that the offense was of worldwide bearing and called for worldwide action.[85] Other neutral nations were asked to follow suit. America's honor had been assailed, and she had taken the only honorable course left. "I should be sorry to think that America was acting from purely selfish motives. I do not think so any more than I think that the Allies are so acting. . . ."[86]

Brent realized as did the Allies that the United States declaration of war could not mean immediate military or naval aid. What it did mean was a commitment of all the resources of the nation to the Allied cause. The moral and

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[84] Brent, extracts from 1917 sermon notes. Brent Papers, Box 29.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid.

psychological effect of this commitment would be immediate, and Brent hoped it would mean a speedy end to the war. But in any event the future was uncertain. "The world is plunging into the unknown. A new social order is being born, as distinct from the past as the past was from the feudal system. . ."[87] The Bishop hoped that this new order would be the Christian world which he envisaged. But he realized whatever the outcome, it was the end of an era.

Even though Brent was pleased that Wilson had finally taken action and brought America into the war, he still was not completely satisfied with the President's performance. He asked the astute question: "Did the President educate the country up to his present position or the country the President?"[88]--a point which historians have been debating ever since. Nor was Brent pleased with what he regarded as Wilson's preference for thought over action, and the caliber of his advisors. Herbert Hoover agreed.

> Hoover, like myself, is afraid of Wilson's academic mind. He has fine thought without power of action. His political bias is too dominating. The whole Cabinet is a 'nebulous sponge'.[89]

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[87]Brent Diary: April 13, 1917.

[88]Ibid., April 7, 1917.

[89]Ibid., April 28, 1917.

Brent returned to Britain on April 7, intending to sail immediately for the United States. Having heard of the American declaration of war he was even more anxious to return home. However, the American Ambassador Walter Hines Page contacted the Bishop and asked him to represent the United States by speaking at a celebration which the British were planning. Brent cabled: "Am honored to do anything you ask in the service of the country and the cause."[90] The British designated April 20, 1917 as America Day in London, and Brent's part in the festivities consisted of delivering the sermon at St. Paul's Cathedral before the King and other notables assembled for the occasion.

The Bishop's America Day sermon was the high point of his career as an unofficial ambassador to Britain. The cathedral was jammed, and Brent was at his most eloquent for the great occasion. His theme was the war and America's part in it, and he voiced the idealism of his country. The United States, he said, had finally taken her place by the side of the Allies. America was fighting for democracy, a democracy which stood for peace and placed ballots before bullets. The object of the war was to end war. The end of democracy in isolation was at hand; democracies were now so interlocked in defense that they could not be separated. Patriotism

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[90] Ibid., April 7, 1917.

however had no right to depreciate another nation in order to exalt itself. In a ringing peroration he pleaded for Christian reunion as a necessary adjunct of world peace.[91]

Following the America Day celebration, Brent at last sailed for New York on April 21, 1917, arriving May 3. On his return he offered his services to the Red Cross and was appointed to a co-ordinating committee in connection with the Red Cross War Council. In addition to Red Cross duties, Brent was also associated with Herbert Hoover in his work of food administration. Hoover asked him to join the Food Administration permanently, but the Bishop refused as he was planning only a short stay in America before returning to the Philippines. However he continued to help Hoover unofficially. He was also involved in various efforts to give adequate moral protection to soldiers and sailors.

Many people urged the Bishop to remain in the United States indefinitely. They pointed out the value of the work he was doing and also suggested that if he remained adequate support for his Moro work would be forthcoming. Brent's response to this gentle attempt at bribery was, "I could not match myself against dollars."[92] A stronger temptation was his

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[91] Brent, America Day sermon, reproduced in the London Morning Telegraph April 21, 1917. Copy in Brent Papers, Box 44.

[92] Brent to C. W. Clash: June 12, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 14.

desire to offer his services to General Pershing and to return to France with him as Chaplain to the American troops. This of course is exactly what happened five months later, but at the time (June, 1917), Brent decided that "my duty was to go back to the philippines which I have neglected for a long time."[93]

The war situation, so Brent believed, was graver than most Americans realized. "Upon us depends the issue and it is an issue of life and death. . . . If the Allies go under, there will be little left in this world to live for."[94] But America was not even half awake, and few realized the deadly peril she was facing. This represents quite a change from the Bishop's attitude in 1914, when he had hoped that neither side would win annoverwhelming victory, when he had seen no difference between British and German militarism, and when he had believed that a German victory would not mean the death of democracy.

Although Brent preached publicly of America's idealism in entering the war, as for instance on America Day in London, his private feelings were very different.

> Men seem to think that our country is very unselfish in going into the war. All of which is bunkum. We are in it to save our national existence. France for

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[93]Brent to Mrs. Boyd: June 18, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 14.

[94]Brent to C. W. Clash: June 12, 1917.

> three years has been more truly unselfish and self-sacrificing than we are.[95]

Brent's own work was of course of a more unselfish nature; he had labored for the Church and for the nation because he believed it was his duty to do so. When he left for the Philippines on July 5, he was conscious of having done all he could for the American war effort.

> All the work I did in America with the Red Cross and all my suggestions to Mr. Hoover proved of service. Indeed had I stayed I could not have done much more. If one's plans are put into effect by others, so much the better.[96]

Brent travelled via the Pacific route and arrived on July 24 in Manila, where he was immediately caught up once again in Philippine politics as well as his neglected missionary work. The chief point at issue in the political world was the Jones Act, which had gone into effect in August of 1916. Brent hoped that the final passage of the Jones Bill would satisfy the Filipino politicians and thus prevent agitation and unrest at least for a while. The Bishop regarded the act in its final form as a "tolerably creditable product."[97] But it had three major defects--the ambiguity of

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[95]Brent to Sam Drury: May 28, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 51.

[96]Brent to Mrs. Davidson: September 7, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 51.

[97]Brent, Yale Review 6, p. 723.

the preamble, the senate's authority to veto appointments made by the governor general, and the increase of the electorate.

The first defect, Brent believed, was the worst. The preamble was ambiguous in that the second paragraph read:

> Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein;[98]

The Bishop realized that the Filipinos would construe this as a promise of immediate independence, while the Americans would interpret it to mean whatever they wished it to mean. Thus it was not only ambiguous but also insecere.

The Bishop also objected to the proviso that the Philippine senate would have the power of vetoing all appointments made by the governor general. Brent had always urged an increase in the power of the governor general, and, formerly, of the Philippine Commission as well. In previous years the governor general's office had been too subordinate to the War Department in Washington. Now it was to be subordinated to the Philippine senate also. Brent did not believe that a governor general could do his jobeeffectively under such circumstances.

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[98]Preamble of the Jones Act, quoted in Grunder and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States (Norman, Oklahoma: 1951), pp. 151-52.

Finally, Brent protested against the increase of thee Filipino electorate embodied in the Jones Act. Under the terms of the act, the franchise was extended to all men who owned 500 pesos or more of property; who paid 30 pesos or more per year in taxes; or who could read and write either English, Spanish, or a native language. The Bishop believed that it would have been wiser to restrict the electorate somewhat until the present school-age children were old enough to vote.

The future of the Philippines under the Jones Act, Brent believed, was difficult to predict. It would depend in part on the attitude and actions taken by the United States, and America, he was still convinced, should continue to remain in the Philippines at least for a while. The period of American control had been one of upprecedented peace, prosperity, and progress. America, however, could not control the isàands indefinitely. Public opinion had made this clear, and the Bishop had never believed in giving the islands a permanent territorial status. The only alternatives were incorporation and eventual statehood or training in self-government and eventual nationhood. Since there was no great sentiment either on the part of Filipinos or of Americans for statehood, eventual independence was the only

answer, but the question continued to bedevil Brent as it had for seventeen years.

The very concept of tutoring in self-government was almost unheard of in 1917. It involved developing the latent capacity of a backward dependency with the purpose of bringing it to nationhood and launching it as a new government. The difficulties involved in the experiment in the PHilippines were many. The area lay at a distance of ten thousand miles from the United States, with a widely scattered and diverse population. There was no bond of common language or customs among the various peoples of the islands. There was no native literature. And in addition to geographic and ethnographic difficulties, there were internal troubles. Many of the tribes in the outlying areas were still savage. The Mohammedan Moros hated the Christian Filipinos and their hatred was returned with interest. But despits all the difficulties, Brent had become convinced that the Filipinos could eventually launch an effective democratic government.

The Bishop sensed that a new era was dawning for colonial powers and for colonial peoples. The general trend was beginning to swing away from colonies and toward independent governments, although the full flowering of this new trend would not occur until the middle decades of the century. But Brent read the handwriting on the wall. "Every nation,

great and small, will desire and be compelled to stand on its own merits and character, manfully shouldering its responsibility."[99]

The Bishop summed up his ideas on the Philippines in an article published in the Yale Review in July, 1917. Entitled "Tutoring the Philippines", it was an exposition of his views on Philippine independence and Philippine-American relations. After reviewing the Jones Act and the current status of the islands, the Bishop went on to summarize the history of the Philippines under American rule. One of the most important steps in preparing the Philippines for self-government, Brent believed, was the co-operative method of actual government that had been adopted. He referred to the policy of Filipinization which had been carried out, at first slowly by the Republicans and then more rapidly by the Democrats. The idea of putting Filipinos into governmental positions as much as possible was a good policy, or so Brent believed. He did however emphasize the need for fitness and training on the part of the Filipinos.[100] And as we have seen he opposed the more rapid Filipinization policy

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[99] Brent, Yale Review 6, p. 726.

[100] Ibid., p. 723.

of Wilson and Harrison. But he was reluctantly compelled to admit that the results had been good.[101]

The most important feature of training the Filipinos for self-government was, in Brent's estimation, the introduction of American education into the islands.[102] Free education was a necessity in a democratic government; the schoolhouse was the symbol of democracy. Progress in education was a good barometer of progress in self-government, Brent believed, and education was more important even than the franchise.[103] In the Philippines, America had done a remarkable job of introducing democracy through the public school system. The Philippine schools represented "the direct application of democracy to the life of the child."[104]

Brent's Yale Review article attracted a good deal of attention, and many Americans were disposed to support the views he expressed. Others however favored a more rapid approach to independence than the Bishop was willing to accept. Brent still found himself unable to agree with the idea of immediate independence for the islands. To him it remained fraught with dangers to the Filipinos.

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[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid., p. 721.

[103] Ibid., p. 720.

[104] Ibid.

> A nascent state moving up slowly toward independence, with no true aspiration for liberty slighted by the superintending country, will give to the individual his unalienable rights as defined by the American constitution to a degree impossible to be given by a republic prematurely born. Such republics have come to the birth, but have been so far from being a light to the nations as to become a thorn in their side, and have never risen high enough to be anything but a nuisance to themselves.[105]

Between the time of Brent's return to Manila in July of 1917 and his final departure from the islands in October, he devoted himself almost entirely to his missionary work. Although he did not make up his mind to leave the islands until the beginning of October, he realized throughout the summer of 1917 that his period of service in the Philippines was drawing to a close. The character of his missionary work had altered radically, for after the passage of the Jones Act the United States army had been withdrawn from the islands and most of the American governmental personnel had left also. Thus much of what Brent regarded as his foremost missionary duty had either disappeared or dwindled. In particular, his cathedral congreation had shrunk drastically. The Bishop was convinced that the relationship between the United States and the Philippines was drawing to a close, and he had no desire to stay on in the

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[105]Brent, Central Methodist Church Address, Brent Papers, Box 57.

islands after the Americans left. He accordingly began to put his episcopal affairs in order for his successor.

In his fourteenth Annual Report, Brent reviewed the status of his missionary work in Manila and elsewhere as of the summer of 1917. In Manila, the Columbia Club and St. Luke's Hospital continued to prosper. The orphanage was also continuing to prove itself a valuable institution; its work was chiefly devoted to children of mixed Filipino-American parentage. The problem of these mestizo children, the Bishop noted, was becoming increasingly urgent.[106] Student dormitories in connection with the newly-founded University of Manila had been established by Brent. Both a girls' and a boys' dormitory were in operation, staffed by volunteers. While approving of the introduction of American education into the islands, the Bishop feared possible bad effects of secular education on the Filipinos. Used as they were to rigid separation of the sexes in church schools, the Filipino students when exposed to coeducation tended to abuse their new privileges of association. To counter-act the lowering of morals, and also to combat a housing shortage at the university, Brent founded his student dormitories.

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[106]Brent, Fourteenth Annual Report. Brent Papers, Box 34, p. 6.

Brent's schools for American boys and girls in Baguio and Manila had experienced a sharp drop in enrollment when the American personnel began to leave the islands. The Bishop noted that, since the church played no part in their financing, those Americans who remained in the Philippines must continue to support the schools if they were to survive.[107] The Cathedral School for Girls did in fact close when Brent left the Philippines, but the boys' school at Baguio lasted until 1942. The departure of American personnel affected Brent's work in other ways also. He reported that the American communities scattered throughout the islands had disappeared; most American personnel had congregated in the area of Manila.[108] This meant less travelling for the Bishop, and more time to devote to other projects, but it also served to emphasize the attenuation of his episcopate.

The work among the pagan tribes continued to be very rewarding. Brent reported that Bontoc was finally beginning to show the results of fourteen years of work. Many former pupils of the missionaries were well-known members of their tribes, respected by their fellow-tribesmen.[109] At Sagada,

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[107] Ibid., p. 7.

[108] Ibid., p. 8.

[109] Ibid., p. 21.

a new group of workers had arrived and the mission was doing well. On the subject of the Catholic Church, Brent urged that missionaries should avoid doctrinal hair-splitting.[110] Instead of emphasizing differences between themselves and the Catholics, they should emphasize the similarities. The Bishop admitted his lack of success in proselytizing:

> It is in connection with this particular feature of the work (proselytizing among the nominal Catholics) that I have not been successful. I could not from conviction undertake or promote that attack on the Roman Catholic Church which, directly or indirectly, seems to be necessary for success. The raising of altar against altar is a process of which I am temperamentally incapable.[111]

To the end, the Bishop preached co-operation rather than conflict among missionaries of the various Christian churches.

Brent was perhaps most proud of his work among the Moros, and this venture was indeed one of the most enduring of all his missionary labors. By 1917 the Zamboanga hospital had thirty beds and was partially self-sustaining. The Bishop emphasized that it was the first hospital in the islands established with direct reference to Moro needs.[112] The hospital however was ministering to Filipinos, Chinese, Japanese, and Americans as well as Moros. The Bishop had also succeeded in

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[110] Ibid., p. 15.

[111] Ibid., p. 9.

[112] Brent to Dr. Pritchett: May 18, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 13.

establishing a Moro Press at Zamboanga which published a paper in Arabic script. The paper, Brent reported, was widely read and exerted a good influence.[113]

The other institution in the Moro country, the agricultural school at Jolo, had been in operation for a year and a half by the summer of 1917 and had become a center of good will. The bishop hoped to establish a stable self-supporting community of intensive farmers around the school. To some extent this did occur in later years. Brent's plan to establish a hospital ship for the Moro areas was not so successful; funds were not forthcoming and the project was dropped when he left the islands.

By September of 1917 Brent realized that his work in the Philippines was almost over. Many reasons impelled him to this conclusion. One of the most immediate was the state of his health. He had apparently as early as 1915 become subject to mild heart attacks; there are several references to such attacks in his diary during this period. His doctor in Manila warned him that if he stayed in the tropics he would not live long.

Brent was also discouraged over the political situation in the islands. He had seen the relationship between

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[113] Ibid.

the Philippines and the United States dwindle almost to the vanishing point following the implementation of the Jones Act. He continued to feel that the Filipinos were not ready for immediate independence, but this was apparently what was in store.

> I am convinced that so far as the development of the Philippines is concerned the U. S. is now in no position to benefit the Filipinos by continuing an attenuated relationship with them. . . . I am inclined to think that the sooner we cut loose entirely and clear out, bag and baggage, the sooner the Filipinos will learn the painful lesson that is waiting for them and which is the only salutary thing in sight.[114]

Thus Brent, who had never favored immediate independence, was driven to support it as the only logical outcome of the policy of the United States.

But the Bishop believed that, whether the islands became independent or not, his work there was done. He was having trouble raising money for the Moro School, and the church showed no intention of contributing funds in aid of this or any other of his plans for the islands. But the main reason for his decision to leave the islands was, as Brent himself said, "I began to think that perhaps another mind and hand could do better than my one."[115] Bishop Brent had

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[114]Brent to Forbes: October 7, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 63.

[115]Brent to Leonard Wood: November 6, 1924. Brent Papers, Box 53.

always been out of step with his contemporaries in the mission fields. Actually a man ahead of his time, particularly in his ecumenical outlook, he was regarded as backward by the church authorities of his day. And he had no heart, as he said, for inaugurating a new policy. "New conditions are arising and a new head and hand will do better than mine the task of readjustment."[116]

And so the Bishop decided that his days of usefulness in the Philippines were over. It was primarily the Jones Act and its results which impelled him to this decision, but the upheavals and changes brought about by the war had also played a part. The war had changed the Bishop's plans and way of life, but it had changed his thinking still more. In his life as in the course of history it served as a watershed, cutting off the future from all that had gone before.

But though Brent was to leave the islands with a sense of discouragement, almost of failure, his work had been found and the best of it would endure. The hopsital, the Moro work, the Baguio school would all continue to prosper. The Bishop also left behind an incalculable heritage of goodwill. He was beloved by his American parishoners, respected by many

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[116]Brent to Father Staunton: October 11, 1917. Brent Papers, Box 51.

Philipinos, and revered by the Pagan and Mohammedan tribes among whom he had labored. By his own work and example, he had contributed to the building of a homogeneus Philippine nation.

The Bishop had also made other, more tangible contributions to the future Philippine state. His advice for years had helped to guide the American administrators in the islands. He had seen his suggestions for a new Moro policy put into effect, And in many subtle ways he had helped mould American colonial policy in the Philippines. As he expressed it:

> When I feel discouraged I get comfort from the fact that in many ways I have been able to exert influence to mould policies, and contribute to the well-being of the whole situation in the PHilippine Islands. These things are known only to the powers that be and to God. That is all that matters.[117]

Bishop Brent occupied a uniqu e position in his dual role as the official representative of the Episcopal Church and the unofficial advisor of many members of the Philippine government. He succeeded many times in bridging the gap between intellectual theory and officialdom, between abstract policy and concrete practice. Perhaps his most conspicuous success in this endeavor was the new Moro policy which he caused to be put into practice.

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[117]Brent to Mrs. Reid: Easter Eve, 1914.

The Bishop also acted as a bridge between two widely disparate fields--religion and politics. Many churcmen have attempted to enter the political arena, and have usually been less than entirely successful. Brent proved equal to the task. He sacrificed none of his religious principles and ideals, but his pragmatic outlook and hard common sense won him the respect of politicians. His is an almost unique example of the missionary spirit on the policy-making level. Of course, the era in which he lived contributed to his success. It was an age of enthusiasm and zeal, in the political sphere as well as the religious. It was an age of humanitarianism, and Brent kept faith with it.

It was also an age of paternalism, and the Bihsop displayed manyoof its characteristics. He went out to the PHilippines convinced of the rightness of American rule in the islands. This is the A Priori viewpoint of which his biographer, Remsen Ogilby, speaks. But having wholeheartedly accepted the original premise, Brent brought his logic and common sense to bear on the specific problems connected with American government of the Philippines. He refused to endorse blindly all the particulars of that government; he became a critic, at times an outspoken critic, of many administration policies. For example, his article in Outlook protesting the existing tariff policy was vituperative.

Thus in the Bishop's mental processes pragmatism blended strangely with a predetermined viewpoint. His pragmatism was one of his greatest assets; it kept him from falling into doctrinnaire rigidity, either religious or political. Brent was always willing to seek out additional information, and when it proved his conclusions wrong, he was always willing to admit the mistake and changehis mind. But he never lost his original conviction that American rule was the best government for the Filipinos, at least until they were able, in his opinion, to govern themselves. It was this conviction which the Filipinos, understandably enough, resented. In their opinion, they were already able to govern themselves. But history has tended to prove the Bishop right. It is impossible to say what would have happened to a Philippine state given independence, say, in 1913. But the Philippine state which emerged in 1946 has proven itself a viable entity. It is however a credit to the Bhsiop's sense of fairness and also to his personal charm that by the time he left the Islands in 1917 he was admired and respected by many of the Filipinos.

As time went on, Bishop Brent's impact began to reach out beyond the confines of the Philippines. In America his name became ever more well known as his articles reached

increasing numbers of people. Many Americans had the chance to see and hear him personally as he traveled around the country on several occasions raising money for his Philippine missions and discussing the religious and political problems of the day. It is impossible to determine just how much he influenced American public opinion, as for instance when he privately campaigned against Wilson in 1916. But judging from the amount of space which the newspapers gave him upon occasion, it would seem that his influence was considerable.

The opium problem proved to be the crucial issue which lifted the Bishop out of his island see and placed him in a position of world-wide prominence. It is interesting to speculate on Brent's place in history had there been no opium problem in the Far East at that time. Such speculation is, of course, useless, but it seems safe to say that, given the Bishop's crusading nature, he would have found another cause to champion. Whether it would have won him equal reknown is impossible to say.

Brent's concern with opium began in 1903 with the problem in the Philippines. In the course of his travels with the Opium Investigating Committee, the Bishop made his name known throughout the Far East. But the real turning point came in 1906 when Brent wrote to Roosevelt, suggesting

an international conference to study the opium problem. From that time on, a major part of the Bishop's energies was devoted to the elimination of the opium evil on a world-wide basis. And from the time of the Shanghai meeting until the day of his death, Brent was an important figure on the international stage.

Thus his impact grew--from local to national to international. He remained an important figure on each level, but it may be argued that his greatest contribution was at the international level. Again we see an example of the missionary spirit active in the political and diplomatic sphere. Again the Bishop bridged the gap between theory and practice, between religion and politics. He breathed life into the concept of international moral duty and made its practice feasible. This was perhaps his greatest achievement. But we must not let this obscure his other attainments. In the Philippines he helped to build a homogeneous nation; in America he had an immeasurable influence on both the public and the policy-makers; in his opium work he gave the world a sense of moral community.

It may be argued that Brent as a cleric could more easily take stands on moral issues, such as the opium evil, than the statesmen could. This is true as far as it goes;

the statesmen of the day were hampered by other considerations which did not touch the Bishop. But the fact remains that, while many churchmen spoke out against the evils of opium, Brent was the man who inaugurated the program which eventually curbed that evil. His unique talen lay, not in is viewpoint which was shared by many of his contemporaries, but in his ability to implement his beliefs on the international level.

In one respect, however, Bishop Brent's viewpoint was unique. This was his dream of worldwide Christian unity, and it was more important to him than even a solution to the opium problem. Here he displayed the visionary rather than the pragmatic side of his nature. It was the consuming passion of his later life, and he lived to see the foundation laid at the international religious conference at Lausanne in 1927. But all of this occurred long after he left the Philippines. He was still there on September 30, 1917, when he received an urgent cable from the Y. M. C. A. in Paris asking him to go to France as a Chaplain to the troops of the American Expeditionary Force. Thenon October 6 he received a cable informing him of his election as Bishop of the diocese of Western New York. Brent immediately cabled his willingness to go to France, realizing that General Pershing had engineered the cable from the Y. M. C. A. and believing that he

could be of real service there.[118] The Bishop then explained the situation to the Church authorities in Western New York. He asked whether it would be possible to accept the post and still go to France. It was agreed that he would not begin his episcopal duties in Western New York until after his return from France. Brent then formally accepted his election to the New York dioceses.

It is not surprising that Bishop Brent was eager to go to France and believed that he could best help the Allies there. In the Philippines he had acquired a great deal of experience in dealing with army personnel. "The problems before the Bishop of assigning to service and controlling chaplains of our forces in France was just what he had been doing for years in the Islands."[119] Since the army had always been a major part of his responsibility, it was logical that the Bishop should desire to continue his close association with the military. His trip to the Western front earlier in the year had reinforced this desire, and the outcome was his acceptance of Pershing's offer.

But despite his desire to go to France, Brent shrank from leaving the Philippines. "The Philippines can never be

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[118]Brent to Father Staunton: October 11, 1917.

[119]Ogilby Manuscript, "Doctors", p. 5.

anything to me but a beloved spot. They contain the best effort and the truest motives of my lifetime."[120] But, convinced of the necessity for leaving, he sailed from Manila on October 17, 1917. His friends in the islands were grieved over his departure for they knew he would not return. And this was indeed the final goodbye. Bishop Brent would not pass that way again.

When the Bishop returned from France in 1919 he divided his time between the diocese of Western New York and further opium work for the League of Nations. But the real passion of his later life was his work in the field of church unity. Bishop Brent lived to preside over the first ecumenical World Conference on Faith and Ofder in Lausanne in 1927. And it was in the same city, en route to the Mediterranean, that he died of a heart attack on March 27, 1929.

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[120]Brent to Father Staunton: October 11, 1917.

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